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JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000
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

The president's power, checked and balanced throughout U.S. history, has now eroded to dangerous levels.

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The Bullied Pulpit

A Weak Chief Executive Makes Worse Foreign Policy

Sebastian Mallaby

The Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) last October has been called a disaster for arms control, a triumph for American security, a humiliation for the Clinton administration, and an embarrassment for congressional Republicans. But these various and contradictory perspectives miss something important, as do most discussions of the failings of U.S. foreign policy: the structural crisis to which the nation has succumbed.

During the past decade of post–Cold War drift, American foreign policy has been assailed by two camps of critics. The first makes ad hominem attacks: America's diplomatic failings reflect a lack of leadership from Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, or congressional Republicans. The second camp is cultural and holds that America is either too isolationist to pursue international goals in a sustained way or too riven by multiculturalism to manage a foreign policy consensus. Both camps miss the point. The central problem of American foreign policy is neither personal nor cultural; it is institutional. Executive power, checked and balanced since the early days of the republic, has been eroded dangerously, to the point where even a skilled president would be hard-pressed to push treaties through the Senate. Indeed, the decline of executive power has proceeded so far that the modern president is more nonexecutive chairperson than CEO—even though the uncertainties of the post–Cold War world make an agenda-setting chief executive as necessary as ever.

DECLINE AND FALL

The erosion of presidential power started with changes in the nature of the bully pulpit. After Theodore Roosevelt popularized this phrase at the turn of the last century, technological advance steadily increased the president's power to win popular backing: radio allowed F.D.R. to deliver his fireside chats; network TV let J.F.K. charm the nation. And cheap air transport gave presidents a way to appear before hitherto inaccessible audiences. Between 1945 and 1975, the number of presidential speeches increased nearly fivefold. Moreover, the power of these speeches was enhanced

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by another technological advance: in 1952 Eisenhower's campaign managers broke new ground when they began using polls to determine which issues most concerned Americans.

Since the 1980s, however, this process has flipped into reverse: technological advances now undermine the bully pulpit rather than amplify it. The rise of cable TV has changed television from a presidential megaphone into a presidential scourge. The three big networks—ABC, CBS, and NBC—which once carried all presidential press conferences live, and which reported respectfully on initiatives emanating from the White House, have been displaced by new cable channels that compete for viewers by eschewing such deference. Rather than televise the president, these cable channels churn out irreverent talk shows. The bully pulpit has been drowned out by bullying pundits.

This shift emerged during Reagan's second term, when the "great communicator" himself became the first president to be refused a request to have a speech televised. But the trend has advanced by leaps and bounds since then, as cable has spread to around two out of three households (up from one in two in the late 1980s) and as the early cable programs have come under pressure from even more irreverent competitors on new channels and on the Internet. The bully pulpit's reach has been reduced to brief sound bites on the evening news, and even these are diminishing. A study of presidential campaigns found that the length of candidates' broadcast quotations declined from 43 seconds in 1968 to 7 seconds by early 1996.

Just as television first built up the bully pulpit and then tore it down, so have opinion polls. In the early postwar years, when Eisenhower's sophisticated advisers started poll-testing the president's speeches, this new science served as a boost to executive power. The president alone spoke on behalf of the whole nation, since no other politician could boast a national mandate and few others had access to such data. But the president's critics have long since begun to use polls themselves, and the media now delight in announcing opinion surveys that suggest the president is out of step with voters. Now anyone with poll data can claim democratic legitimacy for an idea. The president no longer speaks for the country because the country speaks continually to pollsters.

Bill Clinton has fought these trends with much determination. He has hired strategists to read the polls and teams of spin doctors to manufacture sound bites that appeal to TV producers. He has gained attention for his ideas by staging press conferences in telegenic locations, as when he signed a conservation order at a desk on the edge of the Grand Canyon in 1996. The president even appeared on the pop-music channel MTV in order to get his message out. But none of this ingenuity has quelled the growing volume of comment from pundits. Nor has it reversed the decline in the president's influence over the news agenda. Indeed, by appearing in informal settings and relying on slick sound bites, Clinton has arguably devalued the presidential coin and reduced the bully pulpit's usefulness in selling controversial policies.

During the Korean War, no journalist quoted Eisenhower without first gaining his express permission. During the recent Kosovo crisis, by contrast, television pundits trashed Clinton's policies at every opportunity. When Nixon performed a U-turn

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on China, the country was persuaded to follow his lead. Today Clinton can barely mention China without summoning the full wrath of the punditocracy. A host of vociferous interest groups, wielding polls and other data with a dexterity impossible before the advent of the Internet, has sprung up to fuel the media's second-guessing of the president's foreign policy.

DIVIDE AND MISRULE

On top of the decline of the bully pulpit, the presidency has been weakened by the entrenchment of divided government. In the first half of this century, the president's party controlled both chambers of Congress 85 percent of the time. Since 1955, however, this pattern has held only one-third of the time. As divided government has become the norm, Congress has grown increasingly adept at obstructing executive-branch initiatives. This tendency was much remarked on in the 1970s, when Congress passed the War Powers Act. But like cable TV, congressional obstructionism reached new extremes during the 1990s.

The defeat of the CTBT is only the latest example. Congress' appetite for thwarting the executive branch has been painfully evident for some time in the confirmation battles over presidential appointees. Well-qualified nominees have been rejected for reasons ranging from personal resentment to sexual orientation. In 1997, the nomination of former Massachusetts Governor William Weld as ambassador to Mexico was blocked by Jesse Helms, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, despite the fact that a majority on the committee supported confirmation. James Hormel, nominated as ambassador to Luxembourg, was denied confirmation by senators who disliked his homosexuality. Richard Holbrooke, who had on three previous occasions been unanimously confirmed by the Senate, recently spent more than a year waiting to take up his post as U.N. representative. Thanks to the Senate's obstructionism, as many as one in four appointed positions in the Clinton administration has stood vacant at the same time, filled temporarily by an "acting ambassador," "acting secretary," or "acting deputy secretary." This has led G. Calvin Mackenzie (a historian at Colby College) to remark that "there sometimes seem to be more acting positions in Washington than in Hollywood."

Congress now obstructs administration policy in other ways it once disdained. The CTBT was the first far-reaching international agreement to be voted down since before World War II, although the Senate's diminished deference to the president's treaty-making authority had become evident earlier, in the struggle to get the North American Free Trade Agreement passed and in Congress' refusal to renew the president's "fast-track" trade-negotiating power. Meanwhile Congress has grown increasingly inclined to tie the executive's hands by passing sanctions that fix the outlines of U.S. foreign policy, thus eroding the presidential prerogative. It has inserted itself into issues such as the drug war by requiring that the administration certify progress toward goals Congress has laid down in law. Under Helms, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has demanded a say not only on matters such as Balkans policy and arms control, but also on the structure of executive-branch agencies. At one point in 1996, Helms held up 15 ambassadorial nominations until he got his way in restructuring the U.S. Agency for International

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CORBIS-BETTMANN

Commanding the airwaves in the good old days: J.F.K. speaks to the nation, October 1962

Development (USAID). For a while, too, the Senate refused to pay the country's U.N. dues until the administration promised to remake that institution in Helms' image.

The struggle over U.N. dues points to a further problem: not only is Congress today controlled by a party hostile to the president, but the parties themselves are increasingly losing their cohesion. In the 1980s, if the president negotiated an agreement with congressional leaders, he expected it to stick. This can no longer be taken for granted. The Clinton administration made a deal with Helms on U.N. payments in 1997, but the agreement was delayed by anti-abortion activists in the House who have no respect for the handiwork of their fellow Republicans in the Senate. Other presidential systems, notably that of France, reduce the problem of cohabitation with the device of a strong prime minister, which gives the president a single legislative counterpart to deal with. As party cohesion weakens in Congress, the American system travels steadily away from the French model.

Finally, faced with a hostile media and a hostile Congress, the American president also has to contend with a newly hostile legal system. Legal attacks on the president and other executive officials used to be rare; in 1970, fewer than 100 public officials

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were objects of federal indictments. During the Clinton presidency, according to Department of Justice figures, more than 1,000 have been charged each year. Not all these indictments have been of presidential aides; they have also included members of Congress, federal judges, and state officials. The recent expiration of the independent-counsel statute may afford the president's circle some relief from prosecutorial attack. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's 1997 ruling in the Paula Jones case has cleared the way for private suits against sitting presidents.

NONEXECUTIVE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

A cutthroat legal culture, an obstructionist Congress, relentless media criticism, and endless polls—all have combined to weaken the executive's ability to lead, on domestic as well as on foreign issues. A president distracted by lawsuits will not focus on policymaking. A staff filled with temporary appointees will coast along rather than take strong initiatives. An administration that lives in fear of negative polls and "gotcha" television shows is bound to be cautious. Time and again, foreign policy analysts call on the president to show more leadership: to make the case for freer trade or U.N. dues, to explain that air power alone cannot be counted on to win the next war, or to enunciate a doctrine of intervention and then stick to it. And yet, hemmed in from all sides, the modern presidency is more equipped to follow than to lead. If it senses stiff opposition on any issue, it capitulates preemptively. America has arrived in the era of the nonexecutive presidency.

There are, to be sure, respectable objections to this conclusion. All modern democracies must contend with implacable media fueled by Internet-savvy pressure groups. Why should it be especially difficult for Washington? The answer is that, although other governments may face aggressive media, few at the same time face the checks and balances the U.S. Constitution places on the executive branch. Only in modern America must a head of state contend with both problems simultaneously.

Another objection involves a comparison with the country's past. In the nineteenth century, the president also faced an assertive Congress and a hostile press. In the 1860s Charles Sumner, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, anticipated Jesse Helms by routinely blocking administration policies. In 1891, the British observer James Bryce wrote that "the expression of the president's wishes conveyed in a message has not necessarily any more effect on Congress than an article in a prominent party newspaper." The historical comparison is fair, but only up to a point. Today's presidency is not unprecedented in its weakness, and indeed is stronger than it was before depression and world war prompted a vast expansion in the federal budget and bureaucracy. But the current period is the first in which a nonexecutive presidency has coincided with superpower status. In the nineteenth century, the weakness of the executive hobbled American diplomacy. But in those days no one expected the United States to hold the international system together.

MORE KOSOVO CONUNDRUMS?

Finally, some will object that the weakness of the presidency as an institution is not the main explanation for the inadequacies of American diplomacy, even if it is a secondary one. The ad hominem

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school of thought argues instead that Bill Clinton and his advisers have simply been incompetent. Others make various sociological claims that isolationism or multiculturalism lies at the root of America's diplomatic troubles.

All of these arguments may have merit. But the evidence cited by both camps can be better explained by the structural weakness of the presidency. Take, for example, one celebrated error: President Clinton's declaration at the start of the Kosovo war that the Serbs need not fear NATO ground troops. This announcement almost certainly cost lives by encouraging the Serbs to believe that America was not serious about stopping ethnic cleansing. The ad hominem school sees in this example proof of Clinton's incompetence; the sociological school sees in it proof of isolationist pressure, which made the option of ground troops untenable.

But a third explanation, offered privately by a top architect of the Kosovo policy, is more plausible. According to this official, the president knew that pundits and Congress would criticize whichever policy he chose. Clinton therefore preemptively took ground troops off the table, aware that his critics would then urge him on to a ground war—and also aware that these urgings would convince Belgrade that Washington's resolve would stiffen with time, rather than weaken. The president's stand against ground troops was therefore the logical, tactical move of a leader feeling vulnerable to his critics.

Other failings of American diplomacy can likewise be accounted for by the advent of the nonexecutive presidency. Several commentators, notably Samuel Huntington and Garry Wills in these pages, have attacked the arrogance of America's presumption to offer moral leadership to the world. But American leaders resort to moral rhetoric largely out of weakness. They fear that their policy will be blocked unless they generate moral momentum powerful enough to overcome domestic opponents. Likewise, critics point to the hypocrisy of the United States on the world stage. America seeks U.N. endorsement when convenient but is slow to pay its U.N. dues; America practices legal abortion at home but denies funds to organizations that do the same abroad. Again, this hypocrisy has everything to do with the weak executive. The president has a favored policy but is powerless to make Congress follow it. Still other critics decry American diplomacy as a rag-bag of narrow agendas: Boeing lobbies for China trade while Cuban-Americans demand sanctions on Cuba. Here, too, presidential power is the issue. A strong presidency might see to it that America pursues its broader national interest, but a weak one cannot. This is why Clinton signed the Helms-Burton sanctions on Cuba even though he knew that these would do disproportionate harm to U.S. relations with Canada and Europe.

What if America's nonexecutive presidency is indeed at the root of its diplomatic inadequacy? First, it follows that it is too optimistic to blame America's foreign policy drift on the weak character of the current president. The institution of the presidency itself is weak, and we would be unwise to assume that a President Gore or Bradley or Bush will perform much better. But it also follows that it is too pessimistic to blame America's foreign policy drift on cultural forces that nobody can change, such as isolationism or multiculturalism.

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We are dealing with an institutional problem, so it will take institutional reform to improve matters. America must explore ways of arresting the erosion of executive power, by streamlining the confirmation process, by reversing the Supreme Court's *Clinton* v. *Jones* decision in order to limit the executive's vulnerability to legal assault, and by avoiding legislated mandates in foreign policy. Since the republic's founding, Americans have been suspicious of concentrated power. This suspicion has now gone too far. There are worse things to fear than a powerful president—such as a country or a world adrift. This big nation and the small world it inhabits desperately need a strong chief executive to guide them.

Economics

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States' Rights and Foreign Policy

Some Things Should Be Left to Washington

Brannon P. Denning and Jack H. McCall

In the waning days of apartheid, South Africa found itself the subject of sanctions imposed not only by Congress but by a number of U.S. states and municipalities as well. These measures ranged from requirements that the state or city in question rid itself of holdings in South Africa or in companies doing business there to requirements that corporations bidding for government contracts likewise divest. Although the apartheid regime sought to challenge some of these laws, little litigation resulted, in part because few lawyers wished to associate themselves with such a loathsome government.

Local sanctions were not unprecedented. Decades earlier, in the 1960s, U.S. states had occasionally forbidden government purchases from communist countries or required that most state materials be bought domestically. In the 1980s, at the same time as the apartheid battle, some cities declared themselves "nuclear-free zones" and sought to keep nuclear waste or atomic weapons outside city limits. Again, although the constitutionality of such ordinances was questioned, few court challenges were brought. As with the anti-apartheid sanctions, no case made it to the Supreme Court.

In the early 1990s, as first the Cold War and then apartheid ended, so did state and local forays into foreign policy. But today this subfederal assertiveness is back with a vengeance. China, Burma (Myanmar), Nigeria, North Korea, Cuba, and Switzerland have found themselves targeted by state and local sanctions adopted in the face of strong State Department criticism. This time, however, the actual subjects of the sanctions—mainly American companies faced with the Hobson's choice of abandoning overseas markets or losing lucrative government contracts—are challenging the statutes in court. And they are winning. One such case is about to be heard by the Supreme Court, and the outcome there should be

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similar. Local sanctions are being struck down, as well they should. Despite their laudable motives, such laws are not only bad policy—they are unconstitutional.

LETTER OF THE LAW

In *National Foreign Trade Council* v. *Natsios,* decided in June 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit struck down a Massachusetts statute that banned companies with direct or indirect business interests in Burma from competing for state contracts. The statute's terms were so broad that if a company owned a subsidiary in Burma, the parent company would be deemed to be "doing business with Burma" and be prohibited from bidding on contracts to supply goods to Massachusetts—even if the subsidiary was in a completely different line of business.

A federal district court had first struck down the statute in November 1998, ruling it an impermissible encroachment on the federal prerogative to conduct foreign affairs. The decision reminded states that federalism is a two-way street: just as the states have spheres in which the federal government may not intrude, Washington is supreme in the areas assigned to it by the Constitution. "State interests," the district judge wrote, "no matter how noble, do not trump the federal government's exclusive foreign affairs power."

When its turn came, the court of appeals went even further. It found that in addition to transgressing the Constitution's structural boundaries, the statute discriminated against foreign commerce, which states are forbidden to do. The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate foreign trade; courts have long inferred from that grant limitations on a state's power to discriminate in this area. (The very purpose for giving this power to Washington had been to end the conflicting state commercial policies that plagued the country under the Articles of Confederation.) The appeals court rejected Massachusetts' argument that it had a right not to support, directly or indirectly, regimes whose human rights records it found objectionable. Laudable humanitarian aims, the court held, did not license states to violate the Constitution.

Finally, the court found Massachusetts' approach contrary to the sanctions that Congress itself had adopted. According to the Constitution, federal laws are supreme; state laws expressly or implicitly in conflict with those of Congress must give way. Sometimes Congress explicitly declares an intent to preempt similar state laws. More frequently, Congress remains silent, and courts must determine whether there is any room for the states to supplement congressional action or whether such supplements would conflict with the intended congressional scheme. In *Natsios,* the court concluded that although the goals of the federal and state legislation regarding Burma were similar, the state sanctions conflicted with those of Congress and could not stand.

The appeals court offered Massachusetts the following consolation: "The passage of the Massachusetts Burma Law has resulted in significant attention being brought to the Burmese government's human rights record. Indeed, it may be that the Massachusetts law was a catalyst for federal action." The court also noted the role that Massachusetts' congressional representatives played in crafting a federal response. "Nonetheless," it concluded, "the conduct of this nation's foreign affairs can-

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not be effectively managed on behalf of all of the nation's citizens if each of the many state and local governments pursues its own foreign policy."

The First Circuit's decision is binding precedent only in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico, and Massachusetts has appealed it to the U.S. Supreme Court, which has yet to hear the case. Meanwhile, 29 other state and local governments outside the First Circuit have passed or proposed 42 similar sanctions. Passage of 15 other such laws was attempted but has failed in 13 states or municipalities so far. Although no new statutes or ordinances have been passed since the *Natsios* decision—even in the wake of recent crises in East Timor and Pakistan, which might otherwise have provoked them—proponents of local sanctions beyond the jurisdiction of the First Circuit, vowing to fight for the right to dictate foreign policy, have refused to repeal existing laws or suspend their operation.

DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR

What has so emboldened cities and states? Two factors stand out: the increased role for the states brought on by globalization, and the rise of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly those promoting human rights worldwide. The latter have succeeded in replacing the classical view of international relations and international law as high-level affairs conducted among elite policymakers with one in which grassroots organizations now reach millions worldwide through the Internet and the fax machine. An American-led NGO was largely responsible for the drafting and adoption of the recent treaty banning land mines, despite the opposition of the U.S. government—a result unthinkable 25 or 30 years ago. Policy entrepreneurship among NGOs out to abolish the death penalty has driven recent challenges to death sentences imposed on non-U.S. citizens, on grounds that they were arrested and held in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (which guarantees detainees in foreign countries the right to contact their consulates). Similarly, NGOs have furnished much of the impetus for the state and local sanctions.

Meanwhile, state policymakers have been emboldened to play a more active role in foreign affairs, once thought to be the exclusive province of the federal government. And why not? After all, states compete for foreign business, many states with large urban centers host foreign consulates, and some contain large numbers of resident aliens or recent immigrants who retain close ties to their homelands. Given the new realities of international relations, defenders of the sanctions claim, state and local governments should take the lead in combating international human rights abuses. Their taxpayers, they add, should not be asked to support repressive regimes or the companies that do business with them.

Little direction in the devolution debate has come from the federal executive branch, and state and local governments have interpreted this silence as tacit approval. Apparent state disregard for the Vienna consular convention was motivated not so much by indifference to international agreements as by ignorance; the State Department, until recently, made little effort to educate state and local law enforcement agencies about their responsibilities under the convention. Likewise, although

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the State Department made its opposition to some local sanctions known, the Clinton administration did not file a brief in *Natsios*, apparently fearful of offending human rights activists and sanctions' congressional supporters.

TALKING 'BOUT THE CONSTITUTION

Subfederal sanctions have a visceral appeal, particularly given the horrible human rights records of targets such as Burma. Sanctions have even captured the hearts and minds of those holding wildly divergent political views: anticommunist conservatives cherish them as tools to use against nations like Cuba and China, while liberals and human rights activists invoke them to bash regimes like Indonesia's. Yet despite their peculiar transideological charm, local sanctions represent an attempt by states to co-opt the power to set foreign policy—a power that the Constitution, as the courts have long recognized, quite clearly allocates to Washington.

Articles I and II of the Constitution place primacy for the conduct of foreign and military affairs squarely with Congress and the president. The regulation and taxation of foreign commerce, immigration, declarations of war, the appointment and reception of ambassadors, the definition and punishment of offenses against international law, the command of U.S. military forces, the negotiation and approval of treaties—all are left to the federal government. The federal, not the state, judiciary hears cases involving ambassadors, consuls, public ministers, and controversies involving states and foreign countries, citizens, or subjects. Moreover, states are expressly forbidden by Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution from entering into treaties, alliances, agreements, or compacts with foreign powers; from making war; and from laying certain taxes on foreign commerce without congressional consent.

It is hardly credible to look at the Constitution's assignment of power and its proscriptions on state involvement in foreign affairs and to argue that, absent an express ban, states are free to impose sanctions on foreign countries. Such an argument epitomizes interpretative literalism at its most wooden and ignores the historical context in which constitutional powers were assigned. For all that the original supporters and opponents of constitutional ratification disagreed, both sides would have accepted the absolute necessity for uniformity in the conduct of foreign relations. Few dissented from James Madison's statement in the Federalist no. 42 that the powers to conduct foreign affairs constitute "an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration." "If we are to be one nation in any respect," Madison wrote, "it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations." Alexander Hamilton noted elsewhere that since the actions of the individual states in the foreign policy arena would be charged against the United States as a whole, the power to set policy must reside at the federal level. In the Supreme Court's contemporary phraseology, the United States must speak "with one voice" on such matters.

Proponents of state and local sanctions today dismiss Hamilton's concerns, arguing that international actors are now much more sophisticated. Yet when Japan and the European Union protested Massachusetts' Burma law before the World Trade Organization (WTO), the action was brought against the United States,

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since Massachusetts, as a subnational government, has no WTO standing. Similarly, when Switzerland was hit with local sanctions in 1998 for not releasing the bank accounts of Holocaust victims, a major Swiss retailer responded by boycotting American products from states that had neither imposed nor intended to impose sanctions.

There are other, more esoteric, constitutional objections to laws like Massachusetts'. Sanctions burden foreign commerce. As discussed in the *Natsios* decision, the Supreme Court has sharply limited states' powers to regulate interstate and foreign trade. State regulation touching foreign commerce has historically been more tightly circumscribed than that affecting commerce between states. After all, a babble of state regulations would drown out the "one voice" of the federal government.

Even where regulations are allowed, states must not *discriminate* against trading partners from other states or countries. Yet the current subfederal sanctions do just that. To argue that the restrictions apply to interstate and foreign companies alike (i.e., to anyone who trades with Burma) is to miss the point. The relevant discrimination, which Supreme Court case law prohibits, is between companies (foreign or domestic) engaged in foreign commerce and those that are not, or at least not with the pariah regimes targeted by the statute.

Nor, as *Natsios* recognized, does the narrow "market-participant" doctrine apply here to excuse the discrimination. (This doctrine allows states some leeway to interfere with commerce when they themselves are directly involved in the transaction.) The Supreme Court has refused to apply the exception to foreign commerce; moreover, sanctions, like taxes, constitute a "primeval governmental activity" of the sort unavailable to ordinary commercial actors and are thus beyond the scope of the exception.

INTERDICTING IMBECILITY

The First Circuit's decision in *Natsios* should remind states that just as there are constitutionally mandated realms into which the federal government cannot intrude, the federal government also has its own exclusive provinces. Furthermore, policing the demarcation between federal and subfederal governments, as the First Circuit has done, is the appropriate province of the judiciary. Although Congress has the unquestioned power to halt all sanctions initiatives if it wishes, doing so would divert legislative resources from other national concerns or force Congress to react long after damage has been done to the nation's foreign policy. In this case, moreover, the executive branch proved an unreliable guardian of its prerogatives: the Clinton administration, wary of unfavorable publicity, declined to get involved.

Of course, to invalidate sanctions like Massachusetts' Burma law does not leave state and local governments without reasonable alternatives. Subnational governments can, of course, craft nonbinding resolutions to condemn repressive foreign regimes. More effectively, their officials can lobby congressional representatives—who would ignore such requests at their peril, come election time—to act. These options are not foreclosed by the First Circuit's decision. If state and local governments wish to exercise their constitutional rights in calling for a cohesive foreign policy against oppressive govern-

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ments, they can use means other than sanctions. Private citizens and NGOs, too, can organize boycotts to pressure businesses to quit countries with poor human rights records. Such measures can have a powerful effect, as apartheid-era activism demonstrated.

Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, in his influential 1833 treatise on the Constitution, wrote that "notwithstanding our boasts of freedom and independence," Americans were victims "of our own imbecility" in relations with other countries under the Articles of Confederation, because states insisted on conducting foreign policy themselves. Despite the otherwise welcome invigoration of federalism in the legislative and judicial branches of government, Washington still must be given pride of place in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of foreign commerce. Without the central government's lead, the United States risks returning to the Balkanization of its national interests that necessitated the Constitution in the first place.

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

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The world's problem is not a scarcity of oil but a glut.

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The Shocks of a World of Cheap Oil

Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning

THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY

OIL PRICES have been flirting recently with $25–$30 per barrel, levels almost reminiscent of the oil shocks of the 1970s. Rising energy prices have been accompanied by the usual hysteria about dwindling supplies and potentially dangerous transfers of wealth, tempting policymakers to consider ways of dealing with a coming oil crisis. But contrary to much received wisdom, the energy problem looming in the early 21st century is neither skyrocketing prices nor shortages that herald the beginning of the end of the oil age. Instead, the danger is precisely the opposite; long-term trends point to a prolonged oil surplus and low oil prices over the next two decades.

Paradoxically, this scenario of plenty could destabilize oil-producing states, especially those in the ellipse stretching from the Persian Gulf to Russia. And although the economies of the United States and oil-importing developing nations would by and large benefit, the backfire of low oil prices could undermine U.S. policy assumptions and imperil U.S. interests.

Both the popular and the elite media—from *Parade* asking "Could It Happen Again?" to *Scientific American,* no less, proclaiming "The End of Cheap Oil"—are peppered with forecasts of gloom and doom about

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energy security. But the "sky-is-falling" school of oil forecasting has been systematically wrong for more than a generation. In its dramatic 1972 "Limits to Growth" report, the group of prominent experts known as the Club of Rome wrote that only 550 billion barrels of oil remained and that they would run out by 1990. In fact, the world consumed 600 billion barrels of oil between 1970 and 1990, and there are today more than a trillion barrels of proven reserves (recoverable at current prices under current conditions). This figure is likely to continue rising even as global consumption exceeds the current 73 million barrels a day. Indeed, the International Energy Agency says that there are 2.3 trillion barrels in ultimate recoverable reserves, and if unconventional sources such as tar sands and shale are included, the number may well be greater than 4 trillion barrels.

The scarcity forecasters—in some cases, the same people who forecast in the 1970s that oil would cost $100 per barrel by 2000—are not only still wrong, they also have it exactly backward. The world's problem is not scarcity but glut. This is true despite the current Saudi-engineered production cutbacks by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which boosted oil prices off their $8-per-barrel lows. Seasoned oil-market watchers know that this fragile deal among oil producers could dissipate quickly, particularly as financial pressures ease over time, tempting OPEC to release some of the 5 million barrels per day currently being held back from the market.

As OPEC squirms, big and small oil producers around the globe continue to announce new finds and new plans to expand capacity. The latent supply potential in Iraq, Russia, Africa, and elsewhere—combined with more modest economic expansion in Asia—belies the Cassandra-like predictions that the world will soon deplete its oil assets. In turn, the prophecies of dried-up wells obscure the far more likely prospect: a sustained oil glut and long-term low oil prices, which will have very different—and largely unconsidered—political and strategic consequences. The 1998 dalliance with $8 barrels hinted at the possibilities, with the economic meltdown in Russia and a forced succession in wealthy Brunei. The Arab states of the oil-rich Persian Gulf, non-OPEC producers, and consumers are simply not prepared for a new geopolitics of energy.

Neither, frankly, is Washington. The political reverberations of a sustained oil glut should not be underestimated. Several important

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regimes—in the Gulf states, Russia, the former Soviet republics, and such key Latin American countries as Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia—count on healthy oil revenues for calming restive populations, assuaging social tensions, and in some cases, nation-building writ large. Without the salve of rising oil revenues, many of these nations can expect to see heightened political instability, social unrest, or even civil wars, which could be grimly reminiscent of recent Balkan slaughters. In the Gulf, such instability could trigger the next oil shocks in the form of short-term disruptions. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the West's capacity to defend important oil regions from traditional external threats like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But America's painful experiences with revolutionary Iran in the late 1970s and the Balkans in the 1990s are grim reminders of how hard it can be to cope with internal instability. The new dynamics of the global oil market have profound implications for U.S. national security policy. Washington had better gird itself.

AN EMBARASSMENT OF OIL RICHES

WRONG-HEADED predictions of scarcity are as old as the oil trade itself. A rich and embarrassing history precedes such predictions: in 1885 the U.S. Geological Survey predicted "little or no chance of oil in California," in 1914 the U.S. Bureau of Mines forecast a ten-year supply of oil in the United States, and the list goes on.

The latest scarcity theorists are exemplified by one of the world's most prominent petroleum geologists, Colin Campbell. He has argued in many industry, policy, and scientific journals that growing global consumption of oil, driven by the emergence of a modern, industrialized Asia-Pacific, is dramatically raising demand. This rise, he warns, will collide with a slowdown in new oil discoveries, leading to another energy crisis. By 2003, global production will peak and the oil age will start to end.

So why have average oil prices not risen much in real terms in nearly a generation? One reason is profound changes in the oil and gas markets. But perhaps more significant, over the last quarter-century, a veritable technological revolution in the oil and gas business has harnessed the information revolution in ways few predicted.

Since 1980, when control of crude-oil prices in the huge U.S. market ended, international crude-oil markets have become increasingly global

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and transparent—a trend eased by the advent of oil futures and derivative markets. Oil is no longer sold mainly through exclusive, secret, long-term, fixed-price contracts among a handful of major suppliers. Rather, oil pricing has been forced into the open, so oil and oil products have been sold mainly at market prices among many players, including financial institutions with no stake in oil-industry assets. In this commodified market, arbitrage typically generates similar prices worldwide, adjusting for differing oil quality and transport costs. The key factor in this new, more efficient global oil market is transportation. Most sellers strive to sell their oil to the closest market to maximize revenues.

There is no reason to expect that the oil glut will dry up.

As oil trade centers more on transport costs than on political relationships, oil-flow patterns from the Middle East are shifting, thus altering the geopolitics of oil. Increased oil production in Venezuela, Colombia, Canada, Brazil, and the U.S. South has begun crowding more-distant Persian Gulf oil out of the U.S. market. When growing oil imports from the Atlantic basin (the North Sea and West Africa) are added in, the divide widens. In the coming decade, the United States will increasingly rely on oil from within the western hemisphere and the Atlantic basin. It is East Asia's dependence on Middle Eastern oil that is rising substantially, not America's.

Many analysts expected that non-OPEC oil production would be short-lived. But they missed the technological advances—including computer-assisted, three-dimensional imaging that lets geologists "see" underground oil pockets—that slashed the costs of developing hard-to-tap reserves and improved the chances for new discoveries. Moreover, better platform designs and drilling methods have also let companies recover more of the oil they find. These technological gains have dramatically lowered the cost of finding and producing oil and natural gas and given energy consumers ample, inexpensive supplies just at the time that earlier forecasts had predicted a shortage. They have extended the life of existing wells and allowed the oil industry to double the amount of oil recovered—in many cases from about 20 to 30 percent to between 50 and 60 percent. The average U.S. costs for finding oil fell from about $15 per barrel in the 1980s to just $5 per barrel in 1998.

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Drillers are four times as successful at finding natural gas and six times as successful at finding oil as they were before the 1973 oil crisis.

Now that finding and producing oil is cheaper and easier, more and more countries are getting into the act. During the last two decades, pundits predicted that oil production from outside OPEC would decline by 3.6 million barrels per day (b/d), or about 13 percent, thereby driving oil prices up. Instead, non-OPEC production rose by more than 4 million b/d, or about 15 percent. Although problems in the Russian and Chinese oil industries and a sudden collapse in oil prices combined to reduce non-OPEC production by 800,000 b/d in 1998, supplies are already rebounding. They will probably continue to do so over the next decade as oil technology advances. Ample, accessible new reserves will soon come on-line in the waters off the Gulf of Mexico, eastern Canada, and western Africa, as well as onshore in central Africa, South America, and frontier areas in the former Soviet Union and the far reaches of the Arctic. Moreover, some of this new production can be shielded from short-term price swings if owners sell their output in new, sophisticated financial markets for oil, using long-range derivatives.

Contributing to this trend toward ample supply are the technological improvements that have made more efficient use of energy. Energy use has also been held in check by technological advances in residential and industrial use as well as in power generation. For example, from 1980 to 1995, the amount of energy used in the United States per constant dollar of GNP declined from $16.47 to $13.44. Europe and Japan made even bigger gains in efficiency.

The transport sector's use of oil is expected to account for more than half of future oil-industry growth, but here too, there is no reason to expect that the oil glut will dry up. The new direct-injection engines being introduced in Japan and Europe may eventually curb the boom in demand for gasoline. Moreover, all the major auto manufacturers have made large investments in post-internal-combustion cars and already have new prototypes of "hybrid" cars (that is, cars that run on both gas and electricity) and fuel-cell cars to be mass-marketed by 2005–15, if not sooner. Toyota and Honda are already marketing hybrid models in the United States that get 80 miles per gallon, and experts say that by 2015, these post-combustion cars will make up at least

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20 percent of new vehicles. One leading forecaster, Lawrence Goldstein of Petroleum Industry Research Associates, expects alternative-fuel vehicles to reduce gasoline demand by only 275,000 b/d ten years from now but predicts that such cars may substantially reduce oil demand in the second decade of the new millennium.

Trends in the Middle East also bode well for lower oil prices, particularly as U.S.-led sanctions against Iran, Iraq, and Libya begin to erode. Iraq, with 110 billion barrels in proven reserves, has been held back from tapping them by U.N. sanctions since it invaded Kuwait a decade ago. If sanctions are eased—after, say, Saddam Hussein is toppled, or the Desert Storm coalition collapses completely—one can expect to see Iraq's production rates double within five to ten years. And Iraq will not be the only one pumping more in the oil-rich Gulf. Iran and Kuwait are also working to reopen their oil sectors to foreign investors, hoping to boost their capacity to pump out oil, their political clout, and their national security. Saudi Arabia is following suit, both to protect its regional prominence and to stimulate its economy. The Royal Dutch/Shell Group recently announced an $800 million investment in offshore Iranian oil fields, which could further add to the glut.

If Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq get their way, and if non-OPEC production grows at only two-thirds the rate it did between 1985 and 1995, oil markets could be even more oversupplied than in 1998—the year prices collapsed to $8 per barrel. To consume all the oil that will probably be pumped out over the next ten years, world oil demand would need to grow by more than 3 percent per year, instead of the 1.8 percent annual growth rate between 1980 and 1995.

ENGULFED

THE HIGH PROBABILITY of oil prices in the $12–$20 range over most of the next two decades will condemn to a perilous future the arc of instability along the southern rim of Eurasia—from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia and maybe the Persian Gulf as well. Some oil regimes, such as Kuwait and (to a lesser extent) Iran, are trying to prepare by reforming their social, economic, and political institutions. But others—as the rhetoric of the leaders of the newly independent states of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan

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demonstrates so well—cling to the notion that oil earnings will miraculously grease the wheels of the current system of handouts from the top. This delusion prevents these countries from implementing difficult but necessary political and economic reforms.

Low oil prices did not inflict pain just in Central Asia and the Middle East. In 1998, they coincided with unprecedented political strains in key oil-producing countries like Russia, Indonesia, and even such Latin American nations as Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, and Colombia. Russia has historically relied heavily on oil and gas for its hard-currency earnings and still does today; its oil exports generated $16.1 billion in 1996, some 20 percent of Russia's total export revenue. Russia's recent financial crisis was hastened and worsened by disheartening oil earnings. Low oil prices will complicate the country's troubled transformation and leave it prisoner to its cashless "virtual economy." Elsewhere, Venezuela's flagging economy in 1998 helped elect a military populist, usher in a period of political turmoil, and stymie the implementation of major constitutional reforms. Plunging oil revenues in 1998 also destabilized Mexico, whose traditional political system is groaning with strain.

Unfortunately, U.S. foreign policy toward the oil-rich ellipse between the Gulf and Russia also seems caught in the same delusion as the region's bosses: that generous oil revenues will save the day. Some U.S. bureaucrats even argue that this coming oil wealth will magically create democratic institutions and liberal economies, even though history so far has proven just the reverse.

Sustained low oil prices also mean tremors in the Persian Gulf—the site of a fundamental U.S. military commitment. The longer oil prices droop, the more daunting the political, social, and economic challenges that the Gulf countries will face. Social unrest already bubbles under the surface in most Gulf countries, and succession crises may erupt as a generation of aging leaders passes. Populations in the region are swelling at a rate of 4 percent or more per year—a pattern that foreshadows the worsening demographic bulges caused by large populations under the age of 25 throughout the Gulf. Already, half of the Gulf's inhabitants are under 15 years old, portending daunting problems in education and employment as well as increased strains on local infrastructure and resources such as food, water,

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health, and electric power. Per capita incomes have plummeted; in Saudi Arabia, for example, real per capita GDP fell from $11,450 in 1984 to $6,725 a decade later. And oil is no panacea. Since 1982, Saudi Arabia has gone from $140 billion in surplus revenues to run up a national debt of almost $130 billion.

As the Gulf's economies shrink, jobs are becoming an increasingly critical problem. In the ten largest Saudi cities, for example, unemployment is socking the middle classes, and about 20–30 percent of Saudis lack jobs. Broad cultural and demographic shifts do not help, either. Many countries, especially Saudi Arabia, now have a large, idle class of students, some favoring religious study. If employment opportunities in the kingdom remain bleak, Riyadh could lose its ability to co-opt this expanding younger generation, which could become a major constituency for Islamist opposition movements.

Central Asia is filled with accidents waiting to happen.

Distributing economic spoils has been a major vehicle for the Gulf regimes to sustain their power base and legitimacy. In some Gulf countries, as many as 90 percent of the labor force work in government jobs. Political critics and potential opposition leaders are frequently bought off through subsidies, high offices, or other tokens of wealth and status. The regimes also build religious centers, medical facilities, and other services to placate the disgruntled. But economic stagnation has already strengthened local resentment over official corruption and greed and has widened disparities between rich and poor. Without healthy oil revenues to buy off restive populations, the Gulf leaders will be left with only repression to silence foes and quell public discontent, which could fuel even more violent opposition. Radicalized local populations could also threaten the Middle East peace process; disgruntled Gulf states might be tempted to placate Islamist movements by funding the terrorists of Hamas, for instance.

The U.S. military has demonstrated its impressive capacity to handle external threats to the flow of Gulf oil. But how will these more elusive—and more likely—internal threats be managed? Internally organized sabotage of a country's own oil installations is a different type of challenge than those solved in the past through foreign military

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assistance. Nor can the U.S. military easily prevent the oil-supply disruptions that might stem from a violent regime change in the Persian Gulf; witness Iran during its 1979 revolution. One of the lessons of the ill-fated rule of the shah was that pouring arms into the region does little to address the emerging problems of demography, social discontent, and strapped regimes.

LICENSE TO DRILL

INDEED, THE LESSONS America learned so painfully in the Persian Gulf can easily be applied to the accidents waiting to happen in an emerging oil region: Central Asia and the Caucasus. When the newly independent states of Central Asia opened up in 1991 after the Soviet Union disintegrated, the newcomers understandably stirred the interest of the major energy multinationals and Washington. (Caspian oil intrigue even provides the plot of the latest James Bond film.) But as oil companies found less there than met the geological eye, the initial promise of a new Persian Gulf began to fade. The resources of the landlocked Caspian region—perhaps, over time, roughly on the order of the North Sea—will take time to develop. By 2010–15, they will provide only three to four percent of the world's oil supply, and that only if their great distance from their main markets does not thwart investment. Nevertheless, the new "Great Game" in Central Asia has become a growth industry, both within the U.S. government and in the policy community. Alas, this new excitement bears no relation to the modest reality of Central Asia. Those in the bureaucracy seeking to expand democracy in the former Soviet republics developed a sense of mission, fearing that the fledgling states would fall prey to Russia, Iran, or China. To underscore its place as a newfound U.S. priority, the region is now handled by new bureaus, an interagency working group, and even its own special envoy.

Thus the private sector, which initially sought government help to enter the region, has begun drastically lowering its expectations, while an impervious bureaucracy continues on its merry way. Central Asia and the Caucasus are simply not about to spew forth an oil and gas bonanza. Nor, for that matter, must America brace for the threat to world stability that might erupt if the surrounding powers began

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competing for influence there. Far from entering a new Great Game, relatively weak and inward-looking countries like Iran and Russia have been sucked for the past eight years into what might be dubbed a "Mediocre Game" wherein they are played off by the various Central Asian actors. Central Asia's main problem is not voracious neighbors; as with the Persian Gulf, the principal threat to the region is, and will likely remain, internal instability.

So U.S. policy flies in the face of sensible and sustainable strategy. Rather than concentrating on technical training, agricultural reform, humanitarian aid, and institution-building, U.S. policy focuses on expanding already obtuse military ties that now constitute the main interface between Washington and the key Central Asian states. Indeed, in some cases the United States directly supports the training of Central Asia's military and police forces in a manner reminiscent of ill-advised U.S. activities in Latin America in the 1970s. The vehicle—and driver—for these dangerous liaisons is NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, to which almost all Central Asian states belong. Henry Kissinger has noted that the PFP is essentially therapeutic, aimed at psychological reassurances that are "far removed from the basic NATO mission [and] which water down the function of the alliance."

These new PFP commitments, quite apart from further complicating America's already troubled relations with Russia and China, may create expectations that NATO will intervene if turmoil erupts in places as remote but geopolitically significant as Kazakhstan's borders with Russia and China's Muslim-majority Xinjiang province. (Imagine the American reaction if the Chinese army held joint exercises with Mexico across the border from San Diego.) Although there are good reasons to be enthusiastic about fostering new democracies closer to Russia's flank, the vast entanglements that such intervention would entail are deeply unappealing. The complex problems of the Caspian region—evidenced by the turmoil in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Kyrgyzstan—could, if left to fester without the salve of promised oil wealth, make the Balkans look like a pregame warm-up.

Socioeconomic woes threaten to destabilize almost all the governments of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Poverty is widespread and painful. On average, the Caspian region's populations now spend 70 percent of their income on food alone. In Azerbaijan, real GDP

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contracted by an average of 12.4 percent per year from 1992 to 1997. Kazakhstan's GDP dropped 44.5 percent between 1990 and 1995 and has not recovered much since. Fearful that such privation may make their populations restless, most ruling elites have all but stamped out opposition movements and political dissent, leaving no avenue for change except a convulsion. To make matters worse, the region's states face turbulent successions as the older generation of ex-communists gives up the reins of power. As a new breed of nationalists replaces the old Soviet guard, social and ethnic tensions—as well as Islamic fundamentalism—will become more virulent, as they have in Chechnya and Dagestan.

As the promise of oil-driven nation-building in the Caspian region proves elusive and underlying social strains produce full-fledged crises, the United States runs the great risk of drifting into a quagmire that it can neither handle diplomatically nor solve militarily. As a RAND Corporation study noted, NATO risks both "mission creep and a developing gap between its commitments and capabilities." Wisely, RAND concludes that "NATO's military capabilities [read U.S.]" are "of little utility in preventing 'failed states.'"

THE POLITICS OF OIL SECURITY

WORSE STILL, it is not only the security challenge of defending the Persian Gulf and Caspian oil supplies that will get more difficult in the new century. The politics of defending America's global oil supply will probably become more precarious as the world's oil habits change. The days when the Gulf was America's lifeline are fading; the U.S. economy will be fed largely by oil from relatively nearby sources in its own hemisphere. But Persian Gulf oil's share of the current world market, now at 24 percent, will rise to more than 32 percent by 2010, despite falling use in the western hemisphere. If present trends continue, Asia will obtain more than 90 percent of its imports from the Persian Gulf by 2010, while Middle Eastern oil will likely contribute less than 5 percent of America's total consumption, unless the reopening of the Gulf oil fields to U.S. oil-company investment radically alters the picture. Similarly, no Caspian oil will feed U.S. markets; rather, it will flow to Europe and possibly to Asia.

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As U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf diminish, the expensive U.S. military role of "guardian of the Gulf" will become increasingly vulnerable to those at home calling for more burden-sharing. Sophisticated supporters of the U.S. Gulf presence argue that, in a global market, oil is fungible; defending oil anywhere means defending it everywhere. But that still does not mean that Europe and Japan should leave the job to the United States. Will Congress and the U.S. public continue to support spending blood and treasure to protect the Gulf while such allies—and recipients of the region's fossil fuels—as the European Union and Japan play virtually no military role there? Such questions have colored the debate about expanding NATO's post–Cold War role beyond Europe.

If left to fester, the Caspian could make the Balkans look like a pregame warm-up.

These new energy-driven linkages between Gulf suppliers and East Asian consumers also raise other important regional strategic questions. Since the mid-1990s, China and India have ended decades of energy self-sufficiency and become net oil importers. Their import needs are expected to mushroom by some five to ten million barrels per day over the coming decade. As China's energy needs have grown, its sources of supply have moved up the agenda of Beijing's decisionmakers. China's rising hunger for oil imports means that it will depend more on the same energy resources and sea transportation lanes shared by the United States, Japan, and other industrialized countries. And here, the oil glut may boost Asian energy security. After all, if oil supplies are ample, China may relax, rely on the market to provide energy security, and feel less pressure to build a blue-water navy to "compete" for energy supplies with Japan, South Korea, and India.

Still, China, which conceives of itself as an emerging great power, probably will not be comfortable relying on the U.S. Navy to defend the sea lanes through which its own Persian Gulf oil lifeline will have to be strung. Even before the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Beijing fretted in its 1998 defense white paper that the U.S. de facto security system of Pacific alliances was "a threat to peace and stability." If China thinks it is more vulnerable in energy, it could become more assertive, particularly if U.S.-Chinese relations

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turn adversarial. But if generous supplies of oil at moderate prices persist, energy issues might actually provide a good opportunity for cooperation between China, its neighbors, and the United States. Regional energy security could be assured and environmental goals met by helping China enhance its natural-gas industry and imports.

LOOK CLOSER

A WORLD of persistently low oil prices will pose real challenges for U.S. national security. Not only is Washington unprepared to handle these problems, but current policies are likely to exacerbate them. This point is perhaps most stark in the unbridled promotion of U.S. ties to the authoritarian regimes in the Caspian basin—ties that could drag the United States and NATO into local conflicts in which energy and strategic interests are marginal. Central Asia, a complex region with a moderate oil potential that is hard to commercialize, is no replacement for the Persian Gulf. A less ambitious U.S. Caspian policy, rooted in a hardheaded understanding of America's limited interests there, would both avoid Balkan-style entanglements and reduce the number of irritants in U.S. relations with Russia and China.

Complacency and misperception too often prevent effective policymaking on energy. Scarcity is not the only scenario to fear. Burden-sharing questions are better addressed sooner rather than later to lessen the chance of tensions among major oil consumers during a crisis. The lessons of the past century should have taught us that politics, not geology, has ruled our oil-supply fate. Politics and diplomacy brought the price of oil from $8 per barrel to $23 last year; the internal politics of the Persian Gulf have repeatedly disrupted U.S. oil supplies in the past and could do so again in the future.

But there is no escaping the importance of the Gulf. As U.S. dependence on Middle East oil wanes and Asian reliance grows, a new set of issues will arise: rivalries between Asian countries for oil supplies and complex problems about sharing the burden for keeping the Gulf's oil flowing freely. These issues can be assuaged in much the same manner in which the West coped with the 1970s oil crises. Major consumers, particularly emerging economies in Asia, can cooperate to

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create greater energy security for all participants—from joint oil-stockpiling programs to developing natural-gas grids and alternative energy sources.

Properly assessing America's strategic situation in a world of cheap oil requires a comprehensive policy review. Aid to oil-producing countries—given in, say, the Caspian basin in hopes of ensuring a more reliable oil supply—should not be limited exclusively to military assistance but should be linked to political and social institution-building and diversified economic development. In turn, such reforms will better insulate these shaky countries from the internal turbulence caused by volatile oil revenues. Supply would be more secure, and the citizens of oil-producing nations would gain more from the natural wealth their countries control. Both producers and consumers thereby win—regardless of where oil prices eventually wind up.

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The Need for Nuclear Power

Richard Rhodes and Denis Beller

A CLEAN BREAK

THE WORLD needs more energy. Energy multiplies human labor, increasing productivity. It builds and lights schools, purifies water, powers farm machinery, drives sewing machines and robot assemblers, stores and moves information. World population is steadily increasing, having passed six billion in 1999. Yet one-third of that number—two billion people—lack access to electricity. Development depends on energy, and the alternative to development is suffering: poverty, disease, and death. Such conditions create instability and the potential for widespread violence. National security therefore requires developed nations to help increase energy production in their more populous developing counterparts. For the sake of safety as well as security, that increased energy supply should come from diverse sources.

"At a global level," the British Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering estimate in a 1999 report on nuclear energy and climate change, "we can expect our consumption of energy at least to double in the next 50 years and to grow by a factor of up to five in the next 100 years as the world population increases and as people seek to improve their standards of living." Even with vigorous conservation, world energy production would have to triple by 2050 to support consumption at a mere one-third of today's U.S. per capita rate. The International Energy Agency (IEA) of the Organization for Economic

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Cooperation and Development (OECD) projects 65 percent growth in world energy demand by 2020, two-thirds of that coming from developing countries. "Given the levels of consumption likely in the future," the Royal Society and Royal Academy caution, "it will be an immense challenge to meet the global demand for energy without unsustainable long-term damage to the environment." That damage includes surface and air pollution and global warming.

Most of the world's energy today comes from petroleum (39.5 percent), coal (24.2 percent), natural gas (22.1 percent), hydroelectric power (6.9 percent), and nuclear power (6.3 percent). Although oil and coal still dominate, their market fraction began declining decades ago. Meanwhile, natural gas and nuclear power have steadily increased their share and should continue to do so. Contrary to the assertions of antinuclear organizations, nuclear power is neither dead nor dying. France generates 79 percent of its electricity with nuclear power; Belgium, 60 percent; Sweden, 42 percent; Switzerland, 39 percent; Spain, 37 percent; Japan, 34 percent; the United Kingdom, 21 percent; and the United States (the largest producer of nuclear energy in the world), 20 percent. South Korea and China have announced ambitious plans to expand their nuclear-power capabilities—in the case of South Korea, by building 16 new plants, increasing capacity by more than 100 percent. With 434 operating reactors worldwide, nuclear power is meeting the annual electrical needs of more than a billion people.

In America and around the globe, nuclear safety and efficiency have improved significantly since 1990. In 1998, unit capacity factor (the fraction of a power plant's capacity that it actually generates) for operating reactors reached record levels. The average U.S. capacity factor in 1998 was 80 percent for about 100 reactors, compared to 58 percent in 1980 and 66 percent in 1990. Despite a reduction in the number of power plants, the U.S. nuclear industry generated nine percent more nuclear electricity in 1999 than in 1998. Average production costs for nuclear energy are now just 1.9 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh), while electricity produced from gas costs 3.4 cents per kWh. Meanwhile, radiation exposure to workers and waste produced per unit of energy have hit new lows.

Because major, complex technologies take more than half a century to spread around the world, natural gas will share the lead in power

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generation with nuclear power over the next hundred years. Which of the two will command the greater share remains to be determined. But both are cleaner and more secure than the fuels they have begun to replace, and their ascendance should be endorsed. Even environmentalists should welcome the transition and reconsider their infatuation with renewable energy sources.

CARBON NATIONS

Among sources of electric-power generation, coal is the worst environmental offender. (Petroleum, today's dominant source of energy, sustains transportation, putting it in a separate category.) Recent studies by the Harvard School of Public Health indicate that pollutants from coal-burning cause about 15,000 premature deaths annually in the United States alone. Used to generate about a quarter of the world's primary energy, coal-burning releases amounts of toxic waste too immense to contain safely. Such waste is either dispersed directly into the air or is solidified and dumped. Some is even mixed into construction materials. Besides emitting noxious chemicals in the form of gases or toxic particles—sulfur and nitrogen oxides (components of acid rain and smog), arsenic, mercury, cadmium, selenium, lead, boron, chromium, copper, fluorine, molybdenum, nickel, vanadium, zinc, carbon monoxide and dioxide, and other greenhouse gases—coal-fired power plants are also the world's major source of radioactive releases into the environment. Uranium and thorium, mildly radioactive elements ubiquitous in the earth's crust, are both released when coal is burned. Radioactive radon gas, produced when uranium in the earth's crust decays and normally confined underground, is released when coal is mined. A 1,000-megawatt-electric (MWe) coal-fired power plant releases about 100 times as much radioactivity into the environment as a comparable nuclear plant. Worldwide releases of uranium and thorium from coal-burning total about 37,300 tonnes (metric tons) annually, with about 7,300 tonnes coming from the United States. Since uranium and thorium are potent nuclear fuels, burning coal also wastes more potential energy than it produces.

Nuclear proliferation is another overlooked potential consequence of coal-burning. The uranium released by a single 1,000-MWe coal

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plant in a year includes about 74 pounds of uranium-235—enough for at least two atomic bombs. This uranium would have to be enriched before it could be used, which would be complicated and expensive. But plutonium could also be bred from coal-derived uranium. Moreover, "because electric utilities are not high-profile facilities," writes physicist Alex Gabbard of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, "collection and processing of coal ash for recovery of minerals ... can proceed without attracting outside attention, concern or intervention. Any country with coal-fired plants could collect combustion byproducts and amass sufficient nuclear weapons materials to build up a very powerful arsenal." In the early 1950s, when richer ores were believed to be in short supply, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission actually investigated using coal as a source of uranium production for nuclear weapons; burning the coal, the AEC concluded, would concentrate the mineral, which could then be extracted from the ash.

Such a scenario may seem far-fetched. But it emphasizes the political disadvantages under which nuclear power labors. Current laws force nuclear utilities, unlike coal plants, to invest in expensive systems that limit the release of radioactivity. Nuclear fuel is not efficiently recycled in the United States because of proliferation fears. These factors have warped the economics of nuclear power development and created a politically difficult waste-disposal problem. If coal utilities were forced to assume similar costs, coal electricity would no longer be cheaper than nuclear.

DECLINE AND FALL OF THE RENEWABLES

RENEWABLE SOURCES of energy—hydroelectric, solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass—have high capital-investment costs and significant, if usually unacknowledged, environmental consequences. Hydropower is not even a true renewable, since dams eventually silt in. Most renewables collect extremely diluted energy, requiring large areas of land and masses of collectors to concentrate. Manufacturing solar collectors, pouring concrete for fields of windmills, and drowning many square miles of land behind dams cause damage and pollution.

Photovoltaic cells used for solar collection are large semiconductors; their manufacture produces highly toxic waste metals and solvents

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THE WORLD'S ENERGY PRODUCTION



SHARE OF ELECTRICITY GENERATED BY NUCLEAR POWER



that require special technology for disposal. A 1,000-MWe solar electric plant would generate 6,850 tonnes of hazardous waste from metals-processing alone over a 30-year lifetime. A comparable solar thermal plant (using mirrors focused on a central tower) would require metals for construction that would generate 435,000 tonnes of manufacturing waste, of which 16,300 tonnes would be contaminated with lead and chromium and be considered hazardous.

A global solar-energy system would consume at least 20 percent of the world's known iron resources. It would require a century to build and a substantial fraction of annual world iron production to maintain. The energy necessary to manufacture sufficient solar collectors to cover a half-million square miles of the earth's surface and to deliver the electricity through long-distance transmission systems would itself add grievously to the global burden of pollution and greenhouse gas. A global solar-energy system without fossil or nuclear backup would also be dangerously vulnerable to drops in solar radiation from volcanic events such as the 1883 eruption of Krakatoa, which caused widespread crop failure during the "year without a summer" that followed.

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Wind farms, besides requiring millions of pounds of concrete and steel to build (and thus creating huge amounts of waste materials), are inefficient, with low (because intermittent) capacity. They also cause visual and noise pollution and are mighty slayers of birds. Several hundred birds of prey, including dozens of golden eagles, are killed every year by a single California wind farm; more eagles have been killed by wind turbines than were lost in the disastrous Exxon *Valdez* oil spill. The National Audubon Society has launched a campaign to save the California condor from a proposed wind farm to be built north of Los Angeles. A wind farm equivalent in output and capacity to a 1,000-MWe fossil-fuel or nuclear plant would occupy 2,000 square miles of land and, even with substantial subsidies and ignoring hidden pollution costs, would produce electricity at double or triple the cost of fossil fuels.

The massive investment in renewables could have been better spent making coal plants and cars cleaner.

Although at least one-quarter of the world's potential for hydropower has already been developed, hydroelectric power—produced by dams that submerge large areas of land, displace rural populations, change river ecology, kill fish, and risk catastrophic collapse—has understandably lost the backing of environmentalists in recent years. The U.S. Export-Import Bank was responding in part to environmental lobbying when it denied funding to China's 18,000-MWe Three Gorges project.

Meanwhile, geothermal sources—which exploit the internal heat of the earth emerging in geyser areas or under volcanoes—are inherently limited and often coincide with scenic sites (such as Yellowstone National Park) that conservationists understandably want to preserve.

Because of these and other disadvantages, organizations such as the World Energy Council and the IEA predict that hydroelectric generation will continue to account for no more than its present 6.9 percent share of the world's primary energy supply, while all other renewables, even though robustly subsidized, will move from their present 0.5 percent share to claim no more than 5 to 8 percent by 2020. In the United States, which leads the world in renewable energy generation, such production actually declined by 9.4 percent from 1997 to 1998: hydro by 9.2 percent, geothermal by 5.4 percent, wind by 50.5 percent, and solar by 27.7 percent.

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Like the dream of controlled thermonuclear fusion, then, the reality of a world run on pristine energy generated from renewables continues to recede, despite expensive, highly subsidized research and development. The 1997 U.S. federal R&D investment per thousand kWh was only 5 cents for nuclear and coal, 58 cents for oil, and 41 cents for gas, but was $4,769 for wind and $17,006 for photovoltaics. This massive public investment in renewables would have been better spent making coal plants and automobiles cleaner. According to Robert Bradley of Houston's Institute for Energy Research, U.S. conservation efforts and nonhydroelectric renewables have benefited from a cumulative 20-year taxpayer investment of some $30–$40 billion—"the largest governmental peacetime energy expenditure in U.S. history." And Bradley estimates that "the $5.8 billion spent by the Department of Energy on wind and solar subsidies" alone could have paid for "replacing between 5,000 and 10,000 MWe of the nation's dirtiest coal capacity with gas-fired combined-cycle units, which would have reduced carbon dioxide emissions by between one-third and two-thirds." Replacing coal with nuclear generation would have reduced overall emissions even more.

Despite the massive investment, conservation and nonhydro renewables remain stubbornly uncompetitive and contribute only marginally to U.S. energy supplies. If the most prosperous nation in the world cannot afford them, who can? Not China, evidently, which expects to generate less than one percent of its commercial energy from nonhydro renewables in 2025. Coal and oil will still account for the bulk of China's energy supply in that year unless developed countries offer incentives to convince the world's most populous nation to change its plans.

TURN DOWN THE VOLUME

NATURAL GAS has many virtues as a fuel compared to coal or oil, and its share of the world's energy will assuredly grow in the first half of the 21st century. But its supply is limited and unevenly distributed, it is expensive as a power source compared to coal or uranium, and it pollutes the air. A 1,000-MWe natural gas plant releases 5.5 tonnes of sulfur oxides per day, 21 tonnes of nitrogen oxides, 1.6 tonnes of carbon

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monoxide, and 0.9 tonnes of particulates. In the United States, energy production from natural gas released about 5.5 billion tonnes of waste in 1994. Natural gas fires and explosions are also significant risks. A single mile of gas pipeline three feet in diameter at a pressure of 1,000 pounds per square inch (psi) contains the equivalent of two-thirds of a kiloton of explosive energy; a million miles of such large pipelines lace the earth.

The great advantage of nuclear power is its ability to wrest enormous energy from a small volume of fuel. Nuclear fission, transforming matter directly into energy, is several million times as energetic as chemical burning, which merely breaks chemical bonds. One tonne of nuclear fuel produces energy equivalent to 2 to 3 million tonnes of fossil fuel. Burning 1 kilogram of firewood can generate 1 kilowatt-hour of electricity; 1 kg of coal, 3 kWh; 1 kg of oil, 4 kWh. But 1 kg of uranium fuel in a modern light-water reactor generates 400,000 kWh of electricity, and if that uranium is recycled, 1 kg can generate more than 7,000,000 kWh. These spectacular differences in volume help explain the vast difference in the environmental impacts of nuclear versus fossil fuels. Running a 1,000-MWe power plant for a year requires 2,000 train cars of coal or 10 supertankers of oil but only 12 cubic meters of natural uranium. Out the other end of fossil-fuel plants, even those with pollution-control systems, come thousands of tonnes of noxious gases, particulates, and heavy-metal-bearing (and radioactive) ash, plus solid hazardous waste—up to 500,000 tonnes of sulfur from coal, more than 300,000 tonnes from oil, and 200,000 tonnes from natural gas. In contrast, a 1,000-MWe nuclear plant releases no noxious gases or other pollutants[1] and much less radioactivity per capita than is encountered from airline travel, a home smoke detector, or a television set. It produces about 30 tonnes of high-level waste (spent fuel) and 800 tonnes of low- and intermediate-level waste—about 20 cubic meters in all when compacted (roughly, the volume of two automobiles). All the operating nuclear plants in the world produce some 3,000 cubic meters of

[1] Uranium is refined and processed into fuel assemblies today using coal energy, which does of course release pollutants. If nuclear power were made available for process heat or if fuel assemblies were recycled, this source of manufacturing pollution would be eliminated or greatly reduced.

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waste annually. By comparison, U.S. industry generates annually about 50,000,000 cubic meters of solid toxic waste.

The high-level waste is intensely radioactive, of course (the low-level waste can be less radioactive than coal ash, which is used to make concrete and gypsum—both of which are incorporated into building materials). But thanks to its small volume and the fact that it is not released into the environment, this high-level waste can be meticulously sequestered behind multiple barriers. Waste from coal, dispersed across the landscape in smoke or buried near the surface, remains toxic forever. Radioactive nuclear waste decays steadily, losing 99 percent of its toxicity after 600 years—well within the range of human experience with custody and maintenance, as evidenced by structures such as the Roman Pantheon and Notre Dame Cathedral. Nuclear waste disposal is a political problem in the United States because of widespread fear disproportionate to the reality of risk. But it is not an engineering problem, as advanced projects in France, Sweden, and Japan demonstrate. The World Health Organization has estimated that indoor and outdoor air pollution cause some three million deaths per year. Substituting small, properly contained volumes of nuclear waste for vast, dispersed amounts of toxic wastes from fossil fuels would produce so obvious an improvement in public health that it is astonishing that physicians have not already demanded such a conversion.

The production cost of nuclear electricity generated from existing U.S. plants is already fully competitive with electricity from fossil fuels, although new nuclear power is somewhat more expensive. But this higher price tag is deceptive. Large nuclear power plants require larger capital investments than comparable coal or gas plants only because nuclear utilities are required to build and maintain costly systems to keep their radioactivity from the environment. If fossil-fuel plants were similarly required to sequester the pollutants they generate, they would cost significantly more than nuclear power plants do. The European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have determined that "for equivalent amounts of energy generation, coal and oil plants, ... owing to their large emissions and huge fuel and transport requirements, have the highest externality costs as well as equivalent lives lost. The external costs are some ten times higher than for a nuclear power plant and can be a significant

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fraction of generation costs." In equivalent lives lost per gigawatt generated (that is, loss of life expectancy from exposure to pollutants), coal kills 37 people annually; oil, 32; gas, 2; nuclear, 1. Compared to nuclear power, in other words, fossil fuels (and renewables) have enjoyed a free ride with respect to protection of the environment and public health and safety.

ANNUAL SOLID WASTE PRODUCTION
(by a 1000-MWe power plant in one year)

Even the estimate of one life lost to nuclear power is questionable. Such an estimate depends on whether or not, as the long-standing "linear no-threshold" theory (LNT) maintains, exposure to amounts of radiation considerably less than preexisting natural levels increases the risk of cancer. Although LNT dictates elaborate and expensive confinement regimes for nuclear power operations and waste disposal, there is no evidence that low-level radiation exposure increases cancer risk. In fact, there is good evidence that it does not. There is even good evidence that exposure to low doses of radioactivity *improves* health and lengthens life, probably by stimulating the immune system much as vaccines do (the best study, of background radon levels in hundreds of thousands of homes in more than 90 percent of U.S. counties, found lung cancer rates decreasing significantly with increasing radon levels among both smokers and nonsmokers). So low-level radioactivity from nuclear power generation presents at worst a negligible risk. Authorities on coal geology and engineering make the same argument about low-level radioactivity from coal-burning; a U.S. Geological Survey fact sheet, for example, concludes that "radioactive elements in coal and fly ash should not be sources of alarm." Yet nuclear power development has been hobbled, and nuclear waste disposal unnecessarily delayed, by limits not visited upon the coal industry.

No technological system is immune to accident. Recent dam overflows and failures in Italy and India each resulted in several thousand fatalities. Coal-mine accidents, oil- and gas-plant fires, and

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pipeline explosions typically kill hundreds per incident. The 1984 Bhopal chemical plant disaster caused some 3,000 immediate deaths and poisoned several hundred thousand people. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, between 1987 and 1996 more than 600,000 accidental releases of toxic chemicals in the United States killed a total of 2,565 people and injured 22,949.

By comparison, nuclear accidents have been few and minimal. The recent, much-reported accident in Japan occurred not at a power plant but at a facility processing fuel for a research reactor. It caused no deaths or injuries to the public. As for the Chernobyl explosion, it resulted from human error in operating a fundamentally faulty reactor design that could not have been licensed in the West. It caused severe human and environmental damage locally, including 31 deaths, most from radiation exposure. Thyroid cancer, which could have been prevented with prompt iodine prophylaxis, has increased in Ukrainian children exposed to fallout. More than 800 cases have been diagnosed and several thousand more are projected; although the disease is treatable, three children have died. LNT-based calculations project 3,420 cancer deaths in Chernobyl-area residents and cleanup crews. The Chernobyl reactor lacked a containment structure, a fundamental safety system that is required on Western reactors. Postaccident calculations indicate that such a structure would have confined the explosion and thus the radioactivity, in which case no injuries or deaths would have occurred.

These numbers, for the worst ever nuclear power accident, are remarkably low compared to major accidents in other industries. More than 40 years of commercial nuclear power operations demonstrate that nuclear power is much safer than fossil-fuel systems in terms of industrial accidents, environmental damage, health effects, and long-term risk.

GHOSTS IN THE MACHINE

MOST OF THE URANIUM used in nuclear reactors is inert, a nonfissile product unavailable for use in weapons. Operating reactors, however, breed fissile plutonium that could be used in bombs, and therefore the commercialization of nuclear power has raised concerns about the spread of weapons. In 1977, President Carter deferred indefinitely the recycling of "spent" nuclear fuel, citing proliferation

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risks. This decision effectively ended nuclear recycling in the United States, even though such recycling reduces the volume and radiotoxicity of nuclear waste and could extend nuclear fuel supplies for thousands of years. Other nations assessed the risks differently and the majority did not follow the U.S. example. France and the United Kingdom currently reprocess spent fuel; Russia is stockpiling fuel and separated plutonium for jump-starting future fast-reactor fuel cycles; Japan has begun using recycled uranium and plutonium mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in its reactors and recently approved the construction of a new nuclear power plant to use 100-percent MOX fuel by 2007.

Although power-reactor plutonium theoretically can be used to make nuclear explosives, spent fuel is refractory, highly radioactive, and beyond the capacity of terrorists to process. Weapons made from reactor-grade plutonium would be hot, unstable, and of uncertain yield. India has extracted weapons plutonium from a Canadian heavy-water reactor and bars inspection of some dual-purpose reactors it has built. But no plutonium has ever been diverted from British or French reprocessing facilities or fuel shipments for weapons production; IAEA inspections are effective in preventing such diversions. The risk of proliferation, the IAEA has concluded, "is not zero and would not become zero even if nuclear power ceased to exist. It is a continually strengthened nonproliferation regime that will remain the cornerstone of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons."

Ironically, burying nuclear waste only increases the risk of proliferation.

Ironically, burying spent fuel without extracting its plutonium through reprocessing would actually increase the long-term risk of nuclear proliferation, since the decay of less-fissile and more-radioactive isotopes in spent fuel after one to three centuries improves the explosive qualities of the plutonium it contains, making it more attractive for weapons use. Besides extending the world's uranium resources almost indefinitely, recycling would make it possible to convert plutonium to useful energy while breaking it down into shorter-lived, nonfissionable, nonthreatening nuclear waste.

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Hundreds of tons of weapons-grade plutonium, which cost the nuclear superpowers billions of dollars to produce, have become military surplus in the past decade. Rather than burying some of this strategically worrisome but energetically valuable material—as Washington has proposed—it should be recycled into nuclear fuel. An international system to recycle and manage such fuel would prevent covert proliferation. As envisioned by Edward Arthur, Paul Cunningham, and Richard Wagner of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, such a system would combine internationally monitored retrievable storage, the processing of all separated plutonium into MOX fuel for power reactors, and, in the longer term, advanced integrated materials-processing reactors that would receive, control, and process all fuel discharged from reactors throughout the world, generating electricity and reducing spent fuel to short-lived nuclear waste ready for permanent geological storage.

THE NEW NEW THING

A NEW GENERATION of small, modular power plants—competitive with natural gas and designed for safety, proliferation resistance, and ease of operation—will be necessary to extend the benefits of nuclear power to smaller developing countries that lack a nuclear infrastructure. The Department of Energy has awarded funding to three designs for such "fourth-generation" plants. A South African utility, Eskom, has announced plans to market a modular gas-cooled pebble-bed reactor that does not require emergency core-cooling systems and physically cannot "melt down." Eskom estimates that the reactor will produce electricity at around 1.5 cents per kWh, which is cheaper than electricity from a combined-cycle gas plant. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory are developing a similar design to supply high-temperature heat for industrial processes such as hydrogen generation and desalinization.

Petroleum is used today primarily for transportation, but the internal combustion engine has been refined to its limit. Further reductions in transportation pollution can come only from abandoning petroleum and developing nonpolluting power systems for

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cars and trucks. Recharging batteries for electric cars will simply transfer pollution from mobile to centralized sources unless the centralized source of electricity is nuclear. Fuel cells, which are now approaching commercialization, may be a better solution. Because fuel cells generate electricity directly from gaseous or liquid fuels, they can be refueled along the way, much as present internal combustion engines are. When operated on pure hydrogen, fuel cells produce only water as a waste product. Since hydrogen can be generated from water using heat or electricity, one can envisage a minimally polluting energy infrastructure, using hydrogen generated by nuclear power for transportation, nuclear electricity and process heat for most other applications, and natural gas and renewable systems as backups. Such a major commitment to nuclear power could not only halt but eventually even reverse the continuing buildup of carbon in the atmosphere. In the meantime, fuel cells using natural gas could significantly reduce air pollution.

POWERING THE FUTURE

To meet the world's growing need for energy, the Royal Society and Royal Academy report proposes "the formation of an international body for energy research and development, funded by contributions from individual nations on the basis of GDP or total national energy consumption." The body would be "a funding agency supporting research, development and demonstrators elsewhere, not a research center itself." Its budget might build to an annual level of some $25 billion, "roughly one percent of the total global energy budget." If it truly wants to develop efficient and responsible energy supplies, such a body should focus on the nuclear option, on establishing a secure international nuclear-fuel storage and reprocessing system, and on providing expertise for siting, financing, and licensing modular nuclear power systems to developing nations.

According to Arnulf Grübler, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, and David Victor, who study the dynamics of energy technologies, "the share of energy supplied by electricity is growing rapidly in most countries and worldwide." Throughout history, humankind has gradually decarbonized its dominant fuels, moving steadily away from the

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more polluting, carbon-rich sources. Thus the world has gone from coal (which has one hydrogen atom per carbon atom and was dominant from 1880 to 1950) to oil (with two hydrogens per carbon, dominant from 1950 to today). Natural gas (four hydrogens per carbon) is steadily increasing its market share. But nuclear fission produces no carbon at all.

Physical reality—not arguments about corporate greed, hypothetical risks, radiation exposure, or waste disposal—ought to inform decisions vital to the future of the world. Because diversity and redundancy are important for safety and security, renewable energy sources ought to retain a place in the energy economy of the century to come. But nuclear power should be central. Despite its outstanding record, it has instead been relegated by its opponents to the same twilight zone of contentious ideological conflict as abortion and evolution. It deserves better. Nuclear power is environmentally safe, practical, and affordable. It is not the problem—it is one of the best solutions.

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Campaign 2000

Promoting the National Interest

Condoleezza Rice

LIFE AFTER THE COLD WAR

THE UNITED STATES has found it exceedingly difficult to define its "national interest" in the absence of Soviet power. That we do not know how to think about what follows the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is clear from the continued references to the "post–Cold War period." Yet such periods of transition are important, because they offer strategic opportunities. During these fluid times, one can affect the shape of the world to come.

The enormity of the moment is obvious. The Soviet Union was more than just a traditional global competitor; it strove to lead a universal socialist alternative to markets and democracy. The Soviet Union quarantined itself and many often-unwitting captives and clients from the rigors of international capitalism. In the end, it sowed the seeds of its own destruction, becoming in isolation an economic and technological dinosaur.

But this is only part of the story. The Soviet Union's collapse coincided with another great revolution. Dramatic changes in information technology and the growth of "knowledge-based" industries altered

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the very basis of economic dynamism, accelerating already noticeable trends in economic interaction that often circumvented and ignored state boundaries. As competition for capital investment has intensified, states have faced difficult choices about their internal economic, political, and social structures. As the prototype of this "new economy," the United States has seen its economic influence grow—and with it, its diplomatic influence. America has emerged as both the principal benefactor of these simultaneous revolutions and their beneficiary.

The process of outlining a new foreign policy must begin by recognizing that the United States is in a remarkable position. Powerful secular trends are moving the world toward economic openness and—more unevenly—democracy and individual liberty. Some states have one foot on the train and the other off. Some states still hope to find a way to decouple democracy and economic progress. Some hold on to old hatreds as diversions from the modernizing task at hand. But the United States and its allies are on the right side of history.

In such an environment, American policies must help further these favorable trends by maintaining a disciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the important from the trivial. The Clinton administration has assiduously avoided implementing such an agenda. Instead, every issue has been taken on its own terms—crisis by crisis, day by day. It takes courage to set priorities because doing so is an admission that American foreign policy cannot be all things to all people—or rather, to all interest groups. The Clinton administration's approach has its advantages: If priorities and intent are not clear, they cannot be criticized. But there is a high price to pay for this approach. In a democracy as pluralistic as ours, the absence of an articulated "national interest" either produces a fertile ground for those wishing to withdraw from the world or creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures.

THE ALTERNATIVE

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are

- to ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails;

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• to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest;

• to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;

• to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system; and

• to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

INTERESTS AND IDEALS

POWER MATTERS, both the exercise of power by the United States and the ability of others to exercise it. Yet many in the United States are (and have always been) uncomfortable with the notions of power politics, great powers, and power balances. In an extreme form, this discomfort leads to a reflexive appeal instead to notions of international law and norms, and the belief that the support of many states—or even better, of institutions like the United Nations—is essential to the legitimate exercise of power. The "national interest" is replaced with "humanitarian interests" or the interests of "the international community." The belief that the United States is exercising power legitimately only when it is doing so on behalf of someone or something else was deeply rooted in Wilsonian thought, and there are strong echoes of it in the Clinton administration. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect. America's pursuit of the national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace. Its pursuit of national interests after World War II led to a more prosperous and democratic world. This can happen again.

So multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. U.S. interests are served by having strong alliances and can be promoted within the U.N. and other multilateral organizations, as

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well as through well-crafted international agreements. But the Clinton administration has often been so anxious to find multilateral solutions to problems that it has signed agreements that are not in America's interest. The Kyoto treaty is a case in point: whatever the facts on global warming, a treaty that does not include China and exempts "developing" countries from tough standards while penalizing American industry cannot possibly be in America's national interest.

Similarly, the arguments about U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are instructive. Since 1992, the United States has refrained unilaterally from testing nuclear weapons. It is an example to the rest of the world yet does not tie its own hands "in perpetuity" if testing becomes necessary again. But in pursuit of a "norm" against the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United States signed a treaty that was not verifiable, did not deal with the threat of the development of nuclear weapons by rogue states, and threatened the reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Legitimate congressional concerns about the substance of the treaty were ignored during negotiations. When faced with the defeat of a bad treaty, the administration attacked the motives of its opponents—incredibly branding long-standing internationalists like Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and John Warner (R-Va.) as isolationists.

Certainly, Republican presidents have not been immune to the practice of pursuing symbolic agreements of questionable value. According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, some 52 conventions, agreements, and treaties still await ratification; some even date back to 1949. But the Clinton administration's attachment to largely symbolic agreements and its pursuit of, at best, illusory "norms" of international behavior have become an epidemic. That is not leadership. Neither is it isolationist to suggest that the United States has a

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special role in the world and should not adhere to every international convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose.

Even those comfortable with notions of the "national interest" are still queasy with a focus on power relationships and great-power politics. The reality is that a few big powers can radically affect international peace, stability, and prosperity. These states are capable of disruption on a grand scale, and their fits of anger or acts of beneficence affect hundreds of millions of people. By reason of size, geographic position, economic potential, and military strength, they are capable of influencing American welfare for good or ill. Moreover, that kind of power is usually accompanied by a sense of entitlement to play a decisive role in international politics. Great powers do not just mind their own business.

Great powers do not just mind their own business.

Some worry that this view of the world ignores the role of values, particularly human rights and the promotion of democracy. In fact, there are those who would draw a sharp line between power politics and a principled foreign policy based on values. This polarized view—you are either a realist or devoted to norms and values—may be just fine in academic debate, but it is a disaster for American foreign policy. American values are universal. People want to say what they think, worship as they wish, and elect those who govern them; the triumph of these values is most assuredly easier when the international balance of power favors those who believe in them. But sometimes that favorable balance of power takes time to achieve, both internationally and within a society. And in the meantime, it is simply not possible to ignore and isolate other powerful states that do not share those values.

The Cold War is a good example. Few would deny that the collapse of the Soviet Union profoundly transformed the picture of democracy and human rights in eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet territories. Nothing improved human rights as much as the collapse of Soviet power. Throughout the Cold War, the United States pursued a policy that promoted political liberty, using every instrument from the Voice of America to direct presidential intervention on behalf of dissidents. But it lost sight neither of the importance of the geopolitical relationship with Moscow nor of the absolute necessity of retaining robust American military power to deter an all-out military confrontation.

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In the 1970s, the Soviet Union was at the height of its power—which it was more than willing to use. Given its weak economic and technological base, the victories of that period turned out to be Pyrrhic. President Reagan's challenge to Soviet power was both resolute and well timed. It included intense substantive engagements with Moscow across the entire range of issues captured in the "four-part agenda" (arms control, human rights, economic issues, and regional conflicts). The Bush administration then focused greater attention on rolling back Soviet power in central and eastern Europe. As the Soviet Union's might waned, it could no longer defend its interests and gave up peacefully (thankfully) to the West—a tremendous victory for Western power and also for human liberty.

SETTING PRIORITIES

THE UNITED STATES has many sources of power in the pursuit of its goals. The global economy demands economic liberalization, greater openness and transparency, and at the very least, access to information technology. International economic policies that leverage the advantages of the American economy and expand free trade are the decisive tools in shaping international politics. They permit us to reach out to states as varied as South Africa and India and to engage our neighbors in the western hemisphere in a shared interest in economic prosperity. The growth of entrepreneurial classes throughout the world is an asset in the promotion of human rights and individual liberty, and it should be understood and used as such. Yet peace is the first and most important condition for continued prosperity and freedom. America's military power must be secure because the United States is the only guarantor of global peace and stability. The current neglect of America's armed forces threatens its ability to maintain peace.

The Bush administration had been able to reduce defense spending somewhat at the end of the Cold War in 1991. But the Clinton administration witlessly accelerated and deepened these cuts. The results were devastating: military readiness declined, training suffered, military pay slipped 15 percent below civilian equivalents, morale plummeted, and the services cannibalized existing equipment to keep airplanes flying, ships afloat, and tanks moving. The increased

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difficulty in recruiting people to the armed forces or retaining them is hardly surprising.

Moreover, the administration began deploying American forces abroad at a furious pace—an average of once every nine weeks. As it cut defense spending to its lowest point as a percentage of GDP since Pearl Harbor, the administration deployed the armed forces more often than at any time in the last 50 years. Some of the deployments themselves were questionable, such as in Haiti. But more than anything it was simply unwise to multiply missions in the face of a continuing budget reduction. Means and mission were not matched, and (predictably) the already thinly stretched armed forces came close to a breaking point. When all these trends became so obvious and embarrassing that they could no longer be ignored, the administration finally requested increased defense spending. But the "death spiral," as the administration's own undersecretary of defense called it—robbing procurement and research and development simply to operate the armed forces—was already well under way. That the administration did nothing, choosing instead to live off the fruits of Reagan's military buildup, constitutes an extraordinary neglect of the fiduciary responsibilities of the commander in chief.

Now the next president will be confronted with a prolonged job of repair. Military readiness will have to take center stage, particularly those aspects that affect the living conditions of the troops—military pay, housing—and also training. New weapons will have to be procured in order to give the military the capacity to carry out today's missions. But even in its current state, the American military still enjoys a commanding technological lead and therefore has a battlefield advantage over any competitor. Thus the next president should refocus the Pentagon's priorities on building the military of the 21st century rather than continuing to build on the structure of the Cold War. U.S. technological advantages should be leveraged to build forces that are lighter and more lethal, more mobile and agile, and capable of firing accurately from long distances. In order to do this, Washington must reallocate resources, perhaps in some cases skipping a generation of technology to make leaps rather than incremental improvements in its forces.

The other major concern is a loss of focus on the mission of the armed forces. What does it mean to deter, fight, and win wars and defend the national interest? First, the American military must be able to meet

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decisively the emergence of any hostile military power in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Europe—areas in which not only our interests but also those of our key allies are at stake. America's military is the only one capable of this deterrence function, and it must not be stretched or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities. It is the role that the United States played when Saddam Hussein threatened the Persian Gulf, and it is the power needed to deter trouble on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait. In the latter cases, the goal is to make it inconceivable for North Korea or China to use force because American military power is a compelling factor in their equations.

If it is worth fighting for, you had better be prepared to win.

Some small-scale conflicts clearly have an impact on American strategic interests. Such was the case with Kosovo, which was in the backyard of America's most important strategic alliance: NATO. In fact, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević's rejection of peaceful coexistence with the Kosovar Albanians threatened to rock the area's fragile ethnic balance. Eastern Europe is a patchwork of ethnic minorities. For the most part, Hungarians and Romanians, Bulgarians and Turks, and even Ukrainians and Russians have found a way since 1991 of preventing their differences from exploding. Milošević has been the exception, and the United States had an overriding strategic interest in stopping him. There was, of course, a humanitarian disaster looming as well, but in the absence of concerns based on the interests of the alliance, the case for intervention would have been more tenuous.

The Kosovo war was conducted incompetently, in part because the administration's political goals kept shifting and in part because it was not, at the start, committed to the decisive use of military force. That President Clinton was surprised at Milošević's tenacity is, well, surprising. If there is any lesson from history, it is that small powers with everything to lose are often more stubborn than big powers, for whom the conflict is merely one among many problems. The lesson, too, is that if it is worth fighting for, you had better be prepared to win. Also, there must be a political game plan that will permit the withdrawal of our forces—something that is still completely absent in Kosovo.

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But what if our values are attacked in areas that are not arguably of strategic concern? Should the United States not try to save lives in the absence of an overriding strategic rationale? The next American president should be in a position to intervene when he believes, and can make the case, that the United States is duty-bound to do so. "Humanitarian intervention" cannot be ruled out a priori. But a decision to intervene in the absence of strategic concerns should be understood for what it is. Humanitarian problems are rarely only humanitarian problems; the taking of life or withholding of food is almost always a political act. If the United States is not prepared to address the underlying political conflict and to know whose side it is on, the military may end up separating warring parties for an indefinite period. Sometimes one party (or both) can come to see the United States as the enemy. Because the military cannot, by definition, do anything decisive in these "humanitarian" crises, the chances of misreading the situation and ending up in very different circumstances are very high. This was essentially the problem of "mission creep" in Somalia.

The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society. Military force is best used to support clear political goals, whether limited, such as expelling Saddam from Kuwait, or comprehensive, such as demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany during World War II. It is one thing to have a limited political goal and to fight decisively for it; it is quite another to apply military force incrementally, hoping to find a political solution somewhere along the way. A president entering these situations must ask whether decisive force is possible and is likely to be effective and must know how and when to get out. These are difficult criteria to meet, so U.S. intervention in these "humanitarian" crises should be, at best, exceedingly rare.

This does not mean that the United States must ignore humanitarian and civil conflicts around the world. But the military cannot be involved everywhere. Often, these tasks might be better carried out by regional actors, as modeled by the Australian-led intervention in East Timor. The U.S. might be able to lend financial, logistical, and intelligence support. Sometimes tough, competent diplomacy in the beginning can

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prevent the need for military force later. Using the American armed forces as the world's "911" will degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping roles, and fuel concern among other great powers that the United States has decided to enforce notions of "limited sovereignty" worldwide in the name of humanitarianism. This overly broad definition of America's national interest is bound to backfire as others arrogate the same authority to themselves. Or we will find ourselves looking to the United Nations to sanction the use of American military power in these cases, implying that we will do so even when our vital interests are involved, which would also be a mistake.

DEALING WITH THE POWERFUL

ANOTHER CRUCIAL TASK for the United States is to focus on relations with other powerful states. Although the United States is fortunate to count among its friends several great powers, it is important not to take them for granted—so that there is a firm foundation when it comes time to rely on them. The challenges of China and North Korea require coordination and cooperation with Japan and South Korea. The signals that we send to our real partners are important. Never again should an American president go to Beijing for nine days and refuse to stop in Tokyo or Seoul.

There is work to do with the Europeans, too, on defining what holds the transatlantic alliance together in the absence of the Soviet threat. NATO is badly in need of attention in the wake of Kosovo and with the looming question of its further enlargement in 2002 and beyond. The door to NATO for the remaining states of eastern and central Europe should remain open, as many are actively preparing to meet the criteria for membership. But the parallel track of NATO's own evolution, its attention to the definition of its mission, and its ability to digest and then defend new members has been neglected. Moreover, the United States has an interest in shaping the European defense identity—welcoming a greater European military capability as long as it is within the context of NATO. NATO has a very full agenda. Membership in NATO will mean nothing to anyone if the organization is no longer militarily capable and if it is unclear about its mission.

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For America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right balance in our policy toward Russia and China. Both are equally important to the future of international peace, but the challenges they pose are very different. China is a rising power; in economic terms, that should be good news, because in order to maintain its economic dynamism, China must be more integrated into the international economy. This will require increased openness and transparency and the growth of private industry. The political struggle in Beijing is over how to maintain the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Some see economic reform, growth, and a better life for the Chinese people as the key. Others see the inherent contradiction in loosening economic control and maintaining the party's political dominance. As China's economic problems multiply due to slowing growth rates, failing banks, inert state enterprises, and rising unemployment, this struggle will intensify.

Trade can open China's economy—and its politics, too.

It is in America's interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic integration because this will probably lead to sustained and organized pressures for political liberalization. There are no guarantees, but in scores of cases from Chile to Spain to Taiwan, the link between democracy and economic liberalization has proven powerful over the long run. Trade and economic interaction are, in fact, good—not only for America's economic growth but for its political aims as well. Human rights concerns should not move to the sidelines in the meantime. Rather, the American president should press the Chinese leadership for change. But it is wise to remember that our influence through moral arguments and commitment is still limited in the face of Beijing's pervasive political control. The big trends toward the spread of information, the access of young Chinese to American values through educational exchanges and training, and the growth of an entrepreneurial class that does not owe its livelihood to the state are, in the end, likely to have a more powerful effect on life in China.

Although some argue that the way to support human rights is to refuse trade with China, this punishes precisely those who are most likely to change the system. Put bluntly, Li Peng and the Chinese conservatives want to continue to run the economy by state fiat. Of course, there should be tight export controls on the transfer of militarily

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sensitive technology to China. But trade in general can open up the Chinese economy and, ultimately, its politics too. This view requires faith in the power of markets and economic freedom to drive political change, but it is a faith confirmed by experiences around the globe.

Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a "status quo" power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the "strategic partner" the Clinton administration once called it. Add to this China's record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, and the security problem is obvious. China will do what it can to enhance its position, whether by stealing nuclear secrets or by trying to intimidate Taiwan.

China's success in controlling the balance of power depends in large part on America's reaction to the challenge. The United States must deepen its cooperation with Japan and South Korea and maintain its commitment to a robust military presence in the region. It should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.

The United States also has a deep interest in the security of Taiwan. It is a model of democratic and market-oriented development, and it invests significantly in the mainland's economy. The longstanding U.S. commitment to a "one-China" policy that leaves to a future date the resolution of the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is wise. But that policy requires that neither side challenge the status quo and that Beijing, as the more powerful actor, renounce the use of force. U.S. resolve anchors this policy. The Clinton administration tilted toward Beijing, when, for instance, it used China's formulation of the

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"three no's" during the president's trip there. Taiwan has been looking for attention and reassurance ever since. If the United States is resolute, peace can be maintained in the Taiwan Strait until a political settlement on democratic terms is available.

Some things take time. U.S. policy toward China requires nuance and balance. It is important to promote China's internal transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide.

RUSSIAN WEAKNESS

RUSSIA PRESENTS a different challenge. It still has many of the attributes of a great power: a large population, vast territory, and military potential. But its economic weakness and problems of national identity threaten to overwhelm it. Moscow is determined to assert itself in the world and often does so in ways that are at once haphazard and threatening to American interests. The picture is complicated by Russia's own internal transition—one that the United States wants to see succeed. The old Soviet system has broken down, and some of the basic elements of democratic development are in place. People are free to say what they think, vote for whom they please, and (for the most part) worship freely. But the democratic fragments are not institutionalized—with the exception of the Communist Party, political parties are weak—and the balance of political power is so strongly in favor of the president that he often rules simply by decree. Of course, few pay attention to Boris Yelstin's decrees, and the Russian government has been mired in inaction and stagnation for at least three years. Russia's economic troubles and its high-level corruption have been widely discussed in recent months; Russia's economy is not becoming a market but is mutating into something else. Widespread barter, banks that are not banks, billions of rubles stashed abroad and in mattresses at home, and bizarre privatization schemes that have enriched the so-called reformers give Moscow's economy a medieval tinge.

The problem for U.S. policy is that the Clinton administration's embrace of Yeltsin and those who were thought to be reformers around him has failed. Yeltsin is Russia's president and clearly the

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United States had to deal with the head of state. But support for democracy and economic reform became support for Yeltsin. His agenda became the American agenda. The United States certified that reform was taking place where it was not, continuing to disburse money from the International Monetary Fund in the absence of any evidence of serious change. The curious privatization methods were hailed as economic liberalization; the looting of the country's assets by powerful people either went unnoticed or was ignored. The realities in Russia simply did not accord with the administration's script about Russian economic reform. The United States should not be faulted for trying to help. But, as the Russian reformer Grigori Yavlinsky has said, the United States should have "told the truth" about what was happening.

Now we have a dual credibility problem—with Russians and with Americans. There are signs of life in the Russian economy. The financial crash of August 1998 forced import substitution, and domestic production has increased as the resilient Russian people have taken matters into their own hands. Rising oil prices have helped as well. But these are short-term fixes. There is no longer a consensus in America or Europe on what to do next with Russia. Frustrated expectations and "Russia fatigue" are direct consequences of the "happy talk" in which the Clinton administration engaged.

Russia's economic future is now in the hands of the Russians. The country is not without assets, including its natural resources and an educated population. It is up to Russia to make structural reforms, particularly concerning the rule of law and the tax codes, so that investors—foreign and domestic—will provide the capital needed for economic growth. That opportunity will arise once there is a new government in Moscow after last December's Duma elections and next June's presidential election. But the cultural changes ultimately needed to sustain a functioning civil society and a market-based economy may take a generation. Western openness to Russia's people, particularly its youth, in exchange programs and contact with the private sector and educational opportunities can help that process. It is also important to engage the leadership of Russia's diverse regions, where economic and social policies are increasingly pursued independently of Moscow.

In the meantime, U.S. policy must concentrate on the important security agenda with Russia. First, it must recognize that American

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security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by its weakness and incoherence. This suggests immediate attention to the safety and security of Moscow's nuclear forces and stockpile. The Nunn-Lugar program should be funded fully and pursued aggressively. (Because American contractors do most of the work, the risk of the diversion of funds is low.) Second, Washington must begin a comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the changing nuclear threat. Much has been made by Russian military officials about their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of their declining conventional readiness. The Russian deterrent is more than adequate against the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and vice versa. But that fact need no longer be enshrined in a treaty that is almost 30 years old and is a relic of a profoundly adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty was intended to prevent the development of national missile defenses in the Cold War security environment. Today, the principal concerns are nuclear threats from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world and the possibility of unauthorized releases as nuclear weapons spread.

American security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by its weakness and incoherence.

Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats than Washington does. It ought to be possible to engage the Russians in a discussion of the changed threat environment, their possible responses, and the relationship of strategic offensive-force reductions to the deployment of defenses. The United States should make clear that it prefers to move cooperatively toward a new offense-defense mix, but that it is prepared to do so unilaterally. Moscow should understand, too, that any possibilities for sharing technology or information in these areas would depend heavily on its record—problematic to date—on the proliferation of ballistic-missile and other technologies related to WMD. It would be foolish in the extreme to share defenses with Moscow if it either leaks or deliberately transfers weapons technologies to the very states against which America is defending.

Finally, the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power, and that we will always have interests that conflict as well as coincide. The war in Chechnya, located in the oil-rich Caucasus, is

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particularly dangerous. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has used the war to stir nationalism at home while fueling his own political fortunes. The Russian military has been uncharacteristically blunt and vocal in asserting its duty to defend the integrity of the Russian Federation—an unwelcome development in civil-military relations. The long-term effect on Russia's political culture should not be underestimated. And the war has affected relations between Russia and its neighbors in the Caucasus, as the Kremlin hurls charges of harboring and abetting Chechen terrorists against states as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The war is a reminder of the vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia and of America's interest in their independence. If they can become stronger, they will be less tempting to Russia. But much depends on the ability of these states to reform their economies and political systems—a process, to date, whose success is mixed at best.

COPING WITH ROGUE REGIMES

As HISTORY MARCHES toward markets and democracy, some states have been left by the side of the road. Iraq is the prototype. Saddam Hussein's regime is isolated, his conventional military power has been severely weakened, his people live in poverty and terror, and he has no useful place in international politics. He is therefore determined to develop WMD. Nothing will change until Saddam is gone, so the United States must mobilize whatever resources it can, including support from his opposition, to remove him.

The regime of Kim Jong Il is so opaque that it is difficult to know its motivations, other than that they are malign. But North Korea also lives outside of the international system. Like East Germany, North Korea is the evil twin of a successful regime just across its border. It must fear its eventual demise from the sheer power and pull of South Korea. Pyongyang, too, has little to gain and everything to lose from engagement in the international economy. The development of WMD thus provides the destructive way out for Kim Jong Il.

President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea is attempting to find a peaceful resolution with the north through engagement. Any U.S. policy toward the north should depend heavily on coordination with

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Seoul and Tokyo. In that context, the 1994 framework agreement that attempted to bribe North Korea into forsaking nuclear weapons cannot easily be set aside. Still, there is a trap inherent in this approach: sooner or later Pyongyang will threaten to test a missile one too many times, and the United States will not respond with further benefits. Then what will Kim Jong Il do? The possibility for miscalculation is very high.

One thing is clear: the United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and decisively. The Clinton administration has failed here, sometimes threatening to use force and then backing down, as it often has with Iraq. These regimes are living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them. Rather, the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration. Second, we should accelerate efforts to defend against these weapons. This is the most important reason to deploy national and theater missile defenses as soon as possible, to focus attention on U.S. homeland defenses against chemical and biological agents, and to expand intelligence capabilities against terrorism of all kinds.

Finally, there is the Iranian regime. Iran's motivation is not to disrupt simply the development of an international system based on markets and democracy, but to replace it with an alternative: fundamentalist Islam. Fortunately, the Iranians do not have the kind of reach and power that the Soviet Union enjoyed in trying to promote its socialist alternative. But Iran's tactics have posed real problems for U.S. security. It has tried to destabilize moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, though its relations with the Saudis have improved recently. Iran has also supported terrorism against America and Western interests and attempted to develop and transfer sensitive military technologies.

Iran presents special difficulties in the Middle East, a region of core interest to the United States and to our key ally Israel. Iranian weaponry increasingly threatens Israel directly. As important as Israel's efforts to reach peace with its Arab neighbors are to the future of the Middle East, they are not the whole story of stability in the region. Israel has a real security problem, so defense cooperation with the United States—particularly in the area of ballistic missile defense—is critical. That in

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turn will help Israel protect itself both through agreements and through enhanced military power.

Still, it is important to note that there are trends in Iran that bear watching. Mohammad Khatami's election as president has given some hope of a new course for a country that once hosted a great and thriving civilization—though there are questions about how much authority he exercises. Moreover, Khatami's more moderate domestic views may not translate into more acceptable behavior abroad. All in all, changes in U.S. policy toward Iran would require changes in Iranian behavior.

BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST

AMERICA IS BLESSED with an extraordinary opportunity. It has had no territorial ambitions for nearly a century. Its national interest has been defined instead by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity, and peace. Both the will of the people and the demands of modern economies accord with that vision of the future. But even America's advantages offer no guarantees of success. It is up to America's presidential leadership and policy to bridge the gap between tomorrow's possibilities and today's realities.

The president must speak to the American people about national priorities and intentions and work with Congress to focus foreign policy around the national interest. The problem today is not an absence of bipartisan spirit in Congress or the American people's disinterest. It is the existence of a vacuum. In the absence of a compelling vision, parochial interests are filling the void.

Foreign policy in a Republican administration will most certainly be internationalist; the leading contenders in the party's presidential race have strong credentials in that regard. But it will also proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community. America can exercise power without arrogance and pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster. When it does so in concert with those who share its core values, the world becomes more prosperous, democratic, and peaceful. That has been America's special role in the past, and it should be again as we enter the next century.

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A Republican Foreign Policy

Robert B. Zoellick

AN ERA OF CHANGE

AT THE OPENING of the twentieth century, the United States began a quest similar to today's. The rise of American power, revolutions in technology, and great clashes abroad set the stage for a historic transformation. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson dominated the age, as they debated and labored to promote their visions of America's role in a new international system. In 2000, the world is again in an era of rapid change, reminiscent of a century ago. The vitality of America's private economy, the preeminence of its military power, and the appeal of the country's ideas are unparalleled. But as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher cautioned her colleagues, we must "expect the unexpected." A primary task for the next president of the United States is to build public support for a strategy that will shape the world so as to protect and promote American interests and values for the next 50 years.

At the end of the Cold War, President George Bush built on Ronald Reagan's legacy by beginning to adapt American foreign policy to the challenges of changed circumstances. Recognizing the importance of

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economic ties, his administration negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), supported a free-trade agreement with Chile as a step toward free trade throughout the western hemisphere, and promoted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group to bind U.S. economic interests across the Pacific. The United States then employed these regional initiatives to bring the global trade talks of the Uruguay Round to the edge of conclusion. Those initiatives have created the most powerful movement toward free trade in history.

The United States also took advantage of its preeminent position to push hard for peace in a number of vital areas. In the Middle East, the United States used its standing after the Cold War and the Gulf War to break old deadlocks at the Madrid Conference and to push the Arab-Israeli peace process to a totally new plane. The Bush administration sought to reshape the strategic landscape across Europe and Russia by uniting Germany within NATO in 1990, defining a new strategic concept for NATO in 1991, opening the alliance to former enemies in 1990 and 1991, and negotiating landmark conventional and nuclear arms reduction agreements to underpin the new security framework. U.S. ties with Russia reached an impressive level of effectiveness, as demonstrated by their cooperation in the Gulf War. U.S. links with China were also slowly improving after the Tiananmen Square tragedy, as the Bush administration handled sharp differences in a way that still enabled it to foster positive change. By the end of its term, the administration had created a climate of cooperation among the world's major powers.

CLINTON'S FLAWED APPROACH

PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON's intelligence and his ability to synthesize policy and politics at home held out the prospect that he could build on Bush's initial efforts to redefine America's position in the world. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration never adopted a guiding strategy or even demonstrated a sustained commitment to foreign policy. As a result, Clinton has failed to define a new internationalism for the United States, thus letting historic opportunities slip away.

Clinton's foreign policies have been stymied by five flaws. The first, an unwillingness to remain committed to his own priorities, has been demonstrated by his drift on international trade. Clinton started

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with an encouraging emphasis on trade, perhaps because he inherited a signed NAFTA deal and a partial Uruguay Round agreement that he could not abandon easily. But after 1994, the Clinton administration changed its course: it made pledges for free trade, but the reality of its policies did not match the rhetoric. Instead, the United States demanded managed-trade quotas with Japan—precisely the wrong remedy for a country needing deregulation—until it was compelled to retreat. Fearful of alienating protectionist political constituencies, Clinton was unwilling to build on NAFTA or even to defend it. After deferring to the new economic isolationists, Clinton seemed surprised in 1997 when he could muster only about 40 out of 200 members of his own party in the House of Representatives to support his forlorn search for the authority necessary to negotiate additional trade agreements.

These mistakes have had lasting consequences. In the early 1990s, countries throughout Latin America were competing to negotiate free-trade agreements with the United States. Recognizing the strategic value of NAFTA, they wanted to connect their economies, societies, security, and even political systems to America. Today, no one in Latin America or elsewhere expects the current administration to follow through on its statements. Latin Americans proceeded with their own customs union, which has been negotiating new trade ventures with the European Union (EU) and Japan. When East Asian economies faced their greatest financial shock in generations—creating possibilities for structural reforms but also a need to fight protectionism with mutual liberalization—U.S. trade negotiators stood on the sidelines. Without the initiative and leadership of the United States, all participants involved in launching the global trade talks in Seattle last November approached the meeting defensively. So the new trade round was stymied by stalemate. Washington has the power to shape global economic relations for the next 50 years, but it has marginalized itself in this crucial area.

The White House's second flaw has been to erode its credibility by offering words that are not backed by actions; this has taken a special toll with U.S. allies. It is ironic that an administration that came into office proclaiming "assertive multilateralism" has dissipated America's energies as a coalition leader. The Gulf War coalition is in tatters, not surprisingly, after years of strong language about the dangers of Saddam Hussein's machinations, followed by only tepid and reflexive actions.

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Despite the American military's overwhelming superiority in Kosovo, at the end of the bombing its European allies concluded that they needed to create their own alternative to U.S. political and security leadership. After China harshly criticized Japan for agreeing to new defense guidelines with the United States, Clinton could not find one minute during his nine-day trip to China to stand by his struggling Japanese ally. The administration managed to boot out a U.N. secretary-general, but it has never developed a sustained, consistent strategy toward the organization that would serve U.S. ends. (Only a few years earlier, America had proved that a more constructive approach to the U.N. was possible when it built the Gulf War coalition and organized the repeal of the "Zionism is racism" resolution.)

Clinton has left America looking confused, cynical, or both.

The Clinton administration's third flaw is its inability to frame strategies supported by operations, which has particularly damaged its dealings with China and Russia. Neither one is the "strategic partner" that Clinton proclaimed. In fact, the distrust created by the administration has made it hard for the United States to cooperate with either country on long-term mutual interests. Sadly, the Clinton legacy with both China and Russia—the two great powers whose future paths remain uncertain and potentially unstable—is one of tense and suspicious relations that have been getting worse.

In the case of China, at first the administration linked human rights to normal trading relations, but it later backed down—a clear sign of weakness. Clinton then mistakenly promised the Chinese that the United States would not grant a travel visa to the president of democratic Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui; his subsequent reversal of that decision generated distrust and counterreactions that have increased dangers between Beijing and Taipei. During Clinton's high-profile trip to China in 1998, he neglected to explain serious security differences, ultimately misleading China and failing to prepare the American public for China's missile buildup, its nuclear espionage, and its crackdowns on democracy. Next, Clinton prodded Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rhongji to offer the United States concessions in exchange for Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) but then inexplicably spurned Zhu's proposal during a high-profile visit,

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thereby weakening China's reform efforts. The agreement with China on the WTO in November 1999, although welcome, only underscores that Clinton could have cut a deal earlier that was as good or better—avoiding a crisis that left unnecessary scars.

Clinton's Russia policy has discredited free-market economics, squandered money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and generated widespread anti-Americanism. His "Monroeski doctrine" and his comparison of the battle in Chechnya to the U.S. Civil War have encouraged both a view of state power that conflicts with a modern, democratic Russia and a revival of Russian imperialistic attitudes. The administration's indifference to Yeltsin's shelling of the Russian legislature, among other autocratic measures, revealed a blind spot in the importance of Russia's rule of law and democratic process. Clinton has never seemed to grasp the costs of embracing an elected czar, one who oversaw a privatization drive that turned into massive theft and who now presides over pervasive corruption. Not surprisingly, this system has failed to improve the livelihood of average Russians, setting the stage for future trouble.

A fourth flaw has been Clinton's uncertainty on when and how to use American power—frequently hesitating, then overcommitting, and regularly failing to match means with ends. This weakness has shadowed his initiatives to resolve humanitarian and ethnic strife with military intervention. His "nation-building" failure in Somalia was costly in terms of lives, the reputation of the United States, and America's confidence that it can deal effectively with such problems.

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The U.S. invasion of Haiti and its multi-billion-dollar effort to bring "democracy" turned out to be an unhappy reminder that supposedly good intentions cannot save a flawed policy. The United States continued to be drawn into miniwars in the Balkans without clarifying its goals or being honest about the ongoing commitment of human and material resources these U.N. "colonies" would require. The history of false starts and missteps was captured well by Clinton's own new "doctrine" on intervention in such conflicts: his words were at first stunning in their reach but were then quickly reinterpreted, leaving the world to conclude that America is confused, cynical, or both.

Finally, many of Clinton's ventures have the disquieting feature of being driven significantly by political polls and calculations; this perception has made it exceedingly hard for him to call credibly for bipartisan foreign policies. As Clinton's ad hoc foreign policies have frayed, the administration has lashed out at its critics, calling them isolationists. In fact, Clinton's inability to develop a foreign policy disciplined by sustained priorities, reliability, strategy, selectivity, and frankness has squandered opportunities. The president's mistakes have made it harder for him to complete work in areas—such as the Middle East and Northern Ireland—where he has invested considerable effort in bringing parties together for peace processes. The Clinton foreign policy style has also taken its toll abroad. The administration has caused too many countries to be weary, and even resentful, of the United States. The power of the United States is obvious to the world, but Clinton has failed to use that power wisely or diplomatically. His rhetoric has contained much hubris but little credibility. America is more influential if it speaks softly, but with firm conviction. If it asserts that it is committed to do everything, its commitments to everything are suspect.

REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES

FIVE PRINCIPLES distinguish a modern Republican foreign policy. First, it is premised on a respect for power, being neither ashamed to pursue America's national interests nor too quick to use the country's might. By matching America's power to its interests, such a policy can achieve its objectives and build credibility both at home and abroad. U.S. policy should respect the histories, perspectives, and concerns of

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other nations, but it should not be paralyzed by intellectual penchants for moral relativism. All states do not play equally important roles. Given America's responsibilities in the world, it must retain its freedom to act against serious dangers.

Second, a modern Republican foreign policy emphasizes building and sustaining coalitions and alliances. Effective coalition leadership requires clear-eyed judgments about priorities, an appreciation of others' interests, constant consultations among partners, and a willingness to compromise on some points but to remain focused on core objectives. Allies and coalition partners should bear their fair share of the responsibilities; if they do, their views will be represented and respected. Similarly, to have an effective U.N., the key nations that compose it must recognize that their actions—not their speeches and posturing in an international forum—will determine whether problems can be solved.

Third, Republicans judge international agreements and institutions as means to achieve ends, not as forms of political therapy. Agreements and institutions can facilitate bargaining, recognize common interests, and resolve differences cooperatively. But international law, unlike domestic law, merely codifies an already agreed-upon cooperation. Even among democracies, international law not backed by enforcement mechanisms will need negotiations in order to work, and international law not backed by power cannot cope with dangerous people and states. Every issue need not be dealt with multilaterally.

Fourth, a modern Republican foreign policy must embrace the revolutionary changes in the information and communications, technology, commerce, and finance sectors that will shape the environment for global politics and security. Because of these changes, people's aspirations—to exercise their free will and transform their lives—are rising in all corners of the globe. Communities of private groups, whether organized for business or social ends, will achieve results far beyond the reach of governments and international bureaucracies. The United States can leverage this dynamism to open minds and markets. America's foreign policy must promote these global trends. It must take practical steps to move the world toward greater freedoms and human rights. It should link itself to the agents of change around the world through new networks of free trade, information, and investment.

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Finally, a modern Republican foreign policy recognizes that there is still evil in the world—people who hate America and the ideas for which it stands. Today, we face enemies who are hard at work to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, along with the missiles to deliver them. The United States must remain vigilant and have the strength to defeat its enemies. People driven by enmity or by a need to dominate will not respond to reason or goodwill. They will manipulate civilized rules for uncivilized ends.

POWER AND ECONOMICS

A MODERN Republican foreign policy should apply these principles within a long-term strategy to promote peace, security, and liberty. America must capture the dynamism of the era and transform its new elements into the economic and security foundations for a future system. The United States and its partners need to link the world's continental regions within a global economic system that secures the benefits of integration while coping with the inevitable stresses of capitalism. Looking at the twentieth century, it is clear that peace is not ensured through closer economic ties alone; so the United States must navigate changing great-power relations, strengthen its alliances, and maintain unquestioned military superiority over dangerous regimes.

In the information age, America should promote an open architecture in order to capitalize on its greatest assets: a vibrant, innovative economy and a society that continually reinvents itself. American concepts of corporate governance, shareholder value, benchmarking, and the "value chain" are now discussed in executive offices around the globe. By incorporating advances in information and communications technologies into business processes, U.S. corporations have triggered gains in productivity similar to those achieved when companies learned how to reengineer their businesses using electrical power 100 years ago. The surge in e-commerce, already a $500 billion activity, is transforming business models again. Governments everywhere are turning to privatization and deregulation to help their countries keep pace. The American entrepreneur commands an awe that matches the respect accorded the American military.

The American private sector is a powerful, attractive magnet. But the U.S. government has not used this energetic force to transform others

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in ways that enable America to build on its successes. Instead, growth and market imbalances have led to the largest trade deficits in American history. Although U.S. markets are generally open to the world, too many others remain closed to the United States. Countries should embrace changes that will tap the vitality and genius of people around the world, improve their livelihood and health, and open doors to freedom. Government efforts to turn back the clock, even if well-meaning, will end up hurting people. Instead, governments and societies should help people adjust to and benefit from new possibilities. Therefore, a successful U.S. foreign policy must also be based on superior education at home, low taxes that reward work and risk-taking, and secure savings and pensions for retirees.

America's economic agenda should be ambitious—ranging from farm products to e-commerce.

The United States needs a strategic economic-negotiating agenda that combines regional agreements with the development of global rules for an open economy. To link up with Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, the United States should propose free-trade agreements, with either individual countries or regional groups. If India continues its reforms, the United States should offer it a new economic partnership beginning with those Indian sectors that are open to the world or can offer large public gains through deregulation. As a new generation of leaders gains authority in the Middle East, possible peace agreements can be buttressed by drawing these societies into information-age economics and integrating their economies into world markets. African countries seeking to abandon the old, failed state controls need the incentive of open U.S. and world markets for their emerging enterprises, as well as financial backing for serious reforms. The EU and the United States should follow the lead of their increasingly integrated businesses by opening even more sectors to cross-investment and greater competition, with the aim of achieving transatlantic free trade.

These agendas should be ambitious—ranging from farm products to e-commerce. Tariffs should be cut further. The United States should support innovative business ventures to streamline common standards. It should promote the deregulation and opening of vast new

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global markets for services—in areas such as energy, airlines, finance, and entertainment. The United States should apply successful regional precedents in economic and trade liberalization to other regions or to global negotiations through the WTO. By operating at the center of this changing network, the United States—the one economy with a truly global reach—should promote openness among regions.

If some regions are too slow to open their markets, the United States should move on to others. America should spur a competitive dynamic for openness and transparency. Competition can work wonders: when the United States pursued NAFTA and APEC, the EU finally felt the pressure to complete the global Uruguay Round trade negotiations. If others hold back in the new WTO round, the United States should repeat this strategy of regionalism with a global goal in order to break the logjam.

This modern Republican design recognizes the benefits of regional integration and seeks to harness it for global purposes; regional integration can help countries deal more effectively with transnational problems, such as the environment or narcotics trafficking. The practice of joint action within regions, especially by private-sector groups, can be expanded to deal with common political and even security issues. The history of U.S. foreign policy is full of examples of private parties—from missionaries to engineers—who forwarded America's belief in the future by helping others face the challenges of the day. The very nature of the "new economy"—with its rapidly adapting technologies, fast-paced change, and innovative spirit—will elevate the role of private parties; they will often surpass the government in their ability to resolve inevitable disputes. These parties are not zero-sum thinkers. The U.S. government should create a climate in which citizens can serve both the private and the public good. Prosperity with a purpose is an idea that reaches far beyond U.S. borders.

If America links its economy to those of key regions, it can also promote its geopolitical agenda. Deeper integration with Latin America, Europe, and East Asia will support U.S. security commitments as citizens of these regions recognize their common interests. At best, economic interdependence will be a new glue that draws partners close together. More modestly, creating common rules for open economies will connect private sectors and help manage a combination of cooperation and competition.

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This blueprint expands on America's political and economic principles. It promotes open markets and open societies, the free flow of information and ideas, and the development of the private sector—all of which contribute to the growth of economies, middle classes, and liberties. If China, Russia, India, and others want to keep up, they will have to open up. This plan offers a positive program around which internationalists of both parties can rally to counter protectionists and isolationists. It also challenges America to sustain its openness, a feature that attracts great thinkers and doers from all over the world. It creates a dynamism that gives its diverse society cohesion and a shared purpose; and it safeguards liberty and freedom.

If China, Russia, and India want to keep up, they must open up.

The public international financial institutions—especially the IMF and the World Bank—also need to be overhauled to match the demands of the information age and the globalization of financial markets. Considering how private-sector financial firms have changed in recent years, it is understandable that the Bretton Woods institutions of 1944 require major reengineering. First, the operations of the IMF and the World Bank must be more transparent, on-line, and real-time. They should fight corruption, which can drain both money and confidence. But they should not, out of technocratic hubris, usurp the proper roles of either creditor or debtor governments or of the private financial sector. A dependency on international bureaucracies for solutions to tough problems will dissuade national governments from taking responsibility for their countries' futures and will ultimately erode the legitimacy of both governments and international financial institutions.

The IMF still has a role to play in buffering national financial markets against shocks that threaten global stability, until self-help rebalances the capital movements. But the IMF must exercise this role in a fashion that does not add to long-term financial instability by encouraging risks for which investors are not willing to pay. Furthermore, since today's global economy (different from what it was 50 years ago) rests on private capital flows, the IMF must "bail-in" creditors, not bail them out. Private creditors must play a financial role in restructuring "national bankruptcies," just as when they have loaned money to companies in trouble; creditors can reschedule loans, take discounts, and extend more

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money during workouts. The World Bank should concentrate on helping people adjust to change. In poor countries, this agenda may involve improving basic health and subsistence needs while creating economic opportunities. In other low-income countries, the World Bank can assist in developing markets that will enable people to benefit from self-help.

ALLIES, ENEMIES, AND IN-BETWEENS

IN PURSUING a reinvigorated foreign policy, the United States first needs to overhaul ties with its partners and allies: its North American neighbors and its two primary partners abroad, Europe and Japan. Mexico, Canada, and the United States share an interest in building on their common democracy and prosperity by addressing problems that require greater regional cooperation—such as narcotics, the environment, and illegal immigration. To operate effectively overseas, the United States must ensure that it has a strong neighborhood at home. Transatlantic and transpacific alliances can go a long way toward ensuring security in the eastern and western parts of Eurasia, where in the past dangerous powers have threatened the United States. These partnerships can enhance America's ability to address the uncertain futures of China and Russia. The EU and Japan are also important colleagues in ensuring an international economy hospitable to growth, dynamism, and the creative spirit.

The United States should not be complacent about its allies' roles. Europeans say they want to shoulder a greater defense responsibility—and they should—especially when it comes to policing their own continent. But a wide gap still separates Europe's defense oratory and its actual spending on the necessary capabilities. The United States should encourage its NATO allies to face this reality and to recognize the mutual benefit in having European defense forces operating in close concert with the U.S. military through coalitions. Ultimately, an effective European defense arm will require serious participation by British, French, and German troops.

Japan should evolve gradually toward assuming more responsibility for East Asian security, in concert with America and its allies. Only the United States can help Japan's neighbors accept this historic adjustment, which is the key to transforming Japan's domestic opinion. As a start, Japan, the United States, Korea, and Australia should form

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closer defense ties. Over time, Japan's forces should be more closely integrated to support the U.S. military in Asia. These steps will strengthen the posture of the Pacific democracies toward North Korea, demonstrate to China that it should seek security cooperation (and not competition) with the Asia-Pacific democracies, and channel any increased Japanese capabilities into a reassuring framework.

Second, the United States and its partners face three great challenges in Eurasia: China, Russia, and India. China has been rising, Russia has been weakening, and India has been reassessing its outlook. These are the "big ones," and more mistakes with them could cost America dearly in the future. The United States must be realistic, not romantic, about the prospects for China and Russia. These states should be integrated into the economic, security, and political arrangements that America and its allies have sponsored, although we must be prepared to shield against these countries if integration is not possible. These countries are "works in progress"; they are not yet friends and are certainly not partners, but they need not be enemies. The United States and its allies should explain to both China and Russia the steps that can build on shared interests and lessen differences. Ultimately, America will evaluate its own ability to cooperate—and the world will assess America's willingness to do so—based on concrete actions, not photo opportunities.

India, the world's largest democracy and before long its most populous nation, will play an increasingly important role in Asia. To grow and prosper, it will need to adjust to the global economy. To contribute to its prosperity and regional security, India will need to lower the risk of conflict with its neighbors. And to have influence with India, America must stop ignoring it. A more open India, possessing a broader understanding of its place in the world, could become a valuable partner of the United States in coping with Eurasia's uncertainties. In addition to proposing trade and investment liberalization, the United States should open a regular, high-level security dialogue with India on Eurasia and the challenges to stability.

Third, North America, the EU, and Japan need to reach out to the next group of potential partners. In varying degrees, moving at different paces, countries in central and eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia have been opening private markets, building middle classes, and developing representative democracies that respect

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individual liberties. But these countries have been subject to enormous stresses. With Latin America in particular, the United States has resumed its old, bad habit of overlooking its neighbors until problems compel it to pay attention. Resistance is slowing the momentum for democracy and free markets that Latin America kicked off a decade ago. More debt defaults, rising populism, frustrations with the lack of tangible results from economic reforms, and narcotics traffickers seeking to control governments all threaten to eclipse the movement toward what should be a historic and strategic achievement: a fully democratic and prosperous western hemisphere.

Fourth, the United States must counter those dangerous states that threaten its closest friends, such as Israel, or its vital interests, such as maintaining access to oil in the Persian Gulf. In dealing with the likes of Iraq and North Korea, the United States needs to offer consistent long-term directions to guide coalitions that will deter and even replace their brutal regimes. Concessions to blackmail and threats, even if they serve as temporary expedients, will exacerbate these problems. The United States must retain the initiative so that its opponents are so worried about what America is planning that they cannot plot attacks or new forms of blackmail. Theater and national missile defenses will let the United States counter missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction from those countries that might target U.S. conventional forces or paralyze the United States if it intervenes against their threats. Time is on America's side—not that of these decaying dictatorships—if the United States has the confidence and determination to stand up to, and if necessary defeat, its enemies.

MILITARY MIGHT

AMERICA'S LEADERSHIP in the next century requires a strong military, wisely used. The Clinton administration has too often relied on the U.S. military to bail out speculative diplomatic ventures that turned sour. Concurrently, America's military has been cut back some 40 percent. At some point, doing more with less just becomes doing less with less. Given the current demands on the U.S. military, the Pentagon has made the troublesome choice of trying to fund present needs at the expense of future capabilities. This spending improvisation is divorced

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from the administration's own plans. As the military equipment bought in the early 1980s ages, the armed services are spending more and more funds just to keep old planes, ships, and tanks operating. The administration's undersecretary of defense called this quandary a "death spiral." The chair of the joint chiefs of staff called it a "nosedive." These are strong words. The failure to prepare for the future will become sharply apparent during the next decade, when the wheels start to come off the weapons purchased some 25 years ago. As one Marine general said, "If parents are uncomfortable sending their sons and daughters to college in 25-year-old cars, what will they think about sending them into harm's way in 25-year-old helicopters?"

The challenge for the next president is not just to spend more on defense but to spend wisely. In transforming its defense strategy for the future, the United States should seek to align the military's strength with the nation's strengths: America's people and technology. U.S. companies that have not incorporated the revolutionary advances in information and communications technologies have been swept away by their competition with surprising rapidity. The Pentagon cannot afford to run a similar risk. The United States must invest in a combination of sophisticated sensors, information technology, real-time communications, and precision-guided weapons that will enable the individual services to fight together seamlessly in joint operations. Future networked forces should be smaller, quicker, easier to deploy, more dispersed, and able to destroy targets with fewer sorties and greater "standoff" capabilities. They must be able to act together when executing discrete missions—such as suppressing air defenses, achieving complete air dominance, and destroying small, mobile targets—that will be vital in the new security environment. They will need "more teeth and less tail." At the end of the day, gutsy soldiers in muddy boots will still have to hold ground, but they need to be the fastest to get to decisive points, with the most precise firepower to support them.

This transformation will take time. In many respects, technology is the easy part. The challenge is to integrate technology into new operational concepts, doctrines, and organizational structures—and then to practice them. (In June 1940, the French army had more and better tanks than the German army, but the panzer leaders knew how to use blitzkrieg operations to overwhelm France within weeks.) The experience of the private sector

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points the way toward a smart, modernized defense for the future. Like private business executives facing new challenges, the next generation of military officers needs clear goals to guide change—and strong support in making the country's forces achieve these goals. Only the president can establish these goals and provide the needed leadership.

The Pentagon can also learn from the private sector about cutting costs. Although the cost of civilian information-technology systems has fallen tremendously, the price of analogous military systems has not. Like other professional organizations, the Defense Department must focus on its core missions and outsource supporting activities. In leading this transformation, the next president must also challenge America's allies to keep up. In critical areas, U.S. allies in Europe and the Pacific can share significant burdens and make major contributions. In order to fight together, their forces must be interoperable. And allies should assume greater roles in peacekeeping operations, supported by unique U.S. capabilities and backed by the hammer of its robust force.

THE RIGHT TRACK

As Americans enter a new century, the history of the last one may inspire a sense of both caution and opportunity. The United States in 1900 seemed to have unbounded potential. But the first half of the twentieth century involved frightful costs. And although America achieved great accomplishments over the past 50 years, these came at a high price of lives, money, and national attention. Now a new generation must chart a course for America amid revolutionary changes in technologies, economies, societies, and weaponry. It is a mistake for the United States simply to react to events. America needs a strategy that blends traditional truths with the opportunities of a networked marketplace and a modernized army. It must be realistic about human nature and conflicting interests while being optimistic about the world's potential. America must deploy its power wisely, selectively, and consistently to mold an international system that will enhance its influence in future events. Drawing on this influence, modern Republicans believe they can work with like-minded Democrats so that America can advance both its interests and its ideals. America's potential is extraordinary, and so is the world's. It is time to get on the right track.

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Labor's New Internationalism

Jay Mazur

THE SEATTLE MESSAGE

THE FERVENT PROTESTS that accompanied the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle last November showed just how urgent the issues of globalization and trade are to working Americans. Joining with environmentalists, consumer advocates, and human rights activists, the labor movement's message from Seattle could not have been clearer: The era of trade negotiations conducted by sheltered elites balancing competing commercial interests behind closed doors is over. Globalization has reached a turning point. The future is a contested terrain of very public choices that will shape the world economy of the 21st century. The forces behind global economic change—which exalt deregulation, cater to corporations, undermine social structures, and ignore popular concerns—cannot be sustained. Globalization is leaving perilous instability and rising inequality in its wake. It is hurting too many and helping too few. As President Clinton himself has said, if the global market is to survive, it must work for working families. A first step toward that goal is building labor rights, environmental protection, and social standards into trade accords and the protocols of international financial institutions—and enforcing them with the same vigor now reserved for property rights.

These concerns of the labor movement are often caricatured as protectionist, parochial, and out of touch with the realities of the global

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economy. This is a dangerous misreading of the labor movement's position. Confusing labor's concerns over fairness with rising isolationism in America and abroad will only hinder the adoption of the reforms needed. Trade policies that ignore the rights and needs of workers move the world backward, not forward. The cacophonous voices in the streets of Seattle represented tomorrow's challenge, not yesterday's nostalgia. They imagined a world in which prosperity is shared by those who produce it, in which nations treat each other, the earth, and its people with dignity and respect. The protesters demanded accountability for the powerful and a voice for the voiceless. Such idealism has a practical effect. Shared prosperity increases the purchasing power of workers, creating new demand to absorb the excess capacity that now depresses global markets. The fragile institutions of the emerging global economy will therefore be braced by the democratic tonic that gives working people a place at the economic and political table. In the words of John Gray, former adviser to Margaret Thatcher, the global market and free trade are not natural phenomena but creatures of state power, "an end product of social engineering and unyielding political will." Inevitably, the effort to enforce such a system engenders a democratic response.

THE DARK SIDE OF GLOBALIZATION

TRAGICALLY, too many working people are losing out in the new world economic order. The most recent U.N. Development Report documents how globalization has dramatically increased inequality between and within nations, even as it connects people as never before. A world in which the assets of the 200 richest people are greater than the combined income of the more than 2 billion people at the other end of the economic ladder should give everyone pause. Such islands of concentrated wealth in a sea of misery have historically been a prelude to upheaval.

The benefits of the global economy are reaped disproportionately by the handful of countries and companies that set rules and shape markets. The vast majority of trade and investment takes place between industrial nations, dominated by global corporations that control a third of world exports. Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations. Private financial flows have long since surpassed

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

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

One strike and you're out: UPS employees rally in Jersey City, New Jersey, August 1997

public-development aid and remain remarkably concentrated; 80 percent of foreign direct investment in developing and transition economies in the 1990s went to just 20 countries, much of it to China.

Increased trade has not resulted in anything near uniform growth. Only 33 countries managed to sustain 3 percent annual GDP growth on a per capita basis between 1980 and 1996; in 59 countries, per capita GDP declined. Eighty countries have lower per capita incomes today than they did a decade or more ago. And contrary to conventional wisdom, those left behind are often the most integrated into global trade. For example, sub-Saharan Africa has a higher export-to-GDP ratio

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than Latin America, but its exports are mainly primary commodities, leaving those nations vulnerable to the volatility of those markets. The recent Africa trade bill—passed by Congress without debt relief provisions or enforcement of labor rights and environmental standards—merely offers old wine in new bottles.

Millions of workers are losing out in a global economy that disrupts traditional economies and weakens the ability of their governments to assist them. They are left to fend for themselves within failed states against destitution, famine, and plagues. They are forced to migrate, offer their labor at wages below subsistence, sacrifice their children, and cash in their natural environments and often their personal health—all in a desperate struggle to survive.

To be fair, globalization has brought dramatic benefits in some countries. Ironically, the greatest successes have been in East Asia—those very nations that did not play by the rules of the so-called Washington consensus of privatization, deregulation, fiscal austerity, and lower trade barriers. Many of those countries protected their markets, redistributed land, invested in education, targeted and subsidized their exports, and purposefully ran mercantilist trade surpluses, all of which Washington winked at during the Cold War. But in recent years, most of these countries succumbed to pressures to open their economies and deregulate their financial systems. As a result, they became the major victims of the recent global economic crisis that thrust literally millions of working people back into poverty. As Paul Krugman, the MIT economist, concluded in *The Return of Depression Economics,* these Asian economies were vulnerable not because of crony capitalism but because "they had opened up their financial markets, because they had, in fact, become better free market economies, not worse."

The last financial crisis was unusual only in its severity and scope. As the World Bank's former chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, has noted, the deregulated global economy has produced a "boom in busts"—financial crises of increasing depth and regularity. Whereas speculators are often bailed out, workers are not. Education and health budgets are slashed to pay off debts. Children are taken from school. Millions lose their jobs. Real wages fall sharply. Families break up. Social unrest, crime, and violence increase. In short, macroeconomic data can tick upward, but working families suffer the effects for years. Poverty and

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desperation still haunt Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea today even as foreign capital returns to those markets. Mexico's economy may have recovered from its 1996 crash, but many small business owners remain ruined. Mexican workers have lost 25 percent of their purchasing power since the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement. The very remedies that the International Monetary Fund prescribes to nations in crisis—devaluation, austerity, cutbacks in social services to entice foreign speculators by increasing imports—ensure that workers, domestic producers, and peasants pay for a crisis they did not create.

The deregulated global economy has produced a "boom in busts."

One lasting effect of recurrent financial instability has been slower economic growth. The volatility of speculative capital flows encourages caution, leading governments to enforce stricter fiscal and monetary policies. As a result, as the economists John Eatwell and Lance Taylor have shown, the last 25 years of deregulation have been accompanied by slower rates of growth in both industrial and developing countries. For working people, slow growth translates into increased unemployment and underemployment, stagnant wages, and growing insecurity.

The results across the globe sharply contrast with the rosy picture painted by globalization's promoters. As millions of people move from countryside to cities, from peasant villages into informal sectors of urban economies, the standard of living has risen dramatically in a few countries. But the World Bank also reports that 200 million more people this year are living in absolute poverty (on less than $1 a day) than in 1987—a remarkable figure given the relative success of the Chinese economy. In much of Latin America, the lost decade of the 1980s has been followed by the stagnation of the 1990s. In much of Africa, debt, destitution, and disease continue to block development. Russia, once an industrial nation, has been reduced to bartering. China, the eternal next great market, has been caught in a deflationary spiral for two years.

Even in the industrial nations, which benefit the most from the global economy, the record is mixed. Japan is still struggling to emerge from a decade of stagnation. Europe suffers from slow

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growth, chronic unemployment, and downward pressure on wages and working conditions. In the United States, after the longest period of continued growth since the 1960s, relative wages still have not recovered the ground lost over the last decades. Wage inequality has hit levels not witnessed since the Gilded Age of the 1890s, with the average CEO now earning 416 times more than a worker. Fewer workers have adequate health insurance and pensions. People find themselves working longer hours, with less job security, and running harder to stand still.

In global terms, this mix of rising inequality, slow growth, and falling or stagnant wages increases excess capacity in industry after industry, across the globe. Workers are not making enough to buy the products that they produce. Even Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan worried aloud about the threat of deflation as the Asian crisis threatened to spread around the world.

These problems stem from the top. As the World Bank's Stiglitz has noted, the Washington consensus on globalization does not concern itself with inequality or "externalities" like environmental damage, child labor abuses, or hazardous workplaces. The rules-based system developed in global trade rounds—developed largely by and for multinational corporations—requires countries to rewrite commercial codes, uproot traditional ways of farming, and protect copyrights. But the system takes no responsibility for the human costs of these policies.

Now enforced by the WTO, these rules not only avoid responsibility for the impact of these disruptive policies on workers and the environment, they also frustrate national and local efforts to legislate and live by deeply rooted social values. The citizens of Massachusetts are told they cannot prohibit their state government from contracting with companies that do business with Burma's brutal dictators. Workers watch helplessly as their well-paying jobs are given to other workers forced to live on wages that lock them in misery. Laws for cleaner gasoline are struck down as discriminatory. Regulations to protect endangered species are declared to be restraints on trade. In this democratic age, the legitimacy of any modern economic system should be measured by the quality of life afforded the many, not by the license provided the few. For working people everywhere, these realities have produced a growing reaction against the terms and conditions of the global order.

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A WHOLE NEW WORLD

NOT SURPRISINGLY, unions have found themselves at the forefront of the challenge posed by globalization. They have always operated across borders; their ideological roots—and much of their early membership—grew out of the internationalist perspective of the European labor movement of the last century. When American corporations were still huddling behind tariff barriers, workers were organizing international associations based on the principles of solidarity and social justice. These values have constantly drawn unions into the global arena over the great issues of war and peace, democracy and despotism. And this century's history has demonstrated that the correlation between strong, independent unions and authentic democracy is not accidental—a lesson with the utmost relevance for the unfolding debate over the rules of the new global economy.

Organized labor has perhaps been slow in reacting to globalization. After World War II, the social-democratic compromises struck in different industrial nations emphasized full employment and a social contract. For 25 years, companies and workers grew prosperous together. Trade had relatively little impact on economies—and when it did, exports provided a source of jobs. Only a few particularly vulnerable industries were disrupted by imports. Meanwhile, the international role of the labor movement was more geopolitical than industrial; during the Cold War, the AFL-CIO defined its international mission mainly through the prism of anticommunism. The principal structures of the international labor movement, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and even the industrially based international trade secretariats were all seen as instruments in the bipolar struggle against communism, enjoying active government support. Strong, independent unions were seen as vital in strengthening democracy and distributing the benefits of prosperity to ensure that workers felt they had a stake in market economies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed government perspectives toward labor. Unions have been viewed as less politically relevant and obstacles to corporate interests. A broad ideological offensive by corporations has portrayed unions as outmoded relics of a bygone age. But as big business has gone global and wages an increasingly aggressive

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assault on unions, the labor movement has become more, not less, internationalist. Virtually every major industrial dispute in the United States now has an international dimension. Not only do companies use the threat of moving abroad to trump workers' wage and benefit demands, but companies themselves are often foreign firms. A third of the members of the million-member United Food and Commercial Workers union, for example, are employed by non-U.S. companies. As corporate mergers and alliances accelerate the global integration of capital, more unions find themselves in a similar situation.

In response, unions have to reach across borders to forge the same kind of strategic international links among workers and their allies that corporations have formed in shaping the new economy—and are increasingly linked by the same modern communications technologies that corporations have deployed so effectively to exploit their own mobility. A poll of AFL-CIO unions a few years ago found that two-thirds were engaged in international activity as a necessary extension of their normal organizing and bargaining; 87 percent said they needed to do even more on the global scene.

Not so long ago, a major union's international activity could be carried out by a single person who might even have had other organizational responsibilities. This is no longer possible. The most advanced unions now involve many of their departments—organizing, research, political action, public relations, education, legal, health and safety, and corporate affairs—in diverse strategies. In turn, these strategies forge effective links with overseas partners, coordinate industrial actions, lobby governments, take legal action, and simultaneously publicize all this activity in more than one country. International-trade secretariats, headquartered in Europe, link unions from different countries in the same industry and play a critical role.

THE POWER OF POSITIVE LINKING

IN DEALING with management, today's unions understand that they must have an accurate picture of the company's entire global structure to pressure effectively its vulnerable points and establish links with workers and unions around the world. One especially dramatic example of this strategy was the 1997 United Parcel Service (UPS) strike, involving

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185,000 members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The strike was settled after two weeks on terms considered favorable to the union; many saw it as a sign of labor's renewed vigor.

The strike succeeded through preparation by Teamsters members at UPS, who mobilized across America and effectively campaigned to gain public support. But international solidarity also played a critical role. As the dominant firm in the U.S. courier market, UPS could have endured a long national strike. But the Teamsters knew that UPS was fighting stiff competition in Europe and made breaking into that market a high priority. Europe was the vulnerable point in the company's global structure—and there they struck.

In mapping this strategy, the Teamsters relied on a broad international support network that they had built up over many months. A year before the strike, the Teamsters had formed a World Council of UPS unions with help from the International Transport Workers Federation. Communications were established between UPS unions, and a series of meetings was held with union representatives from the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Canada, Germany, Brazil, Ireland, and the United States. No two unions had exactly the same relationship with the company. Many represented UPS workers; others were trying to organize them; still others represented workers at competing firms who would suffer if UPS succeeded in undercutting industry standards. Some enjoyed a relatively good relationship with their employers, others not. The degrees of leverage and militancy varied from country to country. Activities restricted in some countries were allowed in others. Such are some of the extraordinary complications involved in organizing workers globally. But the unions identified enough common ground that the council could hammer out a set of demands for a UPS World Action Day in the spring of 1997, calling a meeting in Washington, D.C., that coincided with the final stages of the Teamsters' negotiations with UPS.

Representatives from UPS looking across the table at the Teamsters' "guests" from around the world realized that the damage from this strike could not be contained within the United States. On UPS World Action Day, the company was hit with more than 150 job actions or demonstrations worldwide, including work stoppages in Italy and Spain. Major European customers began questioning the company's reliability. The

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credible threat that this strike could spread and undermine a crucial element in the company's business strategy was reinforced by escalating solidarity actions. The day after the company learned that a French transport-workers union planned to close UPS operations at Paris' Orly Airport, the strike was settled—in no small part, according to union negotiators, due to this unprecedented international campaign.

The difficulty in organizing a campaign on this scale cannot be underestimated, but neither can the results. Most unions now understand that they must match the mobility and agility of employers in the global economy. And workers understand that conditions abroad clearly affect their prospects at home.

True, some industries—like time-sensitive transportation companies—are more susceptible than others to this type of campaign. But all corporate structures have points of vulnerability, and unions are becoming increasingly effective in identifying them. Linked by computer, phone, and fax, sharing research and planning, energized by periodic face-to-face contact, and working with an increasingly active and sophisticated base of more than 150 million organized workers worldwide, the labor movement is inexorably bringing its force to bear on the global economy.

Picket lines of major strikes now almost routinely radiate internationally. Teamsters in Atlanta, steelworkers in South Carolina, and hotel workers in California get help from unions in Europe, Japan, and South Africa. Requests for solidarity actions flow in all directions—if not with the velocity of currency transactions, then with equal urgency and perhaps more staying power. Corporations are also discovering that when they sit down to bargain with a union, they may look across the table at representatives of workers from more than one country. This now happens in many industries, from low-tech companies producing pickles in Mexico and Michigan to multinational communications giants in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM

GLOBALIZATION is most destructive in countries where independent unions do not exist and organizing is suppressed. Many developing countries market their export-processing zones as union-free to attract investment; the sweatshop *maquilla* factories in Central America

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are only one example. A recent International Labor Organization (ILO) study of 850 of these zones around the world, which employ 27 million workers, found that free trade unions and minimum labor standards are "extremely rare." This enormous mass of unorganized workers poses the central challenge to the international labor movement. Although many of these workers are concentrated in the so-called developing world, millions of others live and work in industrialized countries. They are the human beings quantified by the U.N. statistics cited earlier, victims of the growing inequality in the global economy. Without the ability to organize, bargain collectively, or strike, these workers are caught in what globalization looks like to an awful lot of people: a race to the bottom. It will not end until policymakers recognize that no nation is too poor to enforce the basic human rights of its workers.

Faced with masses of unorganized workers across the world, unions find themselves harking back to an old strategy in the apparel industry: "following the work." After workers organized unions in New York City in the 1920s, manufacturers shifted work across the Hudson River to New Jersey, into the "foreign zones" (as any place outside of New York's garment district was then called) in search of cheaper and more compliant labor. The union responded by following the firms and organizing workers there. When the companies moved on to Philadelphia and the Midwest, the union followed again, but it also realized that basic national standards were needed to put a floor underneath workers. Many other unions soon reached the same conclusion, uniting to campaign hard for what became the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, setting hours, conditions, and a minimum wage for the new national economy. This combination of dynamic organizing and national legal standards created a powerful labor movement that raised the standard of living for millions of working families and bolstered the ideals of American democracy.

In recent years, as the corporate descendants of these employers have taken the next step and moved production halfway around the world, it first seemed that they had dropped off the face of the earth. But pitting American workers against their counterparts abroad, who are forced to live at the very margins of human existence,

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gradually made itself apparent in lowered wages and standards at home. The dismal working conditions in Asia and Central America set the standards for the notorious sweatshop discovered in El Monte, California, in 1995. Unions once more had to learn to follow the work—and to campaign for core labor rights and standards everywhere to ensure that the global rules were respected at home and abroad.

UNITE, for example, has worked closely with its trade secretariat, the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation, over the past five years to help organize the half-million apparel workers in Central America and the Caribbean. Although political boundaries divide these workers from those in Mexico, the United States, and Canada, the trade agreements underpinning globalization in the region—as well as the outsourcing strategies of the large U.S. manufacturers and retailers—have in effect created a unitary and contiguous regional labor market in these industries of some two million workers.

Because workers in this market's southern tier are systematically denied the right to organize and bargain collectively, their wages are artificially suppressed to about one-tenth of those in the industry's organized sectors in the North. Not surprisingly, most of these workers live below the official poverty lines of their own countries. Abysmal standards are driving down wages and conditions of workers throughout the industry. So just as unions had to "follow the work" across the Hudson River in the 1930s, they have been forced to follow the work across the southern U.S. border in the 1990s, supporting the labor movement in neighboring countries, training organizers, coordinating campaigns, lobbying governments to enforce their laws, and appealing to the American people's sense of fairness and social justice.

Progress has been slow but real. Unions and human rights groups have exposed shameful working conditions for women and children. Thousands of workers throughout Latin America have built and joined unions that did not exist a few years ago. Multinational corporations are being forced to accept responsibility, at least verbally, for working conditions in their vast global production chains. Governments feel the heat from citizens demanding

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corrective action, and companies from consumers. Firms such as Nike and celebrities such as Kathie Lee Gifford have discovered this reality.

At least half the clothes purchased by Americans are still made in sweatshops at home and abroad. Companies like to say that consumers do not care about anything except a good bargain, but polls show that people are willing to pay more if they can be assured that their clothes were not made in sweatshops. Meanwhile, a new generation of student activists has joined the labor movement in the war against sweatshops. Churches have passed resolutions and distributed flyers to parishioners. City councils and state legislatures have prohibited the purchase of sweatshop goods. A social movement of potentially tremendous force has begun to gather that can affect the bottom line and the laws of the land.

A SEAT AT THE TABLE

FOR YEARS governments ignored demands to include labor and environmental rights in trade agreements, confident that there was no political cost in doing so. This is now changing. Unions are forging new alliances with environmentalists, human rights groups, and religious and consumer activists. Perhaps the most stunning demonstration of this alliance's political force was Congress' rejection last year of "fast-track" trade authority for President Clinton—not once but three times over the last two years. This new alliance insists that any trade-negotiating authority include labor rights and environmental protections as conditions for opening trade. Most of the House of Representatives now supports that position. Certainly a majority of the public does, including most voters in both parties.[1] The blocking of "fast track" made it

[1] A 1996 Wirthlin Worldwide poll found the American public favored workers' rights and environmental issues in trade agreements by an overwhelming 73 to 21 percent. In a 1997 Peter Hart poll for the AFL-CIO, 72 percent of respondents said that it was very important to include labor and environmental standards in trade agreements, as well as food-safety standards (97 percent), workplace health and safety standards (94 percent), laws against child labor (93 percent), the freedom to strike (92 percent), a minimum wage (81 percent), and the right to form unions (78 percent).

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clear that representatives of this new popular movement must have a seat at the table.

The debate over "fast track" and trade in general can no longer be portrayed as an argument between free trade and protectionism. The demand for enforceable labor rights in global trading accords, built into conditions of the international financial institutions and enacted into U.S. trade agreements and laws, is not an effort to build walls against the global economy. It is an effort to build rules into it, and a floor under it, to lift wages and conditions up rather than drive them down.

Fortunately, there is much agreement already over the substance of core labor rights. Last year, business, labor, and government representatives from 173 nations reaffirmed core labor standards as fundamental human rights, including freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. They also called for the elimination of forced labor, child labor, and employment-related discrimination. Virtually every independent labor federation has endorsed the ICFTU's call for building labor rights into the global trading system. The divide is not between North and South; it is between workers everywhere and the great concentrations of capital and the governments they dominate.

Enforcing core labor rights does not guarantee working conditions. But it does empower workers to act collectively—a right they have theoretically enjoyed for at least 50 years. It is time to enforce that right. When workers can join independent unions, they vastly increase their chances of lifting themselves and their families out of poverty and making their concerns felt in legislatures too often dominated by private interests. In addition, wealth and income tend to be spread more widely and economic demand better sustained, while speculative booms and busts tend to be more limited.

After Seattle, the demand for labor rights and other social standards can no longer be ignored. If the WTO and other institutions cannot accommodate those demands, it is they who will be weakened, not the movement to fix the system. Attention will turn to national and local politics, opposition to trading accords will build, and support for protection and subsidy will increase. Companies will find themselves increasingly vulnerable to exposure and embarrassment,

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to consumer boycotts and worker protests. Citizens will insist that their food be protected, their air not be poisoned, their water not be fouled. Human rights activists will demand sanctions against barbarous regimes. Workers will demand recourse. The failure to heed them will feed the dangerous new strains of isolationism rising throughout the world.

The labor movement is deeply committed to this struggle for reform and the construction of a new internationalism. It is a struggle that takes place at the plant gate, in local and national legislatures, and in international negotiations. The stew of national and international laws and institutions that emerges will not be smooth or bland. But the recent transformation of the world economy has not been matched by changes in political institutions. Workers, social activists, and ordinary citizens are now beginning to demand and mobilize for those changes. Future generations will surely have difficulty comprehending why today's leaders were debating not how to implement these reforms but whether or not they were even worthy of consideration.

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Rwanda in Retrospect

Alan J. Kuperman

A HARD LOOK AT INTERVENTION

SEVERAL YEARS after mass killings in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, the United States is still searching for a comprehensive policy to address deadly communal conflicts. Among Washington policymakers and pundits, only two basic principles have achieved some consensus. First, U.S. ground troops generally should not be used in humanitarian interventions during ongoing civil wars. Second, an exception should be made for cases of genocide, especially where intervention can succeed at low cost. Support for intervention to stop genocide is voiced across most of the political spectrum.

Despite this amorphous consensus that the United States can and should do more when the next genocide occurs, there has been little hard thinking about just what that would entail or accomplish. A close examination of what a realistic U.S. military intervention could have achieved in the last clear case of genocide this decade, Rwanda, finds insupportable the oft-repeated claim that 5,000 troops deployed at the outset of the killing in April 1994 could have prevented the genocide. This claim was originally made by the U.N.'s commanding general in Rwanda during the genocide and has since been endorsed by members of Congress, human rights groups, and a distinguished panel of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Although some lives could have been saved by intervention of any size at any point during the genocide, the hard truth is that even a large force deployed immediately upon

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reports of attempted genocide would not have been able to save even half the ultimate victims.

PRELUDE TO GENOCIDE

RWANDAN POLITICS were traditionally dominated by the Tutsi, a group that once made up 17 percent of the population. Virtually all the rest of the population was Hutu, and less than one percent were aboriginal Twa. All three groups lived intermingled throughout the country. During the transition to independence starting in 1959, however, the Hutu seized control in a violent struggle that spurred the exodus of about half the Tutsi population to neighboring states.

The Hutu themselves were divided into two regional groups. The majority lived in the central and southern part of the country and supported the PARMEHUTU (Parti du mouvement et de l'émancipation des Bahutu), which assumed power upon independence, while a minority lived in the northwest, historically a separate region. During the first decade of independence, Tutsi refugees invaded Rwanda repeatedly, seeking a return to power. The ruling Hutu responded by massacring domestic Tutsi. In 1973, a northwestern Hutu officer, Juvénal Habyarimana, led a coup that shifted political power to his region. Northwestern Hutu came to dominate Rwanda's political, military, and economic life, engendering resentment from other Hutu as well as from the Tutsi. But large-scale violence against domestic Tutsi largely disappeared for 15 years in the absence of any further attempted invasions by refugees.

Stability began to unravel in October 1990, when an expatriate rebel force composed mainly of Uganda-based Tutsi refugees, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), invaded northern Rwanda. The RPA and its political arm, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), were led by battle-tested soldiers who had fought with the Ugandan guerrilla Yoweri Museveni to overthrow Uganda's government in 1986 before turning their efforts toward home. By early 1993, the rebels had made substantial inroads against the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Armed Forces (or FAR, in the French acronym). This military advance, combined with diplomatic pressure from the international community, compelled Habyarimana to agree to share power in the Arusha accords of August 1993.

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The peacekeepers of the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) then arrived, but for eight months the Rwandan leader obstructed and tried to modify the power-sharing provisions. The extremist wing of his northwestern Hutu clique viewed the accords as abject surrender to the Tutsi, who they feared would seize the spoils of rule and seek retribution. Habyarimana attempted to retain power by co-opting the opposition Hutu through bribery and appeals to solidarity against the Tutsi, and he succeeded in splitting off radical factions from the main opposition parties. But he and the extremists also developed a forceful option—training militias, broadcasting anti-Tutsi hate radio, and plotting to kill moderate Hutu leaders and Tutsi civilians. On April 6, 1994, as Habyarimana appeared to be acquiescing to international pressure to implement the accords, his plane was mysteriously shot down. The genocide plan was put in motion.

The most remarkable aspect of the genocide was its speed.

In most areas of Rwanda, violence began on the following day. The government radio station and the extremists' counterpart—Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines—urged the Hutu to take vengeance against the Tutsi for their alleged murder of the president. Led by militias, Hutu began to attack the homes of neighboring Tutsi, attempting to rob, rape, and murder them, and often setting fire to their homes. This initial step did not eliminate a high proportion of Tutsi, however, because their attackers were generally poorly armed. The vast majority of Tutsi fled their homes and sought refuge in central gathering places—churches, schools, hospitals, athletic fields, stadiums, and other accessible spaces. Tutsi often passed through more than one such site to gather in larger concentrations, either voluntarily or at government direction. Within a few days, most of Rwanda's Tutsi had congregated at such centralized sites throughout the country, in groups ranging from a few hundred to tens of thousands.

At first, the assembled Tutsi gained a defensive advantage. The surrounding crowds of militia-led Hutu were generally armed only with swords, spears, and machetes—or with the traditional *masu*, a large club studded with nails. By using walls and buildings for defense,

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

Tutsi groups could often fend off attacks merely by throwing rocks. By contrast, individual Tutsi who attempted to flee were often killed immediately by the surrounding Hutu masses or caught and killed at roadblocks. For several days, this produced a standoff. Tutsi living conditions were deteriorating and supplies were dwindling, but most Hutu were unwilling to risk casualties by attacking.

This situation changed in most of Rwanda within a week, by about April 13, when better-armed Hutu reinforcements—composed of members of the regular army, the reserves, the Presidential Guard (PG), or the national police—began arriving at the Tutsi gathering sites. Although these forces were few in number at each site, they were armed with rifles, grenades, or machine guns, which tilted the

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balance of force. They would typically toss a few grenades on the Tutsi and follow with light-arms fire. Survivors who attempted to flee were usually mowed down by gunfire or caught and killed by the surrounding mob. Militia-led Hutu would then enter the site, hacking to death those still alive. Some Tutsi escaped in the initial mayhem or avoided death by hiding beneath their dead compatriots, but many were later caught at roadblocks and killed on the spot or taken to other central sites to face a similar ordeal. A few lucky Tutsi survived by hiding in places such as pit latrines or the homes of sympathetic Hutu, living to tell their harrowing tales.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the genocide was its speed. According to survivor testimonies gathered by African Rights and Human Rights Watch, the majority of Tutsi gathering sites were attacked and destroyed before April 21, only 14 days into the genocide. Given that half or more of the ultimate Tutsi victims died at these sites, the unavoidable conclusion is that a large portion of Rwanda's Tutsi had been killed by April 21—perhaps 250,000 in just over two weeks. That would be the fastest genocide rate in recorded history.

Despite this generally rapid pace, two factors constrained the speed and extent of the killing in Rwanda. First, Hutu extremists generally avoided large-scale massacres when international observers were present—as part of a comprehensive strategy to hide the genocide from both the outside world and Rwanda's remaining Tutsi until it could be completed. Wherever Tutsi were congregated under the watch of outside observers, the extremists favored an alternate strategy of slow, stealthy annihilation: Hutu leaders would arrive each day at such sites with a list of up to several dozen names, usually starting with the Tutsi political elite. These Tutsi would be removed under a false pretense such as interrogation before being taken to a remote location and executed. This occurred at several places across Rwanda: Kamarampaka Stadium and the Nyarushishi camp in Cyangugu prefecture, where Red Cross aid workers were present; the Kabgayi Archbishopric in Gitarama, under the watchful eyes of the pope's subordinates; Amahoro stadium in Kigali, where U.N. troops stood guard; and smaller sites in Kigali such as the St. Famille and St. Paul's churches. At such sites, the slower pace of killing meant that the vast majority of Tutsi there were still alive at the end of April, and a good number survived the entire ordeal.

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Second, the killing varied among Rwanda's ten original prefectures. Byumba prefecture in the north was the base of the Tutsi-led rebels, who generally prevented large-scale massacres of Tutsi there. The two prefectures most dominated by Hutu extremists, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in the northwest, also suffered relatively little killing because much of their Tutsi populations had fled prior to the genocide in response to earlier threats and harassment.

Two prefectures with high Tutsi populations and strong Hutu opposition movements also initially managed to avoid the genocide. Butare prefecture in the south was governed by a Tutsi prefect who managed to keep matters relatively calm until he was removed from office on April 18. Widespread killing then began with a vengeance, and tens of thousands of Tutsi perished in the next few days. Similarly, Gitarama prefecture, the heart of central Rwandan Hutu opposition to the northwestern Hutu regime, generally resisted implementing the genocide until government forces arrived to spur them on. Large-scale killing commenced there about April 21. Finally, the nature of killing in the capital, Kigali, also differed significantly from that in the rest of the country. During the first two days, a highly organized and thorough assassination campaign was carried out there against opposition politicians and prominent liberals such as human rights advocates. Unlike elsewhere, many of Kigali's initial victims of Hutu extremism were fellow Hutu.

Civil war also erupted in Kigali almost immediately. On April 7, an RPA battalion that had been stationed in the capital since December 1993 under the Arusha accords demanded a halt to atrocities against civilians—and then clashed with government forces when its demand was ignored. With the president and the moderate opposition dead, war breaking out in Kigali, and radio broadcasts urging Hutu to kill their neighbors, the capital descended into chaos. Corpses began to pile up, totaling as many as 20,000 during the first week. Unlike in the countryside, however, Tutsi had a decent chance of gaining some refuge by reaching a central gathering site where foreigners stood guard. Although the extremists could not hide the chaos and violence in the capital, they generally avoided wholesale massacres before such witnesses in hopes of averting foreign military intervention.

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ESTIMATED PACE OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
APRIL – JULY 1994



By late April, only three weeks after the president's plane crash, almost all the large massacres were finished. The rebels themselves acknowledged on April 29 that "the genocide is almost completed." Human Rights Watch concurs that "in general, the worst massacres had finished by the end of April." By that time, it notes, "perhaps half of the Tutsi population of Rwanda"—some two-thirds of the ultimate Tutsi victims—already had been exterminated. Killing of the remaining Tutsi continued at a slower pace for another two and a half months until halted by the rebels' military victory and a belated French-led intervention.

Precise Tutsi death totals are difficult to determine because of several factors, including the inability to distinguish Tutsi from Hutu corpses. But estimates can be made by subtracting the number of Tutsi survivors from the number living in Rwanda immediately prior to the genocide. Estimated 1994 population figures, which are extrapolated from the 1991 census and account for annual population growth of three percent, indicate that Rwanda's pre-genocide

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population included approximately 650,000 Tutsi. There is no evidence for other, higher claims.[1] After the genocide and civil war, some 150,000 Tutsi survivors were identified by aid organizations. Thus an estimated 500,000 Rwandan Tutsi were killed, more than three-quarters of their population. The number of Hutu killed during the genocide and civil war is even less certain, with estimates ranging from 10,000 to well over 100,000.

THE KNOWLEDGE GAP

ALTHOUGH U.S. intelligence reports from the period of the genocide remain classified, they probably mirrored those of the international news media, human rights organizations, and the U.N.—because U.S. intelligence agencies committed virtually no in-country resources to what was considered a tiny state in a region of little strategic value. During the genocide's early phases, the U.S. government actually received most of its information from nongovernmental organizations. A comprehensive review of such international reporting—by American, British, French, Belgian, and Rwandan media, leading human rights groups, and U.N. officials—strongly suggests that President Clinton could not have known that a nationwide genocide was under way in Rwanda until about April 20.

This conclusion is based on five aspects of the reporting during the first two weeks. First, violence was initially depicted in the context of a two-sided civil war—one that the Tutsi were winning—rather than a one-sided genocide against the Tutsi. On April 13, the Western press accurately reported that Rwanda's Hutu interim government had fled the capital for refuge in Gitarama and that "the fall of Kigali seems imminent" (Paris Radio France International). When Western troops arrived to evacuate foreign nationals, the Tutsi rebels did not

[1] Some accounts claim that one million Tutsi lived in Rwanda before the genocide, making up 12 percent of the population, which would correspond with the estimate of 850,000 killed. But historical demographic data suggest otherwise. In 1956, a Belgian census counted almost 17 percent of the population as Tutsi, but half of those fled or died in the violence that accompanied independence. The remaining 9 percent subsequently had a lower fertility rate than the Hutu, reducing the Tutsi population to the 8 percent reported in the 1991 census.

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seek assistance but rather demanded that the troops depart immediately so as not to interfere with their imminent victory. The Canadian commander of the U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire, also identified the problem as mutual violence, stating on April 15 that "if we see another three weeks of being cooped up and seeing them pound each other" (*The Guardian*), the U.N. presence would be reassessed. In addition, until April 18 both the government and the rebels stated publicly that the FAR was not participating in massacres. (The government was engaged in a cover-up, and the rebels initially avoided implicating the FAR in the vain hope of winning its allegiance against the extremist Hutu.)

Second, the violence was reported to be waning when it actually was accelerating. Just four days in, on April 11, *The New York Times* reported that fighting had "diminished in intensity" and *Le Monde* wrote three days later that "a strange calm reigns in downtown" Kigali. The commander of Belgian peacekeepers stated that "the fighting has died down somewhat, one could say that it has all but stopped" (Paris Radio France International). On April 17, Dallaire told the BBC that except for an isolated pocket in the north, "the rest of the line is essentially quite quiet." Only on April 18 did a Belgian radio station question this consensus, explaining that the decline in reports of violence was because "most foreigners have left, including journalists."

Third, most early death counts were gross underestimates and never suggested genocidal proportions. Three days into the killing, on April 10, *The New York Times* quoted varying estimates of 8,000 or "tens of thousands" dead. But during the second week, media estimates did not rise at all. On April 18, the *Times* still reported only 20,000 deaths, underestimating the actual carnage at that point by about tenfold. The true scope of the killing emerged only on April 20, when Human Rights Watch estimated that "as many as 100,000 people may have died to date," followed the next day by a Red Cross estimate of perhaps "hundreds of thousands."

Fourth, the initial focus of international reporting was almost exclusively on Kigali, a relatively small city, and thus failed to indicate the broader scope of violence—a consequence both of Hutu concealment efforts and of the Western evacuation of expatriates and reporters from the countryside. Although a few early reports of rural violence

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did trickle out to the West, these indicated military combat, mutual ethnic violence, or criminal looting rather than an extermination campaign. An RPF official told the BBC on April 12 only that "we want to stop the senseless killing that is going on in Kigali." The first international report of a large-scale massacre outside the capital did not emerge until April 16. As late as April 20, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali still described the killings as "mainly in Kigali." This initial obsession with the capital, which contained only four percent of Rwanda's population, obscured the national scope of violence and thus its genocidal intent.

The rebels' own radio station did not report the nationwide scope of the violence until April 19. American newspapers failed to give any such indication until April 22, when they belatedly reported that fighting bands had reduced "much of the country to chaos" (*The New York Times*). Many foreign observers still could not conceive that a genocide was under way. On April 23, *The Washington Post* pondered why only 20,000 refugees had crossed the border—even though half a million Tutsi had fled their homes—and reported that aid workers had concluded that "most of the borders have been sealed by the Rwandan Army." Only on April 25 did *The New York Times* solve the riddle, reporting that violence had "widened into what appears to be a methodical killing of Tutsi across the countryside." The missing refugees "either have been killed or are trying to hide."

Fifth, no credible and knowledgeable observers, including human rights groups, raised the prospect that genocide was occurring until the end of the second week. In opinion articles published on April 14 and 17, Human Rights Watch gave no hint of an attempted nationwide genocide. The rebels did not use the term until April 17. Human Rights Watch finally raised the prospect in an April 19 letter to the U.N. Security Council. Other international observers remained considerably more cautious. The pope first used the word "genocide" on April 27. The U.S. Committee for Refugees waited until May 2 to urge the Clinton administration to make such a determination. Only on May 4 did Boutros-Ghali finally declare a "real genocide." Thus the earliest President Clinton credibly could have made a determination of attempted genocide was about April 20, 1994—two weeks into the violence.

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THE MILITARY SCENE

AT THE TIME of Habyarimana's death, Rwanda hosted three military forces—those of the government, the rebels, and the United Nations. Government forces totaled about 40,000, including the army, the national police, and 1,500 PG troops. But except for the PG and a few other elite battalions, this force was largely hollow, having expanded sixfold in three years responding to the rebel threat. Another 15,000 to 30,000 Hutu were scattered around the country in militias, but many apparently did not possess firearms or ammunition. Rebel arms were more primitive than the FAR's and included few motorized vehicles and no aircraft.

UNAMIR had about 2,500 peacekeepers, most either in Kigali or in the north near the demilitarized zone. Their presence was subject to the consent of the Rwandan government. Rules of engagement were somewhat ambiguous but were generally interpreted to bar the use of force except in self-defense or in joint operations with Rwandan national police.

On the first day of violence, the PG executed ten Belgian peacekeepers who were attempting to protect Rwanda's opposition prime minister. These deaths and the emerging chaos in Kigali prompted Western governments to evacuate their nationals. European troops began arriving on April 9 and evacuated several thousand Westerners before departing on April 13. On April 10, Dallaire also requested 5,000 more U.N. troops to halt what he perceived to be mutual killing confined to the capital. Instead, Belgium announced on April 14 that it would be withdrawing its UNAMIR battalion, which triggered unease among the other troop-contributors and led the U.N. Security Council a week later to cut authorized troop levels to a skeleton crew of 270.

Rebel forces, estimated at 20,000, had been constrained by the Arusha accords to a small area of northern Rwanda; the exception was one authorized Kigali battalion, which the RPF had reinforced clandestinely to about 1,000 troops. When the civil war was renewed on April 7, the northern-based rebels set out to help the stranded battalion in the capital and engage FAR troops elsewhere, making quick progress down Rwanda's entire eastern flank by late April. Thereafter, the war had two stationary fronts, in Kigali and Ruhengeri,

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until the end of June, as well as a broad mobile front moving westward through southern Rwanda. In just three months, the rebels captured most of the country—Gitarama on June 9, Kigali on July 4, Butare on July 5, Ruhengeri on July 14, and Gisenyi on July 17—before finally declaring a cease-fire on July 18.

As reports of genocide reached the outside world starting in late April, public outcry spurred the United Nations to reauthorize a beefed-up "UNAMIR II" on May 17. During the following month, however, the U.N. was unable to obtain any substantial contributions of troops and equipment. As a result, on June 22 the Security Council authorized France to lead its own intervention, Operation Turquoise, by which time most Tutsi were already long dead.

POTENTIAL U.S. INTERVENTIONS

IN RETROSPECT, three levels of potential U.S. military intervention warrant analysis: maximum, moderate, and minimal. None would have entailed full-blown nationwide policing or long-term nation-building by American troops. Based on historical experience, full-blown policing would have required some 80,000 to 160,000 personnel—that is, ten to twenty troops per thousand of population—an amount far more than logistically or politically feasible. Nation-building would have been left to a follow-on multinational force, presumably under U.N. authorization.

Maximum intervention would have used all feasible force to halt large-scale killing and military conflict throughout Rwanda. Moderate intervention would have sought to halt some large-scale killing without deploying troops to areas of ongoing civil war, in order to reduce U.S. casualties. Minimal intervention would have relied on air power alone.

A maximum intervention would have required deployment of a force roughly the size of one U.S. division—three brigades and supporting units, comprising about 15,000 troops and their equipment—with rules of engagement permitting the use of deadly force to protect endangered Rwandans. After establishing a base of operations at Kigali airport, the force would have focused on three primary goals: halting armed combat and interposing itself between FAR and RPF forces on the two stationary fronts of the civil war; establishing order

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THREE POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS

	Force size	*Airlift in days*	*Tutsi saved*	*Percentage of death toll*
Maximum	Division 13,500 troops; 27,000 tons	40	125,000	25
Moderate	Reinforced Brigade 6,000 troops; 10,000 tons	21	100,000	20
Minimum	Air Assault Brigade 2,500 troops (outside Rwanda); 4,500 tons	14	75,000	15

in the capital; and finally fanning out to halt large-scale genocidal killing in the countryside. None of these tasks would have been especially difficult or dangerous for properly configured and supported American troops once they were in Rwanda. But transporting such a force 10,000 miles to a landlocked country with limited airfields would have been considerably slower than some retrospective appraisals have suggested.

The first brigade to arrive would have been responsible for Kigali: coercing the FAR and RPF to halt hostilities, interposing itself between them, and policing the capital. The second brigade would have deployed one battalion in the north to halt the civil war in Ruhengeri and another as a rapid-reaction force in case American troops drew fire. The third brigade, supplemented by a battalion of the second brigade, would have been devoted to halting the killing in the countryside. Such an effort would have required roughly 2,000 troops to halt the war in Kigali, 3,000 to police Kigali, 1,000 to stop the fighting in the north, 1,500 for a rapid-reaction force, and 6,000 to stop the genocide outside Kigali—a total of about 13,500 troops, in addition to support personnel.

The time required to deploy such a force would have depended mainly on its weight. A division-size task force built around one brigade each from the 101st Air Assault, 82nd Airborne, and a light army division can be approximated as the average of those divisions—26,550 tons, including 200 helicopters and 13,500 personnel. (The Marines could also have substituted for the one of the brigades.)

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Because Rwanda is a landlocked country in Central Africa, and because speed is critical in stopping a genocide, the entire force would have been airlifted. The rate of airlift would have been constrained by factors such as the delay in loading planes at U.S. bases, excessive demand for air refueling, fuel shortages in Central Africa, and the limited airfield capacity in Kigali and at the potential staging base at Entebbe in neighboring Uganda. At an optimistic rate of 800 tons daily, the task force would have required 33 days to airlift. Personnel, which are much quicker to transport than their cargo, could have been sent first—but it would have been imprudent to deploy them into the field without sufficient equipment and logistics. Several additional days would also have been required for the delay between the deployment order and start of airlift, for the gradual increase in the capacity of theater airfields unaccustomed to such traffic, and for travel to and unloading at the theater. In addition, the rate of force deployment might have been slowed by the need to use limited airlift capacity for food, medicine, and spare parts to sustain the first troops to arrive. Thus the entire force could not have closed in the theater until about 40 days after the president's order.

Hutu ringleaders spread false reports of an impending Western intervention to help speed the killings.

Advance units, however, could have begun operations much sooner. Approximately four days after the order, a battalion or two of Army Rangers could have parachuted in and seized Kigali airport at night. Follow-on troops could have expanded outward from the airfield to establish a secure operating base. Within about two weeks, sufficient troops and equipment could have arrived to halt the fighting, form a buffer between the FAR and the RPF in Kigali and northwest Rwanda, and fully police the capital. Only later, however, could the intervention force have turned in earnest to stopping the genocide in the countryside as helicopters, vehicles, and troops arrived.

Some observers have suggested that the genocide would have ceased spontaneously throughout Rwanda upon the arrival of Western enforcement troops in Kigali—or possibly even earlier, upon the mere announcement of a deployment. They claim that the extremists would have halted killing in hopes of avoiding punishment. But these

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Hutu were already guilty of genocide and could not have imagined that stopping midway would gain them absolution. More likely, the announcement of Western intervention would have accelerated the killing as extremists tried to finish the job and eliminate witnesses while they had a chance. Such was the trend ahead of the RPA advance, as Hutu militias attempted to wipe out remaining Tutsi before the rebels arrived. During the genocide, the ringleaders even trumpeted false reports of an impending Western intervention to help motivate Hutu to complete the killings. Although the Hutu generally held back from mass killing at sites guarded by foreigners to avoid provoking Western intervention, they would have lost this incentive for restraint had such an intervention been announced.

A major intervention would have saved 275,000 Tutsi, compared to the 150,000 who actually survived.

The 6,000 U.S. troops deployed to the countryside would have been insufficient to establish a full police presence, but they could have found and protected significant concentrations of threatened Rwandans. Ideally, helicopter reconnaissance could have identified vulnerable or hostile groups from the air and then directed rapid response forces to disperse hostile factions and secure the sites. Alternately, ground troops could have radiated out from Kigali in a methodical occupation of the countryside. Displaced Rwandans could have been gathered gradually into perhaps 20 large camps for their protection.

Depending on the search method, large-scale genocide could have been stopped during the fourth or fifth week after the deployment order, by May 15 to May 25. Interestingly enough, this would have been before the task force's airlift had been completed. Based on the genocide's progression, such an intervention would have saved about 275,000 Tutsi, instead of the 150,000 who actually survived. Maximum credible intervention thus could not have prevented the genocide, as is sometimes claimed, but it could have spared about 125,000 Tutsi from death, some 25 percent of the ultimate toll.

A more modest intervention would have refrained from deploying U.S. troops to any area in Rwanda in which FAR and RPA troops were actively fighting. In late April, this would have limited U.S. troops to

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a zone consisting of six prefectures in the south and west of Rwanda. A single reinforced brigade would have sufficed given the reduced territory, population, and threat of potential adversaries. Ideally, the ready brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division would have been designated and supplemented by two additional light-infantry battalions, supporting units for peace operations, and additional helicopters and motorized vehicles: a force of 6,000 personnel, weighing about 10,000 tons.

For such an action, three main objectives would have been set: first, to deter and prevent entry of organized military forces into the above-mentioned zone; second, to halt large-scale genocide there; and third, to prepare for a handoff to a U.N. force. Strategic airlift would not have relied on Kigali airport, which was still a battleground in the civil war, but rather on neighboring Bujumbura in Burundi and Entebbe in Uganda—which would have further constrained the deployment rates. Still, facing little military threat in the zone, these troops probably could have stopped large-scale genocide there within three weeks after the deployment order, by May 11, 1994. About 200,000 Tutsi from the zone could have survived, as opposed to about 100,000 from this part of Rwanda who actually did. Elsewhere in Rwanda, genocide would have continued until stopped by the RPA, as occurred, leaving only 50,000 survivors outside the zone of intervention. Moderate intervention thus could have spared about 100,000 Tutsi from death, or 20 percent of the ultimate toll. Surprisingly, moderate intervention in this case would have saved almost as many lives as the maximum alternative, because by avoiding combat areas the interveners could have turned sooner to counter genocide in the zone where most Tutsi lived.

The third alternative, a minimal intervention, would have attempted to mitigate the genocide without introducing U.S. ground troops into Rwanda, relying on airpower alone from bases in neighboring countries. For example, the United States could have threatened to bomb the extremist ringleaders and the FAR's military assets unless the killing was halted—and then followed through if necessary. But if the threat alone failed to coerce, U.S. pilots would have had difficulty locating the ringleaders or hitting FAR positions without killing rebels as well. Even if air coercion had succeeded in Rwanda, a follow-on ground force would have been needed to keep the peace. Alternatively, the

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United States could have pursued airborne policing, which would have attempted to interdict physically and intimidate psychologically the perpetrators of the genocide throughout Rwanda. Significant numbers of U.S. attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft could have patrolled Rwanda daily from bases in neighboring countries. If armed factions threatening large groups of civilians were spotted, air-to-ground fire could have dispersed the assailants, at least temporarily. Such air patrols would have continued until deployment of non-American ground troops or until the RPF won the civil war. But airborne policing could not have prevented smaller acts of violence in the meantime.

Another minimal approach would have been to help the Rwandan Tutsi escape to refugee camps in bordering states—Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, or Zaire—by using helicopter patrols to ensure safe passage. Rwanda has only about 600 miles of paved roads. Assuming a team of 20 helicopters with standard maintenance needs, five helicopters could have been kept aloft at a time, with each responsible for 120 miles of roadway. If these helicopters flew at a ground speed of 120 miles per hour, each section of roadway could have been patrolled approximately every hour. Airborne broadcasts and leaflets would have directed the Tutsi to the exit routes. Air-to-ground fire would have broken up roadblocks and dispersed armed gangs to ensure the free flow of refugees. But this strategy could not have saved those Tutsi unable to reach major roads and would have caused a major refugee crisis.

Each of the airpower options would have had drawbacks, including the risk of losing airborne personnel to anti-aircraft fire, but each also had the potential to save tens of thousands of Tutsi. Coercion might have stopped the genocide quickly, potentially facilitating a cease-fire in the civil war. Airborne policing could have allowed more Tutsi to be saved by France's Operation Turquoise or a similar follow-up deployment. Free passage also would have kept more Tutsi alive, albeit as refugees, and they might have returned home quickly after the RPF's victory. About 300,000 Tutsi still were alive in late April 1994, of whom about 150,000 subsequently perished. If minimum intervention had been able to avert half these later killings, it could have spared about 75,000 Tutsi from death, or 15 percent of the genocide's ultimate toll.

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A WESTERN FAILURE OF WILL?

MANY OBSERVERS have claimed that timely intervention would have prevented the genocide. Some even asserted at first that UNAMIR itself could have done so, although most now acknowledge that the peacekeepers lacked sufficient arms, equipment, and supplies. Conventional wisdom still holds that 5,000 well-armed reinforcements could have prevented the genocide had they been deployed promptly when the killing began—and that the West's failure to stop the slaughter resulted exclusively from a lack of will. Rigorous scrutiny of six prominent variations of this assertion, however, finds all but one dubious.

Human Rights Watch makes the boldest claim: Diplomatic intervention could have averted the genocide without additional military deployment. These advocates contend that a threat from the international community to halt aid to any Rwandan government that committed genocide would have emboldened Hutu moderates to face down the extremists and extinguish violence. As proof, they note that moderate FAR officers appealed for support from Western embassies during the first days of violence, and that the intensity of massacres waned after the West intensified its condemnations in late April.

However, this argument ignores the fact that virtually all of Rwanda's elite military units were controlled by extremist Hutu, led by Colonel Theoneste Bagosora. These forces demonstrated their power and ruthlessness by killing Rwanda's top political moderates during the first two days of violence. By contrast, moderate Hutu officers had virtually no troops at their disposal. The moderates avoided challenging the extremists not because of a lack of Western rhetorical support but because of mortal fear for themselves and their families. This fear was justified given that the extremists stamped out any nascent opposition throughout the genocide—coercing and bribing moderate politicians, removing them from office or killing them if they did not yield, shipping moderate soldiers to the battlefront, and executing civilian opponents of genocide as "accomplices" of the rebels. The decline in massacres in late April is explained simply by the dwindling number of Tutsi still alive. International condemnation did little except compel extremists to try harder to hide the killing and disguise their rhetoric. Even these superficial gestures were directed

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mainly at persuading France to renew its military support for the anti-Tutsi war—hardly an indication of moderation.

The only way that the army's Hutu moderates could have reduced the killing of Tutsi civilians would have been to join forces with the Tutsi rebels to defeat the Hutu extremists. This was militarily feasible, given that the Tutsi rebels alone defeated both the FAR and the Hutu militias in just three months—but it was politically implausible. By April, Rwanda had already been severely polarized along ethnic lines by four years of civil war, the calculated efforts of propagandists, and the October 1993 massacre of Hutu by Tutsi in neighboring Burundi. Even moderate Hutu politicians once allied with the rebels had come to fear Tutsi hegemony. Although the moderate Hutu officers sincerely favored a cease-fire and a halt to the genocide, they could not realistically have defected to the Tutsi rebels—at least until the FAR's defeat became imminent.

U.N. peacekeepers were vulnerable to violent retaliation.

The second claim is that 5,000 U.N. troops deployed immediately upon the outbreak of violence could have prevented the genocide. But this assertion is problematic on three grounds. It assumes such troops could have been deployed virtually overnight. In reality, even a U.S. light-infantry ready brigade would have required about a week after receiving orders to begin significant operations in the theater and several more days for all its equipment to arrive. Further delays would have resulted from reinforcing the brigade with heavy armor or helicopters, or from assembling a multinational force. Even if ordered on April 10, as requested at the time by Dallaire, reinforcements probably could not have begun major operations to stop genocide much before April 20. Moreover, it is unrealistic to argue that urgent intervention should have been launched on April 10—given that the international community did not realize genocide was under way until at least ten days later.

Intervention advocates, such as the Carnegie Commission, also erroneously characterize the progression of the genocide. The commission claims that there was a "window of opportunity ... from about April 7 to April 21" when intervention "could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital [and] prevented its spread to the countryside." In reality, killing started almost immediately in most of

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Rwanda, and by April 21, the last day of this purported "window," half the ultimate Tutsi victims already were dead. Even if reinforcements had arrived overnight in Kigali, Dallaire was unaware of genocide outside the capital and thus would not have deployed troops to the countryside in time to prevent the massacres.

Furthermore, 5,000 troops would have been insufficient to stop genocide without running risks of failure or high casualties. Only 1,000 troops would have been available for policing Kigali—some three troops per thousand residents, which is grossly inadequate for a city in the throes of genocide. In the countryside, U.S. commanders would have faced a stark choice: either concentrate forces for effective action, leaving most of the country engulfed in killing; or spread forces thin, leaving troops vulnerable to attack. To avoid such painful choices in the past, U.S. military planners have insisted on deploying more than 20,000 troops for interventions in the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Haiti—all countries with populations smaller than Rwanda's.

A third claim is that U.N. headquarters had three months' advance notice of genocide and could have averted the killing simply by authorizing raids on weapons caches. Critics cite the so-called genocide fax—a January 11, 1994, cable from Dallaire to U.N. headquarters in New York that conveyed a Hutu informant's warning that extremists were planning to provoke civil war, kill Belgian peacekeepers to spur their withdrawal, and slaughter the Tutsi with an *Interahamwe* militia of 1,700 troops that the informant was training. The cable also reported an arms cache containing at least 135 weapons, which Dallaire wanted to seize within 36 hours.

Dallaire, however, raised doubts about the informant's credibility in this cable, stating that he had "certain reservations on the suddenness of the change of heart of the informant.... Possibility of a trap not fully excluded, as this may be a set-up." Raising further doubt, the cable was the first and last from Dallaire containing such accusations, according to U.N. officials. Erroneous warnings of coups and assassinations are not uncommon during civil wars. U.N. officials were prudent to direct Dallaire to confirm the allegations with Habyarimana himself, based on the informant's belief that "the president does not have full control over all elements of his old party/faction." Dallaire never reported any confirmation of the plot.

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Even if the U.N. had acquiesced to Dallaire in January 1994, it is unlikely the weapons cache could have been seized or that doing so would have prevented the genocide. The U.N. actually did reverse itself barely three weeks later, on February 4, 1994, granting Dallaire authorization to raid weapons depots. But his forces failed in every attempt, even after an informant identified three new caches on February 7. By mid-March, six weeks after receiving authorization, the peacekeepers had captured only a paltry total of 16 weapons and 100 grenades; their rules required cooperating with Rwandan police, who tipped off the extremists. If the U.N. had permitted Dallaire to act without consulting local authorities, Kigali could have responded under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (which governs consensual peacekeeping operations) by simply expelling the force. The peacekeepers also were vulnerable to violent retaliation, as they were dispersed and still lacked armored personnel carriers at the time. In addition, Dallaire's cable identified a cache of only 135 weapons—a tiny fraction of the 20,000 rifles and 500,000 machetes imported by the government over the preceding two years. Even had Dallaire managed to seize this cache without prompting expulsion or retaliation, he could not have derailed the wider genocide plot without significant reinforcements.

A fourth claim holds that quickly jamming or destroying Hutu radio transmitters when the violence broke out could have prevented the genocide. A Belgian peacekeeper who monitored broadcasts testified, "I am convinced that, if we had managed to liquidate [Radio Mille Collines], we could perhaps have avoided, or in any case limited, the genocide." A human rights advocate characterized the jamming as "the one action that, in retrospect, might have done the most to save Rwandan lives." But radio broadcasts were not essential to perpetuating or directing the killing. By April, Rwandans had been sharply polarized along ethnic lines by civil war, propaganda, and recent massacres in Burundi. Habyarimana's assassination was a sufficient trigger for many extremist Hutu to begin killing. Moderate Hutu were usually swayed not by radio broadcasts but by threats and physical intimidation from extremist authorities. Furthermore, orchestration of the genocide relied not merely on radio broadcasts but on the government's separate military communications network. Silencing the radio might have had most impact prior to the genocide, when broadcasts were fostering

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polarization, but such action would have been rejected at the time as a violation of sovereignty. Even if hate radio had been preventively extinguished, the extremists possessed and used other means to foster hatred.

The fifth variant of the intervention argument is that the Western forces sent to evacuate foreign nationals during the first week could have restored order in Kigali—and thereby prevented the genocide had they merely been given the orders to do so. Just four days after Habyarimana's assassination, some 1,000 lightly armed Western evacuation troops, mainly French and Belgian soldiers, had arrived in Kigali, where Belgium's 400-troop UNAMIR contingent was already stationed. Another 1,100 reserves were less than two hours away by air. But it is doubtful that this small force, lacking the right equipment or logistical support, could have quickly quashed violence in the capital—or that doing so would have stopped the genocide elsewhere. The Western evacuators had to commit half their force to guarding the airport at the town's outskirts and a few key assembly points, leaving few available for combat. In addition, coordinated action would have been inhibited by the widespread perception that France and Belgium sympathized with opposite sides in the civil war. Moreover, Kigali was defended by 2,000 elite Rwandan army troops and several thousand regulars equipped with heavy weapons, another 2,000 armed fighters of the Hutu militia, and 1,000 national police. Also located there were more than 1,000 Tutsi rebels who had access to surface-to-air missiles and had explicitly threatened to attack the evacuators if they extended their mission. Even if the small Western force had somehow halted the violence in Kigali, it lacked the equipment and logistics to deploy troops quickly to the countryside. Rural killing probably would have continued unless the ringleaders were captured and coerced to call off the slaughter. Such a search would not have been a quick or simple matter for any force, as demonstrated by the failed search for the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid by U.S. troops in 1993. Ill-equipped evacuation troops could have wasted weeks looking for the ringleaders while genocide continued at a torrid pace in the countryside, where 95 percent of Rwandans lived.

More U.N. forces deployed prior to the genocide with a robust mandate could have deterred the killing.

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The sixth claim is most realistic: Had UNAMIR been reinforced several months prior to the outbreak of violence, as Belgium urged at the time, genocide might have been averted. More troops with the proper equipment, a broad mandate, and robust rules of engagement could have deterred the outbreak of killing or at least snuffed it out early. Such reinforcement would have required about 3,500 additional high-quality troops in Kigali, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, adequate logistics, and the authorization to use force to seize weapons and ensure security without consulting Rwandan police. This would have been the 5,000-troop force that Dallaire envisioned—but one deployed prior to the genocide.

Under the U.N.'s peacekeeping rules, Rwanda's government would have had to consent to such a change—and probably would have. Prior to the genocide, its cabinet still was dominated by the Hutu opposition moderates who had negotiated the Arusha accords, which called for a neutral international force to "guarantee [the] overall security of the country." The U.N. Security Council had watered down implementation of this provision, authorizing UNAMIR only to "contribute to the security of the city of Kigali." As tensions mounted in early 1994, the Rwandan government again asked the U.N. to dismantle armed groups, but the peacekeepers were too weak. Belgium pleaded for reinforcements and a new mandate from the Security Council in January and February 1994 on the grounds that UNAMIR could not maintain order. But the United States and Britain blocked this initiative before it could even reach a vote, citing the costs of more troops and the danger that expanding the mission could endanger peacekeepers—as had occurred in Somalia the previous October.

The Rwandan government, however, almost certainly would have welcomed a reinforcement of UNAMIR prior to the genocide. Five thousand troops in the capital would have meant 16 troops for every thousand Rwandans, a ratio historically sufficient to quell severe civil disorders. Such a force might well have deterred the genocide plot. Failing that, well-equipped peacekeepers could have protected moderate Hutu leaders and Tutsi in the capital and captured some of the extremists during the first days of violence, thereby diminishing the chance of large-scale massacres in the countryside.

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Indeed, such early reinforcement of UNAMIR is the only proposed action that would have had a good chance of averting the genocide.

LESSONS

THE MOST OBVIOUS LESSON of Rwanda's tragedy is that intervention is no substitute for prevention. Although the 1994 genocide represents a particularly tough case for intervention in some respects—such as its rapid killing and inaccessible location—it would have been a relatively easy mission in other respects, including the limited strength of potential opponents. Yet even an ideal intervention in Rwanda would have left hundreds of thousands of Tutsi dead. To avert such violence over the long term, there is no alternative to the time-consuming business of diplomacy and negotiation. Tragically, international diplomatic efforts in Rwanda prior to the genocide were ill conceived and counterproductive.

Whether pursuing prevention or intervention, policymakers must use their imagination to better anticipate the behavior of foreign actors. In Rwanda, Western officials failed to foresee the genocide, despite numerous warning signs, in part because the act was so immoral that it was difficult to picture. Increased awareness of such risks demands that any peacekeeping force deployed preventively to a fragile area be adequately sized and equipped to stop incipient violence—rather than be sent as a lightly armed tripwire that serves mainly to foster a false sense of security. If the West is unwilling to deploy such robust forces in advance, it must refrain from coercive diplomacy aimed at compelling rulers to surrender power overnight. Otherwise, such rulers may feel so threatened by the prospect of losing power that they opt for genocide or ethnic cleansing instead. Western diplomacy that relies mainly on the threat of economic sanctions or bombing has provoked a tragic backlash not just in Rwanda, but also in Kosovo and East Timor over the last few years as local rulers opted to inflict massive violence rather than hand over power or territory to lifelong enemies. In each case, Western military intervention arrived too late to prevent the widespread atrocities.

Obviously, time is of the essence once large-scale attacks against civilians begin. Most such violence can be perpetrated in a matter of weeks, as was demonstrated in Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor. Despite this reality, domestic politics often prevents an American president from

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quickly launching a major intervention. Thus U.S. defense planners should be more creative in developing limited alternatives. The case of Rwanda underscores that lighter intervention options that avoid combat areas and focus mainly on stopping violence against civilians could save almost as many lives if pursued seriously and expeditiously. Rapid responses would be facilitated by the development of pre-prepared plans for known trouble spots and by better coordinating intelligence from available sources, including nongovernmental organizations.

That said, tradeoffs are inevitable if the United States hopes to increase its effectiveness in humanitarian military intervention. To deploy troops faster, additional "ultra-light" units (like the Tenth Mountain Division) would have to be created, either by converting existing heavier units intended for major contingencies or by increasing defense spending. The Pentagon's recent proposal to trim some heavy mechanized forces down to medium-weight units would not solve the problem, because they would still be too heavy for a quick airlift. Lighter units probably could save more lives abroad but would also be subject to more casualties and potential failure. Such tradeoffs should be made only after rigorous debate, which to date has been virtually absent in the United States.

Finally, no policy of humanitarian military intervention should be implemented without a sober consideration of its unintended consequences. Recent interventions, whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor, have been motivated by the impulse to provide humanitarian aid to a party visibly suffering in an internal conflict. But intervention in those cases also resulted in the weaker sides being bolstered militarily. This pattern creates perverse incentives for weaker parties in such conflicts to reject compromise and escalate fighting because they expect foreign intervention or hope to attract it. The result is often tragedy, as intervention arrives too little or too late to protect civilians. Thus a policy of intervening to relieve humanitarian emergencies that stem from internal conflicts may actually increase the number and extent of such emergencies—a classic instance of moral hazard.

Inevitably, decisions on whether and how to intervene in specific cases will be caught up in politics. But this challenge should not deter hard thinking on when and how such intervention can be most beneficial—or detrimental. If Rwanda demonstrates nothing else, it is that thousands of lives are at stake in such decisions.

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A Farewell to Arms Inspections

Daniel Byman

THE DANGERS OF A SHAM IN IRAQ

THE RETURN of U.N. arms inspectors to Iraq would do more harm than good. Although politicians and pundits alike call for renewed inspections, the inspectors' return not only would not remove Iraq's remaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, but—more ominously—might actually help develop Iraq's WMD programs over the long term and make a mockery of arms control in general. Surprising as it sounds, an impasse over inspections is actually the best realistic outcome for the United States. A continued standoff will better position the United States to hamper Saddam Hussein's quest for WMD—and avoid being party to the deliberate flouting of U.N. resolutions and arms control agreements.

The champions of inspections make three assumptions: that the return of inspectors will lead to the end of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs; that some inspections are better than no inspections; and that an impasse over inspections is unsustainable. All three assumptions are false.

A new round of inspections would probably not unearth much of Saddam's remaining WMD programs. Unless the international community is willing to significantly ratchet up the pressure on Iraq through tighter sanctions and military strikes, Iraq is not likely to be any more compliant with a new inspection mission. Unfortunately, current international sentiment seeks to ease pressure rather than

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increase it. Thus inspectors would not have access to sensitive sites in Iraq, and Iraqi officials would resume their deception campaign. Inspectors would probably discover only what Saddam wanted them to, or at best marginally improve the West's knowledge of Iraq's WMD programs, leaving Iraq's existing WMD capabilities untouched.

If Baghdad defied the inspectors, Washington would soon find itself in a nasty dilemma comparable to what it faced in December 1998 when it launched the Desert Fox bombing campaign: either ignore Iraq's noncompliance and deception and pave the way for declaring Iraq free of WMD, or use force to demand access. Past shows of force, however, have brought at best limited progress on inspections. Moreover, in contrast to the current on-and-off bombing of Iraq, Baghdad rather than Washington would control the timing of any confrontation.

A more fundamental concern, however, is that inspectors might certify that Iraq has ended its quest for WMD. If Iraq is allowed to control the location of the inspections, it could eventually get a passing grade on its WMD programs. This is particularly likely if the United States and its allies are unwilling to back up the inspectors with force, which would let Iraq return to its old tricks of deceiving them or denying them access. Such a certification would lead to the end of the sanctions regime slapped on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in 1990, which is justified today by Iraq's continued WMD programs. The end of sanctions would, in turn, give Saddam control over Iraqi spending and free him to purchase WMD-related materials from abroad. The nominal success of inspections today would give Saddam a free hand to develop WMD programs tomorrow.

The discrediting of inspections in Iraq could seriously harm future arms control efforts in other parts of the world. Even Iraq's most vocal supporters know that it retains some WMD capacity and almost certainly will pursue WMD in the future. As Richard Butler, the former executive chair of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with ending Iraq's WMD programs, noted, "Saddam Hussein has broken all of Iraq's nonproliferation undertakings. . . . These facts are known in the Security Council, including by those permanent members who have given Saddam strong support." Giving Baghdad a passing grade thus makes a mockery of other arms control regimes, encouraging countries to defy and cheat international agreements.

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Ironically, then, an impasse over inspections is actually the best outcome for the United States. As long as Saddam does not let inspectors into the country—and he has rejected even the suggestion of compromise here—the United States can plausibly argue that Iraq retains its WMD programs. Saddam, not the United States, appears the villain. Washington can keep sanctions relatively robust and gain support for its campaign to isolate and punish Baghdad. If inspectors return and certify Iraqi "compliance," however, the end of sanctions and Iraq's pariah status cannot be far behind.

THE GUTTING OF UNSCOM

IN APRIL 1991, in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which made the destruction of Iraq's WMD programs a condition for ending sanctions. Iraq was to declare its illegal weapons immediately and destroy them within one year. UNSCOM was created to catalog Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological arms and supervise their destruction. No one expected serious problems. Western leaders assumed that the battered, defeated Saddam would cooperate and that Iraq's limited WMD arsenal would be destroyed.

In reality, UNSCOM's task proved enormously difficult. Saddam refused to take UNSCOM seriously and neither declared the contents of his WMD arsenal nor cooperated in its destruction. "The Special Commission is a temporary measure," he reportedly told his advisers. "We will fool them, and we will bribe them, and the matter will be over in a few months." From the start, Saddam blocked the inspectors' access, lied to them about the extent or even existence of his WMD programs, and otherwise made a mockery of the process.

Iraq's arsenal also proved far more extensive than Western leaders initially suspected. Before 1990, the world knew little of Iraq's WMD efforts beyond the fact that it had a tried and tested chemical weapons program—used with gruesome effectiveness against Iraq's own Kurdish population and against Iran during their eight-year war. Moreover, the United States and its allies mistakenly believed that Operation Desert Storm had destroyed much of Iraq's WMD capability. As Defense Secretary Richard Cheney testified in the immediate aftermath of Desert Storm, "Saddam Hussein is out of the nuclear business." Information

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discovered following the Gulf War, however, indicated that Iraq was close to producing a nuclear weapon and had vast stores of chemical weapons. A key Iraqi official defected in 1995 and revealed that Saddam also had a vast biological weapons program. Thus UNSCOM's tasks proved far more onerous than its creators had imagined.

Despite these formidable challenges, UNSCOM made real progress identifying and destroying part of Iraq's WMD and missile arsenal. Along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), UNSCOM has overseen the destruction of dozens of Iraqi long-range missiles and missile warheads, tens of thousands of tons of chemical munitions, 690 tons of chemical weapons agent, a biological weapons plant, and nuclear weapons production facilities. Equally important, when the inspectors had relatively free access throughout Iraq, their presence and vigilance made it harder for Iraq to continue work on its WMD programs. By any imagining, these accomplishments were a serious setback for Saddam's regime.

Kofi Annan's pact let Iraq hide its arsenal with less fear of outside meddling.

But UNSCOM's progress never led to the ultimate success: a complete accounting of Iraq's programs and the destruction of all WMD materials. Baghdad revealed almost none of its programs willingly and often lied about destroying parts of its arsenal. Iraq almost certainly still has a small stockpile of chemical weapons and limited quantities of biological agents and seed stock.

As the inspections dragged on, Saddam provoked a series of crises and successfully wrung concessions from the Security Council that greatly hindered the inspections' effectiveness. Iraq first declared various "sensitive" sites off-limits and then expanded these restricted areas to include "presidential" sites. In June 1996, UNSCOM Chair Rolf Ekeus agreed that his teams would avoid "sensitive" sites such as the headquarters of Saddam's dictatorial Baath Party. In 1997, Iraq declared several sites "presidential" turf and thus off-limits to inspectors, even though these sites included more than 1,000 buildings and storage sites. In a fuzzily worded memorandum of understanding between U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz signed on February 23, 1998, the United Nations agreed to

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AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

The truth is out there: U.N. weapons inspectors search for missile components north of Baghdad, June 1998

respect Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legitimate concerns related to its dignity. The memorandum made particular reference to presidential sites. By implication, Annan agreed that the inspectors would limit their activities.

Taken together, the various agreements with Baghdad represented a marked shift for UNSCOM. Despite Iraq's defiance and lies, Saddam's regime was no longer bound to the original interpretation of the U.N. resolutions. Rather, it became a negotiating partner. Annan even declared that Saddam was "a man I can do business with." The Annan-Aziz

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agreement let Baghdad hide its existing WMD programs and carry out WMD-related research with less fear of UNSCOM meddling. Barring the inspectors from large parts of Iraq made the effective concealment of WMD-related materials far easier, as UNSCOM members knew better than anyone. After Ekeus' successor, Butler, stepped down, Butler blasted Annan's efforts, charging that the secretary-general papered over unsolved problems with airy diplomacy and that Annan wanted UNSCOM ended because it was too independent.

Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM and determination to confront the United States and its allies over inspections became increasingly apparent as 1997 drew to a close. Despite near-constant negotiations, Iraq refused inspectors access, sought to remove U.S. personnel from UNSCOM's staff, and otherwise made a mockery of inspections. Several attempts at compromise throughout 1998 failed, including a last-minute agreement in November 1998 under threat of U.S. air strikes. Since several days of bombing in December 1998, a campaign that went by the unfortunate name of Operation Desert Fox, Saddam has not let any inspectors visit Iraq.

In addition to gaining the complicity of officials at the United Nations, Iraq has also gained the tacit—and at times overt—support of several major powers. France, Russia, and China all became highly critical of both inspections and sanctions. After UNSCOM issued reports citing Iraqi noncompliance, these powers called for the end of sanctions and criticized UNSCOM, rather than demanding that Iraq respect the Security Council's previous resolutions. In 1997 and much of 1998, the United States eschewed air strikes on Iraq despite its contempt for U.N. disarmament resolutions for fear of losing the international consensus that had heretofore girded its actions.

Iraq implausibly insists that its WMD programs have been terminated and therefore demands that sanctions be lifted. In reality, Iraq's WMD programs probably have continued since Desert Fox, even though information on their progress is extremely scarce. A White House report to Congress notes that "Saddam Hussein has shown no hesitation in developing WMD in the past, and it is prudent to assume that he is still intent on such development."

The UNSCOM experience provides a fundamental lesson about successful arms control. Ferreting out a WMD program requires either

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the cooperation of the state involved or a willingness by the international community to ensure compliance with the relevant agreements, using force as necessary. To no one's surprise, Saddam's Iraq never cooperated. More alarming, the international community was reluctant to use force to back up the inspectors despite Iraq's repeated flouting of U.N. resolutions. As a result, UNSCOM fell short. Iraq "could have an unknowable number of SCUD-type missiles, with sufficient anthrax and VX to cause immense damage," noted Tim Trevan, a former senior adviser to UNSCOM. "This represents an impressive power projection capability in the hands of a regime that has amply shown the political will to use it. That should be enough to scare anyone into action. It scares me."

THE FIG LEAF

GIVEN THE ONGOING IMPASSE, the Security Council is currently weighing two replacements (along with several variants) for UNSCOM. Neither heir is inspiring. Both would replace the already hobbled UNSCOM with something even feebler. More important, both are short-term expedients that would speed the removal of sanctions rather than defang Saddam.

The first proposal, favored by China and Russia (and initially France), calls for replacing UNSCOM with a long-term monitoring system. This system would be essentially reactive, like past IAEA monitoring. If Baghdad agreed to this proposal, sanctions would be lifted. On balance, the suggestion is a barely veiled declaration of surrender to Iraqi obstinacy.

If China and Russia's goal was disarming Iraq, their proposal would be easy to dismiss. In essence it is modeled on the old IAEA system, which had a poor record of stopping the spread of WMD. Under the IAEA's eyes, Iraq built up a massive nuclear program in the 1980s, and hiding biological and chemical weapons programs is far easier than hiding a nuclear one. Moreover, Iraq for years successfully hid many of its WMD programs from UNSCOM's far more intrusive inspections. An IAEA-like structure would not be able to monitor, let alone halt, Iraq's WMD programs.

The powers favoring this proposal, however, care little about keeping nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons out of Saddam's clutches. They seek Baghdad's goodwill and, eventually, renewed commercial ties. They have already tried to end sanctions, declaring Iraq's paltry

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disarmament efforts sufficient. Beijing and Moscow (and sometimes Paris) want to reward Iraq for its lack of compliance by lifting sanctions, using protestations of concern about sanctions' humanitarian impact as window-dressing for their commercial motives.

NO TIME TO GO WOBBLY

A SECOND, more muscular proposal advanced by the British and the Dutch has won tentative American (and even more tentative French) backing for what was initially labeled a "United Nations Commission on Inspection and Monitoring." Now referred to as "the omnibus resolution," the proposal calls for a more assertive inspections regime, and—if Iraq complies—an end to sanctions. Foreign companies would also be allowed to invest in Iraq's oil industry, and the ceiling on Iraqi oil sales would be raised. In essence, this proposal resurrects UNSCOM, albeit in a debilitated form. If Iraq cooperated with the new regime for several months and complied with a disarmament road map, sanctions would be suspended, although they could be reimposed if, as it almost invariably has in the past, Iraq subsequently reneges on its promises.

The British-Dutch proposal to replace UNSCOM initially seems to meet most sensible U.S. concerns, unlike the fig leaf on capitulation offered by China and Russia. A closer look, however, reveals that even this proposal suffers from the same problems found later in UNSCOM's unhappy existence.

The first and most basic hitch is that any renewed inspections regime would be too weak and riddled with loopholes to be effective. The concessions made by Annan restricted inspections tremendously. Unless they are repealed, inspections will be a sham.

Even when the inspections regime was going full-bore, its effectiveness was limited. Finding hidden weapons in a vast area is exceptionally difficult, particularly for biological weapons, which require relatively limited infrastructure and can be easily concealed as legitimate medical or research facilities. The January 1995 defection of Wafiq al-Samarrai, the former chief of Iraqi military intelligence, led to the revelation that Iraq had manufactured and loaded onto delivery systems the lethal chemical agent VX—a surprise to UNSCOM. Similarly, despite four years of intrusive inspections, the full extent of Iraq's biological weapons

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program became clear only after the 1995 defection of Hussein Kamel al-Majid, who headed Iraq's WMD programs. Only then did Iraq admit that it had "weaponized" some biological agents. And remember, this successful deception occurred before the Annan concessions. With "sensitive" and "presidential" sites off-limits and with the international community reluctant to force Iraq to cooperate, inspectors will have little success in finding and destroying Iraq's most lethal weapons.

Progress would require cooperation with the world's intelligence agencies. Because of the Baathist regime's deception techniques, only clandestine means can obtain the necessary data for robust inspections—the location of the programs, the extent of ongoing research, the amount of material truly destroyed, and so on. But given the brouhaha over UNSCOM's reported cooperation with U.S., Israeli, and other intelligence services, cooperation between UNSCOM's successor and various intelligence agencies may be impossible. Even the most basic associations with others' spy services would be used to discredit the inspection process.

The inspectors' limited effectiveness was and is not due to the composition of UNSCOM itself or any of its likely successors. Indeed, its dedicated staffers and two doughty leaders, Ekeus and Butler, withstood tremendous pressure from Iraq and its allies, sticking to their guns and demanding that Iraq be held accountable for its defiance of the Security Council's will and international law. Rather, the problem is with squaring a circle: having some kind of inspections when the government in question flatly will not cooperate and when the international community will not enforce its own rules. Iraq regularly stopped UNSCOM from acquiring sensitive documents simply by blocking inspectors' access and moving the documents out the back door. Iraq's interference was hardly subtle, and its pretexts for noncompliance were often pathetic. But UNSCOM could do little more than issue firmly worded reports of Iraqi noncompliance; the commission (and its possible replacements) had no stick with which to punish Iraq. Except for the United States and Britain, the major powers would not back the commission up. And as long as there is no significant punishment for defiance, Iraq will not budge. Instead, Baghdad will appeal the decisions of UNSCOM or any successor body to the great powers, effectively neutering it.

Second, the long-term outlook would remain bleak even if UNSCOM's successor were more robust. Simply discovering and destroying Iraq's

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WMD capabilities is not enough to stop Iraq over the long term so long as Iraq can simply rebuild its WMD programs. Given Iraq's impressive engineering and scientific base and its erstwhile (and future) oil wealth, it could quickly rebuild its arsenal if sanctions were lifted as a reward for "cooperating" with inspections.

Fortunately for the United States, Saddam appears even more ignorant of this fact than are the proponents of renewed inspections. Indeed, had Saddam simply complied with UNSCOM in 1991, his WMD programs would probably be stronger today than they were on the eve of Desert Storm. Iraq could have started rebuilding after its 1991 arsenal was destroyed, which would have brought a lifting of sanctions. Ironically, Baghdad's noncompliance worked out better for Washington and its allies than compliance would have; it isolated Saddam and thus prevented him from rebuilding his WMD programs.

True long-term success arises from either a country's inability to manufacture WMD, its lack of desire to do so, or both. Saddam is obviously committed to his WMD programs; he has sacrificed almost a decade of economic development on the altar of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. He sees his terrifying arsenal as one of the key props of his power. But Iraq's WMD programs, particularly in the area of chemical weapons, will not go away even when Saddam does. Saddam's replacement will most likely come from the ranks of the army or the Baath Party, and any such successor will probably want WMD, too. Most Iraqi leaders saw chemical weapons as instrumental in defeating Iran. Moreover, given Iraq's dangerous neighborhood, a strong deterrent will be a top priority for almost any regime.

Halting Iraq's ability to manufacture WMD is a more promising approach, but it requires constant vigilance. Again, simply destroying Iraq's current stocks is no guarantee of success since Iraq retains the human capital to rebuild its programs quickly. Although assessments vary, Iraq probably would need only a few years to build a nuclear weapon after sanctions were lifted. Iraq's biological weapons programs could be resumed in a matter of days. Producing chemical agents such as mustard gas and sarin would take only a few months.

So both sanctions and strict controls over Iraqi imports are necessary to stop proliferation. Sanctions have cut Iraqi state revenues by $10 billion to $15 billion a year, slashing the regime's assets. Equally important,

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sanctions have sharply restricted what Iraq can buy. If Iraq cannot acquire "dual-use" items—items that can be used for both its WMD programs and legitimate civilian purposes—developing WMD programs will be far harder. A Baathist Iraq that can trade as a "normal" nation is an unnerving prospect.

Third, renewing inspections lets Iraq pick the timing of the inevitable future confrontations. In the final years of UNSCOM, Saddam chose his provocations according to his own lights, disrupting inspections or otherwise egregiously violating agreements when he felt international support for his cause was strong or when domestic concerns led him to pick a fight abroad. Given the declining support for containment among Washington's regional allies and the major powers, ceding Baghdad the initiative could mean disaster. If Saddam waits for a particularly sensitive moment—say, a setback in the Arab-Israeli peace process, or a burst of internal discontent in Saudi Arabia—to defy the inspectors, the necessary basing, access, and diplomatic support for U.S.-led strikes to ensure compliance may not be forthcoming.

Finally, if the British-Dutch proposal or one similar to it is adopted, it would complicate U.S. efforts to use force against Iraq in other ways. Iraqi violations would put the United States in an unenviable position. Ignoring Iraq's truculence will discredit the United States, but military strikes in response to Iraqi noncompliance would probably receive little support. Only massive campaigns comparable to Desert Fox will make the Iraqis blink, and even America's allies offer little support for such a campaign—particularly if Saddam links his defiance to the sanctions, which most of America's key Arab allies dislike. The better Saddam times his provocation, the more likely the world is to go wobbly. On balance, then, adopting a proposal similar to the British-Dutch initiative—although not as bad as the risible suggestion by China and Russia—is asking for trouble.

BETTER OFF AS WE ARE

PROLONGING an impasse over inspections is better than the superficially attractive but deeply counterproductive resumption of enfeebled inspections. To be sure, an ideal policy for the United States would involve the return of inspectors. It would combine three elements: lasting sanctions

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on WMD-related items, intrusive inspections and monitoring comparable to those in UNSCOM's early days, and an international and regional consensus to use force should Iraq violate any agreements. Such an ideal, however, is flatly unattainable. Inspections achieved their earlier successes only because of strong support from the international community. Today, however, Russia is an aggressive advocate of Iraq's cause and a full-throated critic of inspections and sanctions. France and China also oppose all three items of the ideal U.S. policy, and—except for a handful of traumatized Gulf emirates, especially Kuwait—the Arab states often hesitate to support U.S. strikes on Iraq. Not surprisingly, then, all the various inspection regimes on the table are not intrusive.

A watered-down version of inspections, however, is not acceptable. In this case, no loaf is better than half a loaf. If inspectors return to Iraq, Washington will soon find itself in a jam. Saddam may again refuse to cooperate, leaving the United States almost alone in seeking military strikes. Even more dangerous, however, is the possibility that Saddam will cooperate. This would spell not only the end of inspections but also the end of sanctions. Iraq would then be free to reconstitute its WMD programs—a clear and present danger to the entire Middle East.

Those who believe most strongly in the value of arms control should be those most outraged by the prospect of enfeebled inspectors heading to Iraq. If the United States and the other major powers close their eyes and declare Iraq to be in compliance, they discredit the very premises of arms control: that states are bound to their international agreements and that the international community has a duty to enforce these obligations. Other states will learn from Baghdad's example, cheating or ignoring their commitments if they feel that they will pay no price.

Iraq's successful defiance would encourage proliferation in other troubled regions. If international frameworks, U.N. resolutions, and solemn statements by the leaders of major powers mean little in Iraq, states in other dangerous regions will be more likely to seek nuclear weapons, anthrax, and sarin gas. Iraq's experience would demonstrate that the international community will let even the most brutal and bellicose leaders acquire WMD, thereby encouraging their unhappy neighbors to seek WMD deterrents of their own.

Better that the United States embrace an impasse than support half-baked efforts to resolve it. True, a standoff deprives the United States and

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the world of both a means to further curtail Iraq's existing programs and an on-the-ground monitoring force, but an impasse does quite effectively stop Iraq's future WMD development. The United States can compellingly argue that Iraq is not complying with its U.N.-sanctioned nonproliferation obligations and thus justify the continuation of sanctions. And Iraq, not the United States, clearly remains the recalcitrant party.

As a diplomatic tactic, the United States should press for its ideal policy while blocking compromise solutions. Diplomatically, it would be difficult and, indeed, foolish for Washington to openly oppose renewed inspections. But U.S. policymakers should recognize that compromises, which offer the false promise of progress, will in fact lay the groundwork for Iraq to free itself of sanctions and rebuild its WMD programs. As long as the inspection program remains hobbled, political capital should be spent on shoring up sanctions and winning support for sustained, extensive air strikes on Iraq rather than returning inspectors whose hands would be tied.

As long as there is no real punishment for defying the inspectors, Iraq will not budge.

At first blush, such an approach appears duplicitous, but it is actually far less disingenuous than support for or cooperation with enfeebled inspections. Washington would simply demand that if inspections occur, they be effective. If this is impossible—and today, it is—a continued impasse is a more honest policy than a flawed compromise.

The greatest difficulty is in shoring up sanctions, which are necessary to block Saddam's WMD programs. Sanctions fatigue is acute. Critics in the region—and, increasingly, at home—regularly denounce the humanitarian cost of sanctions. To counter, sanctions' defenders need to more vigorously and more frequently point out the obvious: Saddam has spent what limited money he controls on arms and lavish rewards for his followers, not on the well-being of the Iraqi people; money earmarked for humanitarian purposes often goes unspent; the regime smuggles humanitarian goods out of Iraq to sell on the black market; and Iraqis living in the parts of northern Iraq under U.N. control fare far better than those under the Baathist thumb. If sanctions were removed, there is little reason to expect that Saddam would spend the new revenue on

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the Iraqi people and every reason to believe that he would blow it on Iraq's WMD programs.

To counter legitimate humanitarian concerns about the harm done by halting the transfer of some dual-use items—such as chlorine, which can be used for both chemical weapons and water purification—Washington should push for more direct international control over Iraqi imports. If the international community can confidently purchase, transfer, and install water-treatment facilities or other humanitarian necessities without worrying that Iraq will divert them for military uses, it could send the requisite dual-use items. Such transfers, however, require that control remain in international hands lest Saddam's goons swipe the technology. Iraq, not the United States, is the main barrier to such a shift today.

In a wider sense, however, the stumbling blocks in this diplomatic dance lie not with Iraq but with U.S. allies and other major powers. America's greatest obstacle is the efforts by France, Russia, and other defenders of the Baath to readmit Iraq into the community of nations without requiring it to adhere to international norms. Unfortunately, standing alone may be self-defeating, despite its moral attractiveness. If Washington uses its Security Council veto to keep sanctions strong despite an international consensus that they must go, China, France, Russia, and many Middle Eastern states will trade openly with Iraq, making sanctions a joke.

Striking the proper balance will be difficult. For sanctions to succeed, all the major powers will have to cooperate, particularly those that have advanced engineering products, chemical and pharmaceutical industries, and other sources of WMD-related materials. But Beijing, Paris, and Moscow all want the sanctions gutted. To counter, Washington must use its leverage in other foreign policy areas. Here, Saddam is Washington's greatest ally: his continued defiance, heavy-handed blustering, and refusal to consider even the most favorable compromises make isolating his thuggish regime far easier.

Clearly, an impasse is not a lasting solution to the problem of Iraqi doomsday weapons. But the perfect should not become the enemy of the good. Renewed inspections would, however unwittingly, help Saddam develop his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Opposing inspections may require Washington to stake out some unpopular diplomatic positions, but given the stakes involved, the danger of offending Saddam's defenders is easily worth the risk.

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Iran's New Revolution

Robin Wright

PROMISES, PROMISES

A GENERATION after it seized power, Iran's revolutionary regime is deeply troubled: fractured by intense political divisions, endangered by economic disorder, discredited by rampant corruption, and smothered in social restrictions no longer acceptable to large sectors of its changing population. To the outside world the Islamic Republic of Iran often appears to be at a precipice, its unique theocratic government on the verge of imploding from internal tensions. Over the past year, its domestic drama has played out visibly, and sometimes violently, in killings by a rogue death squad, newspaper closures, student unrest, political trials, local elections, charges of espionage against the Jewish minority, and as always, relations with the United States.

Yet Iran, often in spite of the theocrats, has begun to achieve one of the revolution's original goals: empowering the people. New social and political movements are blossoming defiantly in ways that put Iran on the cutting edge of the Islamic world on issues ranging from religious reform and cultural expression to women's rights. So, although the theocratic regime that seized power in 1979 is unlikely to survive in its current, austere form because of profound internal problems, the driving force behind the revolution has proven durable and, in the end, adaptable enough to allow Iranians to go out and get for themselves what the theocracy has failed to provide.

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DARK HORSES

IRAN'S REVOLUTION was about more than getting rid of an unpopular king or ending 2,500 years of dynastic rule. In the quest for empowerment, the upheaval of 1979 was an extension of earlier challenges to the state's central power: the 1905–11 Constitutional Revolution that diminished the monarchy's authority, and the nationalist rule between 1951 and 1953 that briefly forced the shah into exile. Both earlier attempts at evolutionary change were ultimately aborted. Thus the coalition of parties seeking a greater say in public life resorted to revolution. Iranians were not alone in trying to end autocratic rule. Iran's upheaval was part of global change, including the demise of communism in Europe, white rule in Africa, and military dictatorships in Latin America.

But the process of empowerment was hijacked in the early days of the revolt by a clique of Shiite clerics who used their networks, legitimacy, and leadership to unite the disjointed opposition. After the shah's ouster, the coterie around Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini gradually purged its partners and crafted a theocracy instead of a democracy. Human rights were virtually ignored during the decade-long "First Republic," which lasted from 1979 until Khomeini's death in 1989. With typical revolutionary excess, the regime's zealots became obsessed with deconstructing the past and winning converts to their cause, both at home and in the region. The fragile new state was also nearly overwhelmed by plummeting oil prices, economic sanctions, international isolation, and the region's bloodiest war in a century. It survived only by crushing dissent, spending its foreign exchange reserves, and tapping into fierce, age-old Persian nationalism.

Nonetheless, seeds of public empowerment were planted and grew. The Construction Jihad (teams of development experts and builders) brought progress in the form of schools, social services, clinics, electricity, television, and roads to the countryside. The revolution particularly excelled in education, in quantity if not always in quality. In the late 1970s, only half of Iran's youth between the ages of six and twenty-four were literate; two decades later, the number had grown to 93 percent—even though the population itself had doubled. Iran succeeded in part because traditional families trusted an Islamic government to educate

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AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Students for a democratic society: demonstrations in Tehran, July 1999

their children, especially girls. Students also remained in school longer. The number of university graduates soared from 430,000 in the late 1970s to more than 4 million in the late 1990s. This success spurred expectations of a greater role in the system and access to new instruments of progress.

In the "Second Republic," from 1989 to 1997, Iran graduated from reacting against the past to realistically dealing with the present. During President Hashemi Rafsanjani's tenure, the government of God plummeted back to earth—with a thud. The new leadership initially promoted physical reconstruction, economic reform, and a diplomatic thaw. But without the ayatollah's authority, long-standing political divisions deepened and paralysis set in. Despite a brief try at privatization, including reviving the monarchy's stock market, promises of change remained largely unfulfilled. In the end, the regime's blatantly manipulative tactics kept it from achieving its goals, instead spawning corruption, deepening debt, and social turmoil.

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Paradoxically, the very policies that Rafsanjani introduced to win back the support of a war-weary public inadvertently jump-started the empowerment process. The regime sporadically tolerated cultural freedoms and relaxed some of its social restrictions. It also facilitated a consumer spending spree on imports by making credit available. The outside world soon flooded back in, through satellite dishes, videos, computers, and even textbooks full of ideas. From that point on, the tide of information could no longer be controlled, however hard conservatives and clerics tried.

Iran's savvy population is taking stands, making demands, and even defying the ruling theocrats.

The Second Republic also overlapped with the end of the Cold War, which Iranians felt deeply because of their shared border with the Soviet Union. The collapse of Soviet rule—in a country with superpower resources—sent a powerful warning about the vulnerability of revolutionary regimes. Finally, Iran's return to peacetime pursuits, its flirtation with pragmatism, and the pressure of social problems all unleashed unusual initiatives, largely outside the government but also within the circles of power and even the clergy.

Iran's theocracy slowly came to recognize that it was endangering its own agenda by ignoring the state's real problems, such as its population policy. In the 1980s, millions of women complied with the theocrats' dictate to breed a new Islamic generation that would defend the revolution. Within seven years, Iran's population jumped from 34 million to more than 50 million; it is now 70 million. The clerics soon realized that soaring numbers were more likely to undo the revolution than to save it, and they introduced one of the world's most extensive family-planning programs. Every form of birth control, from condoms and pills to sterilization, became free. All couples now have to pass a family-planning course before obtaining a marriage license. Thousands of women mobilized by the Health Ministry have gone door-to-door to explain the necessity of birth control. Clerics, preaching the benefits of small family size, have issued *fatwa*s approving everything from intrauterine devices to vasectomies.

Sensing a reluctant realism within the regime, Iran's increasingly savvy population began taking stands, making demands, and even defying the

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theocrats. In the 1997 presidential election, which had the highest turnout since the Iranian people endorsed revolution a generation earlier, 70 percent of Iran's voters spurned the theocrats' candidate of choice and instead elected a dark-horse cleric named Mohammad Khatami, a former minister of culture and Islamic guidance who was purged in 1992 for "liberalism" and "negligence." The election marked the onset of the "Third Republic" and the burgeoning of what is now a very public fight for empowerment. Its outcome will be determined partly by Khatami's success in restoring the rule of law, fostering a civil society (two of his campaign pledges), and wresting power from the religious superstructure—the theocratic part of Iran's system—that limits the government's powers. But more likely, Iran's future will be decided by the newly energized popular forces that made Khatami's election possible in the first place. Three movements reflect how the revolution is being redefined: daring Islamic reformers, an adventurous film industry, and spirited women's groups.

BRAVE NEW WORLD

THE MOST INNOVATIVE MOVEMENT in Iran today is the Islamic reformation. Iranian thinkers have injected energy and ideas into a disparate movement, spreading from Egypt to India, that has been struggling for more than a century to reconcile a seventh-century religion with modernity. By using Islam as a popular political idiom, by weaving Islamic tenets into a modern, Western-style constitution, and by putting clerics in charge of the state, Iran became a live test and a venue for debate on the proper relationship between Islam and the modern world. Ironically, the failure of the world's only theocracy to empower its populace provided the biggest boost for new, progressive formulations about the modern Islamic state. Much of the most profound discourse within Islam today is taking place in Iran's newspapers, courtrooms, and classrooms. Even clerics who once held high office and intellectuals who were Khomeini's protégés are now challenging the religion's basic precepts as well as the specifics of theocratic rule.

Tehran was engrossed last autumn in the trial of Abdollah Nouri, a cleric, former Khomeini aide, and editor of the newspaper *Khordad*

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who served during the Third Republic as vice president, interior minister, and Tehran city councilor. The Special Court for the Clergy, which operates as an independent agency, charged him with multiple counts of "insulting" Islam, the prophet Muhammad, and Khomeini. Nouri's specific offense was running articles in *Khordad* that questioned everything from the Islamic concept of eye-for-eye justice to the clergy's automatic right to hold power. At his trial, Nouri, dressed in a white turban and clerical robes, astonished Iranians by taking the stand and denying the court's right to judge him: "I totally reject the court, its membership, and its competence to conduct this trial, and any verdict you reach will have no legitimacy." After his conviction he refused to appeal, on the same grounds. In late November, Nouri was sentenced to five years in prison and was also barred from political activity for five years, a punishment tacitly designed to prevent Khatami's closest ally from running for speaker of the parliament. And Nouri's newspaper was banned, although his staff defiantly pledged to launch another publication—the new way of getting around forced closures.

Six months earlier, Tehran had been absorbed in a similar trial—that of Mohsen Kadivar, a popular young cleric and seminary professor whose sister was an adviser to Khatami and another Tehran city councilor; his brother-in-law was Khatami's minister of culture and Islamic guidance. The Special Court for the Clergy charged him with "disseminating lies and disturbing public opinion" for writing articles advocating the separation of political and religious institutions. Kadivar also dared to compare practices in the Islamic republic with the shah's repressive controls on the freedom of expression and questioned the powers and righteousness of the theocracy. "From both a legal and religious point of view, it's quite permissible to criticize the Supreme Leader or the ruling establishment," he argued. Like Nouri, Kadivar rejected the clergy's right to judge: "Investigation into political and press offenses must be carried out in the presence of a jury and by a qualified court of the judiciary," he told the court. He was convicted and received an eighteen-month sentence.

Kadivar's case gained him celebrity status. Posters of the young cleric, who came from a noted religious family in the city of Shiraz, were plastered all over Tehran. Students held a candlelight vigil in the

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hills near Evin prison, where he was being held without bail. Chanting "freedom of thought, forever, forever," they released doves as a symbol of liberty. More than 200 journalists also signed a petition that condemned Kadivar's arrest as unconstitutional and called it an "offense" against Iran's writers and intellectuals. These responses to Kadivar's imprisonment reflected a newly emboldened population.

Both trials involved an issue more fundamental than the freedom of expression: the separation of religion and government. In an Islamic society, who has the ultimate power—the elected officials or the clergy? Since Islam is a monotheistic religion that offers not only spiritual values but also a set of rules to govern society, sorting out the allocation of power is critical to any genuine reform. Hence political change and religious reform are often intertwined in Muslim societies.

Over the past five years, Iran's leading philosopher, Abdul Karim Soroush, has fueled public debate by offering a framework—on the basis of faith—to blend Islam and democracy. He argues that to be a true believer, one must come to the faith without coercion or pressure—in other words, freely. That principle is the origin of all other freedoms. He never abandoned the tenets of his faith; he believes that sharia (Islamic law) can be a basis for modern legislation. But he breaks from Iran's theocrats in his declaration that Islamic law is not static, but is flexible and adaptable because it has only begun to be understood by imperfect human beings.

Soroush was a long-time follower of Khomeini, who appointed him to the Committee of the Cultural Revolution to conform university curricula to Islam. But a decade after the revolution, Soroush began to see the ayatollah as an instrument of transition, not as the goal. In books, magazine columns, and lectures at the three universities where he taught, Soroush warned that Islam, like any other religion, should never be used to rule a state, because it opens the door to totalitarianism. Often called the Martin Luther of Islam by students, Soroush is also widely popular among intellectuals, reformers, and the clergy. Many of his former students and followers launched new, reformist newspapers—most notably *Jameh*, *Tous*, *Neshat*, and *Asr-e Azadegan*, or "Era of the emancipators"—all of which were closed down by the judicary.

The goal of Soroush, Kadivar, Nouri, and other reformers is to be Muslim without being fundamentalist, to be reverent but free, and to

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find a world-view that is both Islamic and modern. As the only Shiite-ruled country, Iran is unique in the Muslim world. Yet the work of Iran's reformers is nonetheless spreading throughout the 53-nation Islamic bloc, the last group of countries to hold out against the wave of democratization that has swept the rest of the world.

CINEMA VERITÉ

THE FRONTLINE in the conflict over Iran's identity and its future is between artistic freedom and Islamic correctness. Some of the earliest and boldest challenges to the Second Republic came from artists. In a 1994 open letter titled "We Are Writers," 134 writers, poets, journalists, and scholars, including many who had once rallied around the regime, demanded the freedom to associate in a writers' union, noninterference in their personal lives, and an end to censorship. Within months, more than 200 film directors and actors petitioned for an end to the "straitjacket regulations and complicated methods of supervision" of Iran's movie industry, including everything from script approval to the distribution of raw film stock.

Iranian cinema has led a major countercultural revolution since the early 1990s. Despite often ridiculous restrictions, filmmakers have been able to exploit the subtleties of their medium to make bold statements about sensitive political and social issues. Characters are challenging the status quo; plots focus on the shortcomings of the Islamic system; dialogue is extending the boundaries of public discussion. Indeed, few subjects are now off-limits. *The White Balloon*, one of Iran's most famous postrevolution films, jabs at the country's failures to address poverty, racial bias, and child exploitation. Dariush Mehrjui, the father of modern Iranian cinema, wrote a quartet of films—*Banoo* (1992), *Sara* (1993), *Pari* (1995), and *Leila* (1997)—about the professional and personal plight of women in Islamic society. Each ended with the lead female character defying convention or leaving her husband to head out on her own—a radical move in a society where women must get written permission to leave the country. Mehrjui's *Hamoon,* ranked the best movie in Iranian history in a 1997 poll of Iranian film critics and audiences, was a dark comedy about modern Iranian life that examined people's fixations with

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Islamic religious figures. Today's increasingly independent film industry is thoroughly undermining the theocrats' draconian effort to create a new society centered around the devout Shiite. Indeed, the change in the social climate is stark.

In the 1980s, the regime had forced artists and writers into silence or exile. Bookstore shelves were emptied and state-controlled television and radio were limited to religious programs, children's shows, sports, news programs, and staid documentaries. In the 1990s, a bookstore was firebombed for publishing an "un-Islamic" book. Theaters were attacked for showing films accused of religious insensitivity. One leading writer died mysteriously in prison; three others were murdered by a death squad tied to the intelligence ministry. Nothing was too trivial: the theocrats even endorsed new, Islamically correct dolls—Sara and her brother Dara—to supplant the influence of Mattel's Barbie and her boyfriend Ken.

But Iran's isolation proved to be a boon to the movie industry. The theocrats' ban on most foreign films in public theaters created a captive audience for Iranian cinema at a time when other countries were dominated by American movies. For the first time, Iran developed its own artistic film business. And like religious reformers, film directors with reformist views enjoyed a certain legitimacy, since many of them were once the regime's closest allies. Mohsen Makhmalbaf, who spent five years in the shah's jails, was known in the 1980s for ardently religious and pro-revolution films. But in the 1990s, his films shifted to secular stories that coyly challenged revolutionary truths. Makhmalbaf's fifth film was blatantly antiwar, and two were banned by the government. His seventh film, *A Time to Love*, was a controversial tale—with three endings based on three perspectives—about a married woman who pursues a younger man. But critics were concerned less with the illicit affair than with the film's message: Perception varies, and so can the truth.

Today, few subjects are off-limits in Iranian films.

In 1998, Makhmalbaf's teenage daughter Samira made her film debut with *The Apple*, the true story of an illiterate man who had locked his twelve-year-old twin daughters at home since infancy, for fear that the girls' purity would be spoiled by strange men's gazes. The

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movie revolved around the gradual exposure of the girls—almost mute, unschooled, and both physically and mentally disabled—to the outside world. "I wanted the film to make this point: All it takes to imprison many, many women is one man," Samira told reporters when the film opened in New York in 1999. "What I noticed about those two girls is that the more they came into contact with society, the more complete they became as human beings. For me, that became a metaphor for all women. Women in Iran are like springs. If they want to be free, and if they try, they burst out with a lot of energy."

Iran's countercultural revolution has had a major boost since Khatami took office. During his 1997 confirmation hearings, Minister of Culture Ataollah Mohajerani described his ministry as the "laughing stock" of the government. "Islam is not a dark alley. Everyone can walk freely in the path of Islam," he told parliament. "We must create an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity in all centers of culture, where all citizens can express their ideas and where the seeds of creativity can blossom." Iran's filmmakers are several steps ahead of the bureaucrats—and are gaining international attention. *Children of Heaven* was one of five films nominated for the 1999 Academy Award for best foreign film. *The White Balloon* won the 1995 Cannes Camera d'Or prize for best first feature film and the 1997 New York Film Critics award for best foreign film. *Taste of Cherry* won the Palme d'Or at Cannes in 1997. Other films have won festival prizes in six continents for best picture, best foreign film, best director, best script, best actor, best documentary, best short film, and best jury. In defining the modern Islamic agenda, Iran's cinema is proving to be more appealing—and effective—than the theocrats' campaign to export religious militancy.

FROM UNDER THE CHADOR

THE MOST ENERGETIC MOVEMENT to emerge since 1979 is the women's movement, which is shattering the starkest stereotype of the Islamic republic: the chador-clad female. A generation after the revolution, Iranian women are by far the most politically active in the Persian Gulf and are among the most empowered in the Islamic world. In 1996, 200 women ran for the 270-seat parliament, and 14 won. In 1997, four women registered to run for the presidency. Although

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all were disqualified by the Council of Guardians that vets candidates, the decision was not based on gender. Five months later, Khatami appointed a female vice president. And in 1999, 5,000 women ran in local elections, and 300 won.

Today, more than 40 percent of university students are female, as are one-third of faculty members. Thousands of women educated after the revolution work as engineers, doctors, scientists, lawyers, and even clerics. More than 340 directors-general in government ministries are female. Iran has 140 female publishers, enough to hold an exhibition of books and magazines published by women only. Women have become painters, authors, designers, photographers, movie producers, directors, stars, and sculptors crafting "anatomically correct" female figures (otherwise known as nudes).

A fierce women's movement was not what the theocrats intended. Their original goal was more akin to gender apartheid. After the revolution, the regime dismissed almost all women who had risen to positions of importance. A former female education minister was executed for promoting "prostitution" among girls. The revolution's severe intentions were reflected in the new Islamic dress code and the lowering of the minimum age at which women could be married to nine. The new constitution also removed critical women's rights in divorce and child custody battles.

A generation later, restrictions still border on the bizarre. A woman may have an equal vote in parliament or equal powers among the vice presidents, but her testimony in court carries only half the weight of a man's. Women can head universities and publish newspapers but cannot leave the country without their husbands' written permission. They can act in plays and movies alongside men, but they cannot sing in public or ride in the same section of a public bus.

Iranian women, however, have proven irrepressible. In defiance of the theocracy, they are putting their imprints on diverse aspects of Iranian life. Beginning in the mid-1990s, pressure from women changed laws on employment, divorce, and maternity leave. Women packed a courtroom to protest child-custody laws after the brutal death of an eight-year-old girl—weighing only 35 pounds, with a fractured skull, two broken arms, and burn marks covering her body—at the hands of her father, a drug addict with a criminal record and a documented

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history of child abuse. Islamic tradition allows a mother to keep a daughter until the age of seven and a son until the age of two; full custody then switches to the father. Parliament subsequently revised the law in 1998 to stipulate that a child could no longer be awarded to an unfit father, defining the custody qualifications in a way that could often disqualify men.

Women have challenged other male bastions as well. Thousands of women broke a long-time barrier preventing females from attending male sporting events when they poured into Tehran's stadium to greet the Iranian soccer team after it qualified for the 1998 World Cup. Women are also playing sports. Tehran alone has eighty-five women's basketball teams in five leagues. Only ten thousand women engaged in intramural sports on the eve of the revolution; today, two million participate in soccer, basketball, swimming, tennis, handball, skiing, aerobics, fencing, judo, shooting, volleyball, rowing, horseback riding, gymnastics, golf, table tennis, karate, tae kwon do, and even water-skiing—despite the slightly absurd waterproof coats and scarves women must wear to demonstrate modesty. And women have forced the theocrats to acknowledge their participation officially; at the 1996 Olympics, for the first time, a female athlete led the Iranian team onto the field.

The new activists are as distinct as their political environment. The most outspoken women are no longer Westernized or upper-class elites, but have emerged from within the revolution. Many are from traditional families, clerical circles, and rural areas—none of which had previously produced female activists. Some women would continue wearing conservative dress, even if it were not required. But all dare to challenge the regime on far more critical issues, from centuries-old Islamic traditions to recent clerical interpretations of Islam.

Women's publications have been brazen on reform issues. *Zan* (Woman), the newspaper published by Faezeh Hashemi, a member of parliament and the daughter of former President Rafsanjani, editorialized against child-custody laws, the use of stoning as a punishment, and "temporary marriage"—the practice of contracting a short-term wife. It ran an exposé on the return of prostitution and reported on a New Year's message sent to Iran by the former empress. The theocrats banned *Zan* in 1999. Another publication, *Farzaneh*, is trying to

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reconcile more robust women's rights with the Islamic faith; its articles have included "Human Rights of Women in Islam," "A History of Silence and Debates Today," "How to Proceed," and "The Long Way Ahead."

Iran's women still face serious discrimination. But their participation in society has already helped to reshape the political scene. In a country where women have the franchise from the age of 15, Khatami's stunning upset victory would not have happened without the female vote.

Like the world around it, Iran is still undergoing a profound transformation. More internal turmoil lies ahead, as the revolution's early passions are replaced by hard-earned pragmatism, and as arrogance gives way to realism among many sectors of Iranian society. Gradually, the government of God is being forced to cede to secular statecraft—and to empower Iranians. In the process, Iran has begun contributing to the spread of public empowerment around the world.

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The Second Nuclear Age

Paul Bracken

THE RISE OF ASIA'S MILITARIES

FOR 200 YEARS, the world has been shaped by Western military dominance. Gunboats were replaced by battleships as agents of national power, which in turn were replaced by cruise missiles and stealth bombers. Until recently, these weapons belonged exclusively to Europeans or North Americans. But this monopoly on advanced military technologies is now ending. Ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads or weapons of mass destruction (WMD), along with other cutting-edge technologies, are now within reach of as many as ten Asian nations from Israel to North Korea—a major shift in the world's balance of power.

The rise of Asian military power heralds the beginning of a second nuclear age as different from the first, that of the Cold War, as that contest was from World War II. The world that the West created is being challenged—not just in military ways but in cultural and philosophical terms as well. Just as Asia began asserting itself economically in the 1960s and 1970s, it now does so militarily, backed by arms that would make Western interference in Asia far more treacherous and costly—even in peacetime—than ever before.

Western military power has always been about more than just winning battles against the weaker forces of non-Europeans. It has been a tool for shaping the world along Western lines, a symbol of general supremacy in commerce and technology that separated the developed from the undeveloped. Those who actively opposed the West's vision of the future would inevitably lose, and the West in the early

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1990s believed that no one would dare try. But for all the spectacular displays of American armaments in the Persian Gulf war and the former Yugoslavia, other nations have indeed contested the point—not by trying to close the arms gap but by exploiting disruptive technologies that thwart America's advantages and exploit the Achilles' heel of its military position in Asia.

The dawning of a second nuclear age overturns fundamental strategic assumptions about both the techno-military balance and preserving Western dominance in other areas. For example, the Western agenda today is defined almost exclusively in economic terms. Throughout the 1990s, the echo of "It's the economy, stupid" has had as much influence on foreign as on domestic policy. The integration of the Asian giants into a Western-led economic system has been seen as the era's central task. When should China be allowed into the World Trade Organization? How can India be made to loosen restrictions on foreign investment? How can the next financial crisis be prevented? These questions remain relevant, but the presumption that the West can still set the agenda and determine which hoops Asia must jump through to join the world system is now in serious doubt.

AFTER VASCO DA GAMA

THE LANDING of Vasco da Gama in India in 1498 marked the start of the era of Western dominance, aided by the "high-tech" armament of the day—the cannon-armed warship. Thus began an age of Western influence and reach that ended only when the colonial powers left Asia after World War II. And Western economic and military predominance lasted longer than this in some areas. The year 1998 marked the 500th anniversary of da Gama's epic feat, which in human and technological terms rivaled Neil Armstrong's landing on the moon. But how many celebrated this event? The West let the date pass in embarrassed silence for fear it would draw unnecessary attention to a history most would now like to forget.

Instead, the West spent the 1990s celebrating its victory in the Cold War. The new, post–Cold War era was said to be one of American military supremacy, which backed Western economic dominance. Moreover, the new epoch marked the spread of a Western form of

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triumphant globalization, a linking of economies and cultures that ostensibly made national cultures and histories obsolete. American values and norms would spread to countries who would willingly embrace the superior ways that gave America the world's greatest military force as well as the world's richest economy.

But the post–Cold War era never came to Asia. It was a Western conceit. The very term "post–Cold War era" presumes that the U.S.-Soviet struggle was the central event of our time and that its end marked a completely new beginning for the world. In Europe, of course, the Cold War did define the political landscape and produce the first nuclear age, as NATO tried to match Soviet conventional superiority in Europe with thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. To be sure, the Cold War also spread to other parts of the world, but in Asia it produced a different dynamic. When the United States took the preeminent Cold War security institution, NATO, and tried to clone it in Southeast Asia to create the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the results were catastrophic. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam cost some 50,000 American and untold Vietnamese lives, demonstrating just how elementally dissimilar Asian and European politics were.

Only the most parochial reading of history would see the Cold War as the major event of this century.

The Cold War was not a world war. In Asia, the Cold War was not merely different from that in Europe, it was also less important. The central motor of Asia's history in the twentieth century was post-colonialism, the efforts of China, Vietnam, India, Iran, and others to create viable nation-states after the long period of foreign rule. Their attempts to move into an era of self-rule and industrialization were far more important for the world than anything happening thousands of miles away at the Berlin Wall.

Most Asian states used the Cold War not to advance the world-view of either superpower but to milk that competition to advance their own development. Of course, China, India, and others played roles in the Cold War drama—but not those assigned to them by the Western powers. Postcolonial Asia was, by and large, so economically and militarily weak that it had little voice in world affairs and often

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had to display a certain loyalty to the Western system. By the 1990s, that dynamic had changed. Seen more broadly, what the world was actually entering was not a post–Cold War era but a post–Vasco da Gama era—a period wherein the final trappings of Western military superiority fell away as Asia's industrialization and wealth supported a military effort that could not be easily defeated by a more modern outside power.

THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND

SEEN IN THIS LIGHT, 1998 was a more historically significant year than 1989, during which the Berlin Wall fell. For not only did 1998 mark the 500th anniversary of the West's landing in Asia, it also saw the detonation of five Indian atomic bombs. Pakistan quickly followed India's example. North Korea fired a rocket that overflew Japan. Iran, India, and Pakistan tested intermediate-range ballistic missiles. China began deploying short-range missiles aimed at Taiwan and appeared to step up additional longer-range missile deployments that would threaten most U.S. military bases in East Asia. Iraq continued its obstinate attempts to get its hands on comparable weapons and, even worse, a germ-warfare arsenal.

These things were not supposed to happen. Westerners assumed that as Asia liberalized economically it would also absorb a larger Western ethos that stigmatized WMD and ballistic missiles. Yet while China and India opened up their economies and absorbed increasing amounts of both foreign investment and cultural influence, and even Iran retreated from extremism, these Asian countries were also building their arms capabilities.

Just as seeing the Cold War as the ordering event of world politics was thoroughly Western, so too is the drive for universal nonproliferation. Both are Western models imposed on Asia, continuing a long tradition of projecting Western views there. Thus what is now perceived in the West as a breakdown in nonproliferation policy is seen in the East as a push for national security. Asia sees no reason to accept a non-Asian monopoly on the military instruments needed to ensure order, and it projects a growing sense that reasonably wealthy countries must defend their own interests.

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The rise of Asian military power also touches on the way America sees the world. America's capacity to respond intelligently to changes in international affairs is badly constrained by doctrinaire attitudes that cannot grasp the complex situations facing Washington. Policy choices in the post–Cold War world are often said to resemble three-dimensional chess: decisions so intricate (especially compared to those of the Cold War) that only a careful fine-tuning of policies can adequately address them. But while the world is getting more confusing, American foreign policy is getting oversimplified. Consider our China policy, which is usually cast in terms of engagement versus containment, or global commerce, where free trade is set against protectionism. Even the most complicated issues are mapped onto crude dichotomies.

Such binary thinking often leads to hasty judgments—even when they produce absurd conclusions. Thus India, the world's largest democracy, is punished for testing nuclear weapons, while China, hardly a democracy, is courted as a strategic partner. America's apparent reasoning is that India broke certain nonproliferation norms—but these are norms codified in U.S., not Indian, law. This hardly looks like three-dimensional chess. Rather, it reveals a foreign policy built in terms of rigid polar alternatives and a disdain for the middle ground. The United States refused to help India craft a nonproliferation agreement tailored to that region, but instead demanded the acceptance of an all-or-nothing, American-led global nonproliferation regime. Today Asian states can express their interests and worldviews and back them up with a daunting new ability to inflict costs and damages on outside powers who wish to thwart their rise.

ACHILLES' HEEL

GIVEN THE ATTENTION lavished on atomic bombs and missiles, it is easy to miss the larger trend manifested in the past few years: the side with the best technology does not always win. This is not because American technology does not work—the wars in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans proved that it does. Nor is it because of larger issues of organization and strategy, important as they are. Rather, it is because of a fundamental distinction between technologies that sustain advantage and those that disrupt it. The failure to distinguish between the

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two has caused countless upsets in business and war. Institutions with a tremendous technological lead are often beaten by upstarts. "Who's ahead in technology?" is almost always the wrong question. Asking it frequently drives leading companies—and countries—to emphasize their strengths, while ignoring rivals who are creating different and threatening technologies.[1]

To take an example from business, consider the way Microsoft knocked IBM out of the box in the personal computer (PC) business. Personal computers became a commodity, whereas the software that made them run became a branded good. Software became the high-value part of the marketplace. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, no company could have displaced IBM in the PC world by making better hardware. The IBM research empire was too vast and deep, and IBM managers knew how to keep hardware startups out of the game—for example, by introducing PCs with new features every few months. But Microsoft chose an entirely different approach. It changed the basis of competition from hardware and circuits to software and bits. In software, IBM's vaunted competencies were much thinner. Moreover, IBM managers were less sure of how to outcompete a software firm. In fact, IBM's lead in technology actually prevented it from perceiving the new basis of competition. In this sense, IBM's advantage worked against it, serving to channel corporate energies into varying existing hardware while not even recognizing the new danger until it was too late.

This same dynamic is now found in business after business. The world is often described in terms of "head-to-head" competition. But such competition is rare. Instead, businesses focus on areas where powerful foes lack the skills, perception, and management to respond easily. Often this produces the same pattern as with IBM and Microsoft: dangers are not even recognized as the more powerful player dismisses the weaknesses of what appears to be a puny upstart.

As with companies, so too with countries. U.S. military forces have proven themselves unbeatable so long as conflict can be kept within certain geographic and technical boundaries. Any nation that takes on the American military in an area the rough size of Kuwait or

[1] See Clayton M. Christensen, *The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail*, Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997.

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Korea, uses only conventional weapons, and does not attack the base structures that support this splendid force is certain to lose. But a country that builds its military program around eliminating these very American advantages would have a much better chance—both in fighting and, more important, in deterring an attack in the first place. The United States has used arms control to prevent such a war: keeping WMD out of the hands of other states preserves the lopsided U.S. conventional advantage.

Asia is getting ballistic missiles right before Western eyes, but no one is paying attention.

Yet instead of competing for better tanks and airplanes—the sustaining technologies of the West—Asia is shifting toward WMD and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. Asia's disruptive technologies are appearing right before Western eyes, but remain unnoticed as the West concentrates on its overall lead. Focusing on electronic surveillance systems, aircraft, and mechanized land power is like IBM focusing on PC architecture as Microsoft wrapped up the software market.

This is not a case of one or two "rogue states" going against the grain. If developing ballistic missiles and WMD makes a state a rogue, there are now at least eight such rogues in Asia. Israel, Syria, Iraq (if it ever escapes U.N. sanctions), Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea are all reorienting their militaries from infantry to disruptive technologies. Some countries pursue chemical or biological weapons; some build atomic weapons; some build all of them. But what is common is the ballistic missile.

Saddam Hussein's 1991 Scud missile attacks against Israeli cities and U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia did little material damage. But they did underscore America's overwhelming military dependence on forward bases. The same dependence was seen in the recent Kosovo air campaign, in which the United States relied on air bases in Italy and other nearby countries. Without these bases, the United States cannot mass its forces. It must either launch long-distance attacks, such as cruise missile raids, or rely on the navy and long-range bombers.

In the public mind, both Operation Desert Storm and the air war against Serbia demonstrated the extraordinary technology of the United States, which can land pinpoint attacks that demolish targets

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with little collateral damage. War is turned into a video game. Targets are chosen, buttons pushed, and another bull's-eye marked up. Despite occasional failures—like the destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade—the American public thinks that this is what war is all about.

Inside the U.S. armed forces, the picture is quite different. To the military professional, the enduring image of modern war is not a cruise missile surgically taking out enemy headquarters, but the huge supplies of equipment America needs to fight: ammunition stocks, air bases, maintenance equipment, and housing. In the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia's Dhahran airfield was the site of an iron mountain of supplies. Photographs of this base, packed with supplies, haunt military planners because one WMD-tipped ballistic missile could have disrupted its operations. The spread of WMD in Asia makes such bases even more vulnerable.

Asia's new weapons are targeting the Achilles' heel of the U.S. military presence in Asia—its fixed bases.

Fixed bases are the Achilles' heel of the American military presence in Asia. Imagine fighting Desert Storm without staging grounds in Saudi Arabia or Turkey. In Vietnam, U.S. bases were harassed but never openly challenged. In neither the Korean nor the Gulf War was there any danger that supplies from the American homeland could not land safely. Were today's bases to vanish or be rendered unusable, the vast flow of supplies would have nowhere to park safely in preparation for battle. What were once the visible symbols of U.S. power are becoming hostages to missile attack.

The world's attention naturally focuses on individual "events" of weapons proliferation, and Washington is not terribly good at stepping back from dramatic individual episodes like the Indian nuclear tests. Slow-motion evolution, although less noticeable than rapid change, is the only proper focus for intelligent judgments about strategic power. It reveals that a historic transformation is taking place. Asia's military technologies target not American strengths but American weaknesses. Asia's ballistic missiles and WMD trump the West's technological lead, making technology an increasingly irrelevant measure of actual military capacity.

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SUPERPOWER LITE

IT IS EASY to overlook just how vulnerable America's military position in Asia is. The 1990s were described as America's era, but America—the "sole superpower"—was more of a "superpower lite." The United States faced virtually no challengers; Soviet power had collapsed, and Asia's disruptive technologies had not yet been fielded.

But Washington was lulled into complacency. Saddam's Scuds could not destroy the U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia, but large numbers of better short- and intermediate-range missiles could. Iraq had only a few of these, which it used only with conventional warheads. Moreover, following the Gulf War, Israel, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea all stepped up their efforts to build cutting-edge ballistic missiles—a major and ominous change for the United States, which must move its forces over vast distances and deploy them at an increasingly vulnerable handful of bases to make them useful.

Washington's proposed solution to this quandary is antiballistic missiles that can shoot down incoming warheads. The current U.S. strategy is to hang onto its bases at all costs but protect them from enemy missiles with an impermeable shield. But this vast and expensive plan has not received anywhere near the discussion it deserves.

The technological barriers to shooting down missiles racing over relatively short distances are daunting. Whereas intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) fired from Russia at the United States had a 30-minute flight time, flight times within the Middle East are on the order of 10 minutes. Of course, American technology is not to be underestimated and might rise to the challenge. But the relatively benign threat environment that most U.S. bases enjoyed in the 1990s is gone. No new theater-missile-defense system can restore the unchallenged supremacy of American power; no new arms control agreement can preserve the uncontested viability of American bases. Can anyone seriously imagine China, Iran, or India scrapping its ballistic missiles? Giving them up would permanently lock in the Western advantages of the 1990s, turning history back to Vasco da Gama. It is only a matter of time before a state ensures the fielding of a U.S. antimissile system, and the death of the Anti–Ballistic Missile

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Treaty, by providing a threat great enough to change America's mind on national defense.

Consider, too, the actual behavior of countries confronted with an American missile shield. Several Asian states have already expanded their production of missiles. Deployment of a U.S. anti–ballistic missile defense system is likely to speed proliferation of missiles as Asia churns out greater numbers to offset U.S. defenses and changes tactics to make its attacks more effective.

Finally, the theater missile debate misses the intimate connection between U.S. national missile defense and smaller theater systems. Washington will never protect South Korea, Japan, or Saudi Arabia *without also protecting the United States. Hence, a theater missile* defense deployed to protect Asian allies will mean national missile defense for the United States.

These trends herald the end of the era of "superpower lite." The tens of billions of dollars needed for missile defense, the new platforms needed to carry them, the satellites to make them work—all mark the end of an epoch when the United States could remain unchallenged while cutting its defense budget. Global supremacy is an irresistible temptation when it comes on the cheap—but the price of global power is rising. Aside from Japan, no Asian country has mounted a technological military challenge to the West. But in the future, such challenges will be commonplace.

THE HOT ZONE

ALTHOUGH similarities exist between the second nuclear age and the first (command and control problems, for example), there are also some striking differences. The single biggest one is the role of nationalism. The Cold War was a struggle waged with the icy rationality and cool logic that characterized the two superpowers' approach to nuclear weapons. There was no place for hysteria; indeed, one striking feature of even the most dangerous nuclear issues was that the two sides never really got angry at each other.

But the second nuclear age is driven by national insecurities incomprehensible to outsiders whose security is no longer endangered. In the West, the politics of rage had no role in foreign policy. This

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cannot be said for disputes in Asia between Pakistan and India, the two Koreas, or the Arab states and Israel. Having such emotional dynamics linked to the brandishing or use of ballistic missiles and WMD is something to be anticipated—and dreaded. Despite the economic opening of Asia and Western claims that globalization will somehow render national identity obsolete, nationalism is a rising force in Asia, where it broke the colonial grip. Nationalism is not viewed kindly in the West these days, where it is automatically associated with ethnic cleansing, extremism, and xenophobia. Though this association is often untrue, nationalism will undoubtedly complicate the second nuclear age.

Nationalism is less likely to be directed against the United States than against Asian countries' immediate neighbors. The distance between the United States and Asia is still a buffer, but for the first time in the modern era, continental Asian nations can target one another using the modern technologies of disruption.

Before the second nuclear age, Asia's civilizations were not active in shaping world affairs. Instead, the Western powers were the shapers, mapmakers, and architects of the global system. Asian technology was too backward to compete. But today, not only must the West integrate new powers into an old order, it must revise its self-conception to become less doctrinaire. The West must accept that the long era when Asia was controlled by outside powers—when the greatest military power in Asia was not Asian—is quickly ending.

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Reviews



MAGNUM PHOTOS / MICHA BAR-AM

Preparations for Independence Day, Ofra, 1979

Dirty laundry from Israel's founding era has been aired for its next generation.

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Review Essay

New History for a New Israel

Two Landmark Looks at a Sentimentalized Past

Yaron Ezrahi

Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999. BY BENNY MORRIS. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, 751 pp. $40.00.

The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World Since 1948. BY AVI SHLAIM. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999, 448 pp. $32.50.

The education minister in the dovish new Israeli government led by Ehud Barak caused a stir recently. Yossi Sarid decided that Israeli high schools should teach their students about something most Israelis would just as soon not dwell on: the massacre by Israeli soldiers of dozens of Israeli Arab civilians who broke a curfew in and near the village of Kafr Kasim some 43 years ago. The shootings were followed by a trial and an Israeli court's landmark decision to pin individual responsibility on Israeli soldiers who follow illegal orders. With Sarid's directive, dirty laundry from Israel's founding era was to be aired for its next generation.

This was something quite new under the sun. For decades, Israelis were raised on a celebratory, heroic version of their history—a story of the return to Zion, of the resettlement of the desolate Jewish homeland, of a war of liberation in which the few stood up to the many, and of a constant struggle by the newly established state to survive in a sea of Arab hostility and brutal violence. This epic was founded on ideas and beliefs that most Israelis held as self-evident: the Jewish nation is ancient, and the Palestinian claim to nationhood is questionable at best; Israelis are innocent, and Arabs have an innate propensity to terrorism; Israel's humanistic soldiers were driven to fight by necessity, not fear or hatred; the Arabs

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are determined to push the Jews into the sea; the Israeli army's victories were made possible by the spirit of the Israeli fighters, not their superior numbers or weapons; the Arabs have failed to modernize and to ameliorate their economic condition; Israel is a tiny sliver of land in a region of vast Arab territories; the Palestinian refugee problem was created by Arab leaders; and many costly wars could have been prevented if not for Arab intransigence, starting with the 1947 U.N. partition plan and continuing through the many rebuffed Israeli peace initiatives.

Toward the end of the 1980s, however, these certainties began to be shaken. A small group of revisionist historians, including Avi Shlaim, an Oxford professor, and Benny Morris, who teaches at Ben-Gurion University in Beersheva, published more skeptical versions of the early phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These studies elicited some legitimate criticism from professional academics. But the Israeli public—including much of the intelligentsia—was unwilling to sympathetically consider a more complex version of Israel's history that implied greater Jewish responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem, criticized Israeli diplomatic blunders that prolonged the conflict, and exposed Israeli soldiers' involvement in some atrocities. The works of the "new historians" triggered an angry public debate that quickly deteriorated into a clash between apologists for both the received Israeli master narrative and its "post-Zionist" debunkers.

Shortly after Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization formally recognized each other in September 1993, a Palestinian friend living in exile in Paris asked me, "Now that we have recognized you, will you start remembering what you did to us?" Israelis have. For nations in conflict, the selective processes of remembering and forgetting are always shaped by the fluctuations between war and peace. The Oslo breakthrough and its aftermath demonstrated that—despite such grave setbacks as the 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the 1996 wave of Islamist bus bombings—once they thought of the Arabs not as the enemy but as neighbors and future partners in peace, battle-hardened and skeptical Israelis could reassess the extent of their responsibility for the conflict and even recognize some of their adversaries' claims. This ability to share blame for the costly struggle has let former fighters, some of them notoriously ruthless, meet again as diplomats around the negotiating table and convert their military reputations at home into the political authority that can sanction painful compromises with erstwhile foes.

Although the peace negotiations with the Palestinians have made Israelis more ready to replace unexamined, self-glorifying notions of the past with more complex and even painful historical accounts, the new Israeli openness must also be traced to deep social and cultural transformations. Recent decades have brought a slow, steady erosion of the almost automatic national solidarity and docile public conformism on which Israeli governments once counted, especially during emergencies; a growing fragmentation of Israeli society into competing groups (Sephardim, the ultra-Orthodox, Israeli Arabs, Russian immigrants, and so on) with distinct senses of identity and profoundly divergent takes on the meaning of the Jewish state; and perhaps most significant, the rise of Israeli

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individualism, which brings with it a spreading distrust of authority in almost all spheres of life.

Taken together, these developments mark a dramatic shift from an epic culture and politics to a post-epic Israel. In the new, more jaundiced Israeli mood, the once-hegemonic version of Israel's past can survive only as another partisan history. What used to be the official heroic Israeli narrative of the Arab-Israeli conflict is today mostly the version of the Israeli right.

In this climate, the two major new books by Morris and Shlaim are more likely to trigger debates among academics than among ideologues—an improvement on the debate over their earlier books some ten years ago, which demonstrated that very little light is shed when the bias of apologists meets the bias of debunkers. But now there is a very different Israel to read the new historians.

WOUNDED SPIRITS

The periods covered by the two books converge only partly. Benny Morris' *Righteous Victims* begins with the start of major Zionist settlement in Ottoman Palestine in 1881 and ends in 1999, whereas Avi Shlaim's *The Iron Wall* extends from Israel's creation in 1948 to the present. The bulks of these two volumes may make readers decide that one is plenty, but they are more complementary than redundant. While Morris concentrates on the details of military history, which he combines with an account of the politics of the conflict, Shlaim focuses on the diplomatic history of Arab-Israeli relations.

As in his earlier work—most notably, on why some 700,000 Palestinians fled their homes during Israel's War of Independence—Morris provides a very rich account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and a very thin interpretive framework. The greatest merit of this bulky "synthesis of existing research" is that the massive body of facts it builds defies sweeping generalizations about the conflict and facile attributions of moral responsibility to any one side. As such, Morris' book provides a timely account for readers who have been learning to regard parts of Israel's past with ambivalence rather than apologetics. His work can help Israelis face the contradictions and ironies of a narrative of liberation that entailed a narrative of conquest and displacement. Where Zionists repeatedly recalled the Arab threat "to throw the Jews into the sea," Morris quotes the fuller statement made during World War I by the Jaffa Muslim-Christian Association: "We will push the Zionists into the sea—or they will send us back into the desert." Morris describes the role of rightist Jewish militias in introducing the indiscriminate bombing of civilians into the conflict by attacking the markets of Haifa and Jaffa in 1938, but he does not exonerate the Arabs for their share of the terrorism. He details the Israeli army's edge in both numbers and equipment but does not underestimate the superior motivation of Israeli soldiers or the demoralizing effects of internal Arab rivalries.

Righteous Victims illuminates the historical evolution of Jewish perceptions of Arab violence—particularly the shifts from viewing it as merely the result of incitement by a few belligerent leaders like Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem in the 1920s and 1930s, to regarding it as a consequence of innate Arab and Muslim aggressiveness, to the

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

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



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

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post-*intifada* view of Palestinian violence as an expression of national aspirations. But when Morris examines the way Israelis look at their own armed forces, his book suffers from his unwise assumption that one can separate a nation's military from its social and cultural history. Hence, he does not consider the nexus between the evolution of Jewish perspectives on force and the Zionist aspiration to make the Jew into a soldier—to create a new Jewish identity to replace the Jewish merchant or the feeble religious scholar. Against this background, the debate between activists such as the country's founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, and moderates such as his foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, reflects not only competing strategies for handling the Arabs but competing notions of modern Jewish identity and the meaning of freedom and statehood for post-Holocaust Jews.

Since writing history, however empirically based, is inevitably also an exercise in interpretation, Morris should have been more explicit about how he chose his sources and weighed his evidence. The impression of a neutral, factual description may be misleading even when the historian tries to be fair.

BETWEEN GUN AND OLIVE BRANCH

Avi Shlaim takes a bolder and richer approach than Morris'. His mastery of the sources and his explicit preferences win him the reader's trust for his decisions about what to highlight, when to summarize, and which shortcuts to take in retelling the complicated history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By advancing a reasonably coherent interpretation and constructing a flowing narrative, Shlaim risks the criticism that the "real world" is too messy, contradictory, and ambiguous to fit into neat patterns. But this is usually a worthwhile price to pay for parsimony and provocation.

The principal theme of *The Iron Wall* is the constant disagreement between Israeli moderates and military activists on how to handle the conflict with the Arabs. According to Shlaim, moderates like Sharett, Levi Eshkol, and Abba Eban usually read the Middle East situation correctly and relied on diplomatic rather than military means, whereas activists like Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, Ariel Sharon, Golda Meir, and Menachem Begin tended to miss important opportunities for negotiations that might well have prevented costly wars.

Shlaim's account of the competition between these two schools makes fascinating, revealing reading, although the dichotomy he draws between them is sometimes too sharp. Despite the sympathy the reader might feel toward the moderates, one doubts that the bridges they proposed building would have served Israel better during its formative years than the "iron wall" that the activists, and especially the militants, actually built around the Jewish state—on the theory that after they had bashed their heads against it often enough, the Arabs would eventually reconcile themselves to Israel's existence. The echoes of these opposing approaches can still be heard in the two parallel conceptions of the ultimate goals of the peace talks with the Palestinians—the Rabin school, which seeks to separate Israel from the Palestinians, and the school of his rival and successor, Shimon Peres, which seeks to link the Palestinian and Jewish states.

The biggest problem with Shlaim's study is its occasional lapses into

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20-20 hindsight. A case in point is Shlaim's assessment of Peres' decision in 1996 to let the Israeli General Security Service kill Yahya Ayyash, the mastermind behind many gory suicide bombings by the Islamist militants of Hamas. Shlaim calls this decision "the greatest mistake of Peres's political career." Hamas, writes Shlaim, "declared Ayyash a martyr" and, in a series of retaliatory suicide attacks, seriously undermined Peres' leadership, making him politically vulnerable to the assaults of his foe in the 1996 elections, Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu. Peres, to be sure, could have anticipated that Hamas might seek revenge, but he had no way of knowing how savage the terrorists' spree would be—or that it would tip the electoral scales for Netanyahu. Shlaim is guilty here of retroactive foreshadowing, or what the literary critic Michael André Bernstein calls "backshadowing"—judging participants in historical events as if, unconstrained by uncertainties, they should have known the future that we know as the past. Nevertheless, Shlaim's usual appreciation for complexities and contradictions and his keen sketches of the principal Israeli actors make this very readable book one of the best and most illuminating accounts of Arab-Israeli relations in years.

Read together, these two books give a historical perspective from which it is easier to understand why the peace process has proven stronger than any Middle Eastern government or leader. Looking at their past, the adversaries can see that military solutions to the conflict are becoming obsolete. There is no Soviet Union to arm and support the Arabs, and the remaining superpower is the main sponsor of the peace process. Moreover, in today's world of globalization, the media puts military operations under such a glare that, increasingly, they are simply not worth the risk.

Both Shlaim and Morris have tried to carve out a space for history between the domain of myths, which have for many years governed Israelis' perceptions of the more distant past, and the domain of journalism, which mediates their perceptions of the very recent past and the present. Writing history inherently revises the mythological past. But the special authority of the historian—who can combine a historical perspective with painstaking research based on original documents and testimonies—diminishes the closer his or her account comes to the present. The two volumes are, therefore, more revealing about the early phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict than about more recent ones. Toward the end, Morris' and Shlaim's accounts tend to merge with the familiar journalistic reports and become shallow. Still, in a democracy, self-reflection, skepticism, and ambivalence toward authority accelerate the movement from myth to history and encourage history to lend depth to journalism. Without ignoring the limits of these two volumes, Shlaim and Morris can only be commended for their contributions to this process. Israelis' reactions to these two landmark works will be deeply telling.

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Review Essay

The Road From Serfdom

Amartya Sen Argues that Growth Is Not Enough

Richard N. Cooper

Development as Freedom. BY AMARTYA SEN. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, 366 pp. $27.50.

A perusal of professional economics journals today would make it difficult to appreciate the long and rich connection between economic discourse and moral philosophy. Adam Smith is usually credited with founding the discipline of economics in his remarkable *Wealth of Nations,* published in 1776. The book persuasively sketched the general equilibrium characteristics of a market economy, showing that pursuit of private gain can be socially productive under conditions of competition. But Smith was also a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University whose publications included *The Theory of Moral Sentiments.* In fact, most of the celebrated nineteenth-century economists, from Thomas Malthus through John Stuart Mill to Francis Edgeworth and Alfred Marshall, took moral considerations seriously and made important contributions to the subject.

Most economists these days eschew moral philosophy—namely, the consideration of social justice—because they consider it too "soft" for rigorous analytical treatment. But Amartya Sen harks back to the older and richer tradition of evaluating the considerations of economic efficiency—which dominate most modern economic analyses—with respect to their general social consequences. Such judgments require an ethical framework.

Sen was born in 1933 in Bengal, then part of British India, and studied there until he went to Cambridge University for postgraduate work. After teaching in India, he held various posts at Cambridge,

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the London School of Economics, and Oxford University. He went to Harvard University in 1989, where he held joint appointments in economics and philosophy before heading back to Cambridge in 1998 to become Master of Trinity College. That same year he won the Nobel Prize for his cumulative contributions to welfare economics—especially his technical work on aggregating individual preferences into collective choices and assessing theoretically appropriate measures of poverty—as well as his empirical work on the causes of famines, especially in South Asia and Africa.

Development as Freedom attempts to map out Sen's thoughts on economic development for a broad, nonspecialist audience, drawing extensively on his more technical work as well as that of others. Although the book avoids jargon, it is closely argued and requires attentive reading, despite the many repetitions and recapitulations. Its central idea is relatively straightforward, even though it radically recasts how concerned individuals should think about economic development—not only professional economists but also development planners, public officials in developing countries, aid agency workers, international civil servants, and members of the general public, insofar as they think about economic development at all.

FREE TO BE

Over the past 50 years, "development" has generally been defined in terms of industrialization. Most economists define it as growth in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) output on a per capita basis—perhaps with a nod, especially in the 1990s, to the need for some legal and institutional development, particularly to protect property rights and settle disputes. Sen, in contrast, argues that such conceptions of development are far too narrow. While not denying the importance of raising output and per capita income, especially in very poor countries, he argues for a broader goal for development: increasing the capability of all human beings to achieve those things that they most value. Higher income, of course, increases such capabilities in important ways, so it is a significant component of development. But it is not the only part. It does not assure good health, adequate education, greater longevity, the ability to influence the political decisions that affect one's life, or the freedom to choose alternative lifestyles—or even goods and services beyond those that are immediately on offer. One can concede that all these valuable attributes are more likely to be accessible to people with higher incomes while still insisting, as Sen does, that higher income is not sufficient to assure development—only necessary.

This point may seem obvious. Indeed, the entire tone of the book is so modest and unassuming that Sen's arguments generally seem obvious once he has made them. Nonetheless, his thesis has radical implications. Development should be seen, Sen begins, "as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy." Hence, "development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states."

The remainder of the book expands on and elaborates this simple thesis: development is not merely an economic process but a political one as well. It

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therefore ultimately requires a "democratization" of political communities to give citizens a voice in important decisions made for the community. To fail in this regard, Sen argues, is to limit human freedom—and, by extension, the possibility for full human development.

This perspective leads Sen to place special emphasis on basic health care, especially for children, and basic education, especially for women. Not only are these factors desirable for their instrumental value in helping to achieve higher income and (in the case of women's education) control fertility; they are also beneficial in their own right. People cannot develop their capabilities if they are chronically ill or woefully ignorant.

Sen also examines three philosophical traditions that have laid claim to the proper basis for social justice. First is utilitarianism, going back to Jeremy Bentham, with its emphasis on maximizing the total "utility" of a community by achieving "the greatest good for the greatest number." The second school is libertarianism, which emphasizes both the natural and the inherited rights of all individual members of the community and holds them as inviolable (except insofar as they must be limited to protect the rights of others). Finally, there is the "maximin" principle, as proposed by the Harvard philosopher John Rawls, which insists on choosing those social arrangements that maximize the well-being of the poorest member of a community, subject to the preservation of liberty.

Sen's training as an economist serves him well here. He argues that each perspective holds merit, but that if pushed to the extreme each also can lead to results that defy commonsense justice; for example, if a village's utility is maximized by tormenting its ugliest, or dumbest, or most eccentric member; or if Rawls' scheme involves a great reduction in the material well-being of large numbers of people compared with an alternative that leaves the poorest not quite so well off; or if the uncompromising pursuit of liberty has grotesque consequences. Compromises must sometimes be made among perfectly valid but sometimes conflicting perspectives. These tradeoffs and moral decisions, Sen argues, should be exposed to public debate, should use fully available information, and should resolve each particular case in some democratic way.

SEN AND SENSIBILITY

Sen is a genuine world citizen. Implicit throughout his book is the notion that all humanity is connected and that human suffering anywhere holds relevance everywhere. Given the strong sense of social justice that he espouses, however, he does not address some hard practical questions. How should, say, wealthy Bostonians allocate their energies and resources among their relatively deprived inner-city neighbors, the indigent and often poorly educated agricultural workers in California and Texas, and the seriously malnourished and undereducated peoples of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa? Each person cannot carry a burden of responsibility for every ill, missed opportunity, or obvious injustice. To which relevant "community" should people chiefly belong, and which one should command the most attention? Whatever answer one chooses holds profound implications both for the private activities of individuals and for the foreign policies of

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the United States and other well-off countries. Sen offers no help here.

Sen's position does, however, have a great deal to offer to groups—nongovernmental organizations, national foreign-aid agencies, and international organizations—that promote economic development. He argues strongly and convincingly that economists' post-1950 focus on economic growth alone has been far too narrow. Moreover, everyone knows that the record of accomplishment of foreign assistance is spotty at best, even when focused narrowly on raising material well-being. As the record suggests, foreign assistance promotes development only if the recipient pursues appropriate macroeconomic and pricing policies and, above all, genuinely and enthusiastically embraces development objectives.

Even though Sen is a philosopher-economist, not a practicing politician, he is intensely interested in the real world of human well-being. As such, he must be aware of the practical implications of his general thesis. He does not expand on them for his readers; the main thesis is subversive enough. But what might some of these implications entail? Sen would greatly applaud, for example, the explicit emphasis in recent years on public health and primary and secondary schooling. Indeed, he would go much further and take on authoritarianism and serious discrimination against women wherever they exist, encouraging leaders to reduce political and civil repression and to promote public discussion about government decisions. In this respect, Sen implicitly attacks the grand bargain built into the post-1945 system of the United Nations: external aggression anywhere is a matter for legitimate global concern and potential action, but internal matters are left entirely to member states, except possibly in cases of extreme violations of human rights.

It is noteworthy that Sen presumes throughout his discussion a peaceful and stable society in which his framework can operate—having in mind, perhaps, his native India, from which he draws many illustrations. But he fails to note that many poor countries are either not peaceful and stable or are stable only because political or civil freedoms have been suppressed. Although he does not emphasize it, Sen's analysis includes among the primary freedoms such stability: the security of the individual against physical assault or depredation, necessary for developing human capabilities to enjoy the kinds of life that are valued. A well-ordered society assures physical security for its residents from both internal and external threats. But actual and potential conflicts abound. During periods of turmoil, freedoms are often suppressed in the name of stability.

Historically, political leadership has often been determined, over resistance, by force. As stability takes root, other freedoms can flourish. But leaders are never sure when stability is securely established, and they typically err in the direction of suppressing potential dissenters who do not threaten the regime in the interests of catching all who do. A stable society such as the United States can protect the rights of innocent individuals even at the expense of missing some who would, if they could, threaten society. But in recently stabilized societies, that freedom may be a luxury, since physical security could be undermined if regime-threatening dissidents are not suppressed. And some (if not most) political leaders have a tendency to prolong the period in which they use internal

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security as a plausible excuse, rather than a real reason, for suppressing dissent.

VALUE ADDED

Regrettably, Sen does not tackle the vital question of balancing freedoms against security and stability. Yet he does take on a different but related issue: the so-called Asian values debate. Sen unambiguously dismisses the notion that there are values specific to Asia, markedly different from those of European civilization. Challenging Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, a vocal exponent of this school, Sen documents that Asia's scholars and leaders have historically expressed a wide diversity of values. Furthermore, some of these moral principles closely track Western values—which have themselves evolved over time, increasingly but only gradually covering more and more people, such as women and slaves. And exponents of Asian values cite that great authority, Confucius, very selectively. As Sen notes, Confucius' views were more complex and sophisticated than his modern-day supporters acknowledge.

It is also noteworthy that the main contemporary exponents of Asian values enjoy great political authority, which gives them a self-interested perspective. The Asian publics would very likely demonstrate much less enthusiasm for authoritarian rule if given the chance. Alas, Sen notes, leaders rarely consult their citizens on such matters. On one major occasion when the public was consulted, the Indian elections of 1977, the authoritarianism of Indira Gandhi's "emergency" was decisively rejected.

Sen punctuates his discussion of principles with numerous pertinent illustrations, drawing on a broad range of social-scientific research. Within his framework for development, he chides India for its slighting of primary education—a decision resulting in illiteracy rates of nearly 50 percent, and even higher among women. China does much better on this score and gets good marks for bringing basic public health to rural villages. But Sen criticizes China for repressing public dissent and discussion of issues of public policy—a form of liberty central to Sen's framework of development that cannot be fully compensated by rapid growth in per capita income. India, with its free press and contentious democracy, is much further along in this dimension of development.

Development as Freedom provides a framework for thought rather than a formula for reform. It urges readers to ask what the ultimate aims of development should be, arguing that the appropriate aim is enlarging the capabilities of all human beings. In the process, Sen skillfully emphasizes the many dimensions—including freedom of expression—needed to attain that goal. But he is quietly revolutionary in insisting that we keep our eye on the ultimate objectives rather than on the intervening instrumental variables.

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Review Essay

The Dreamer

The World According to Gorbachev

Jack F. Matlock, Jr.

Gorbachev: On My Country and the World. BY MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV, TRANSLATED BY GEORGE SHRIVER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, 300 pp. $29.95.

Mikhail Gorbachev left an imprint on the twentieth century that matches, in depth and durability, that of any other leader of the time. Once in power, he came to understand that the system he headed had to change. He also saw that fundamental change required an end to the Cold War—and that the terms the West offered were consistent with his own country's real interests. Gorbachev may have failed to convert the Soviet Union to the democratic federation he sought in the last years of his rule, but this should not obscure his achievements. Only the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union could have destroyed that party's totalitarian rule. And among the Communist leaders of his generation who might have occupied that post, only Gorbachev had the combination of insight, courage, and political skill to remove from power the self-perpetuating clique that held his country hostage for seven decades. Saving the Soviet Union in the process was probably an impossible task, although Gorbachev still imagines that, had it not been for Boris Yeltsin's intrigues, he would have succeeded in doing that too.

TRUE LIES

Those seeking scandal and sensation will find Gorbachev's latest book, *On My Country and the World*, dull. Those seeking a better understanding of how the Cold War ended and what motivated the last ruler of the Soviet Union to destroy the

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Mikhail to the chief: Gorbachev works a crowd, Prague, 1987

system that put him in power will find nuggets that enlighten. Those seeking to make sense of the world after the Cold War will find food for thought, although less insight into the present than into the past. But along with wisdom and passion, the reader will also encounter questionable judgments, evasions of the truth, and claims so patently mistaken that they make one wonder how their author ever managed to do what, in fact, he did. The thoughtful reader will, in turn, be fascinated and bored, inspired and enraged.

Gorbachev has divided *On My Country and the World* into three sections: his interpretation of Russian history, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet state it produced; an account of his failed efforts to preserve the Soviet Union as a democratic federation; and his view of Russia and the world today, with appeals to all governments for a change of course.

As he reviews Russian history since 1917, Gorbachev sticks to the belief that the Bolshevik Revolution was inevitable and that Lenin was a great leader. But his condemnation of the Soviet system that developed thereafter is unsparing. It was, he writes, a betrayal of "October" and the "socialist idea." He repeatedly describes the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime based on force, and quotes approvingly from Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Nobel Prize address: "Anyone who has proclaimed violence his method inexorably must choose lying as his principle."

In tracing the course of perestroika, Gorbachev admits that he did not understand from the outset the magnitude of the task:

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> In the early stages we all said that perestroika was a continuation of the October revolution.... The delusion was that at the time I, like most of us, assumed [perestroika] could be accomplished by improving and refining the existing system. But as experience accumulated, it became clear that the crisis that had paralyzed the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s was systemic and not the result of isolated aberrations.

Gorbachev gradually came to the realization that the foundations of the system had to change. For a time he believed that the Communist Party could be the instrument for that change. Now he sees that this, too, was a delusion.

Gorbachev's description of perestroika's evolution is persuasive, as is his judgment that the end of the Cold War was not a defeat for the Soviet Union but a victory for all. The communist system was the loser, not the country or its people. Although he periodically takes swipes at Western policy and holds it partially responsible for Cold War tensions, he nevertheless stresses that his predecessors were incapable of coming to terms with the outside world. Ultimately, in his words, "the positions held by the Western system turned out to be superior."

But Gorbachev is less convincing when defending the proposition that the Soviet Union could have been preserved as a pluralistic democracy. He attributes the collapse of the Soviet Union almost exclusively to maneuvers by Yeltsin, Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk, and those who joined them, but ignores his own errors. It was he, after all, who put and kept in office every one of the leaders of the attempted coup d'état of August 1991. It was during his watch that the Soviet currency lost much of its previous value (although it lost even more under his successors), goods disappeared from the shelves, and the country faced the prospect of famine in the winter of 1991–92. It was he, a year before the Soviet Union collapsed, who removed most reformers from his government and entrusted it to those intent on reestablishing "order" by force. It was he who drove the "democrats" into Yeltsin's arms by rejecting their proposals and treating them as enemies. If Gorbachev could bring himself to honestly confront his own mistakes during the last few years of his rule, his views on the present and future would command more respect.

AFTER THE FALL

Even so, Gorbachev's picture of Yeltsin contains a large measure of truth. Over the past eight years, much of Gorbachev's earlier diagnosis of Yeltsin's shortcomings has been confirmed. But what Gorbachev fails to recognize is that the economic policies he himself pursued in 1991 were unlikely to have produced better results. There was no practical way to effect gradual economic reform when the existing system was designed to suppress any element of free enterprise.

The parallel between the two men does not hold when it comes to political decisions, however. Gorbachev most likely would have avoided Yeltsin's most egregious errors, such as shelling the Russian parliament building and launching the war in Chechnya. One of Gorbachev's most significant contributions to the Russian political tradition was a reluctance to solve problems by force; he was the first Russian ruler to use force as a last, rather than a first, resort. It is Russia's tragedy that Yeltsin has not followed his example in this respect.

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Turning to the present and the future, few will dispute the importance Gorbachev attaches to the need for cooperative efforts to establish peace, defend human rights, protect the environment, and close the gap between the world's haves and have-nots. Yet he limits his advice to general aphorisms, failing to acknowledge that some of these conflict. For example, he would defend human rights, avoid any resort to force, and absolutely respect sovereignty. But what if a regime, under the cloak of sovereignty, commits atrocities against its own people?

Gorbachev does not answer. He refuses to recognize that his high-minded principles can conflict with one another, and that political leaders often must determine which principle takes precedence. When he was in power, he understood this very well—and expected his friends to condone his compromises. Out of power, however, he has become, in many respects, a quixotic absolutist.

Despite all of his accurate insights into Soviet political reality, Gorbachev, while president, failed to understand market economics and capitalism. And he seems to have learned little since leaving office, to judge from his discussion of the "socialist idea" and globalization. His concept of the "socialist idea" is so general and vague that it defies precise description, except to say that it stresses distribution rather than production and ignores the fact that goods and services cannot be distributed unless they are produced in the first place. Furthermore, there seems little in his broad definition of "socialism" that cannot be accommodated in the social democracy of, say, Sweden or, for that matter, even in some variant of the American welfare state. Ironically, his insistence that his "socialist idea" is in basic conflict with "capitalism" is based on stereotypes promoted by the Soviet system he condemns.

To Gorbachev, "globalization" is a bad thing. He often sees it as "Americanization," a calculated effort by the United States to impose its system on others. It has escaped his notice that globalization, as its name suggests, is a worldwide tendency to which the United States is as much subject as other countries. Feeling that ending the Cold War was a mutual achievement, Gorbachev exhibits a deep resentment of any hint of Western—particularly American—triumphalism. He takes President Clinton's braggadocio about the "American century" as an avowal of imperial goals. And he vehemently rejects Francis Fukuyama's claim that the collapse of the communist system demonstrated the superiority of liberal democracy, even though he himself has said much the same thing.

Gorbachev's thinking exhibits a tendency to lash out at the rest of the world whenever he discusses the sins of Soviet totalitarianism. His otherwise accurate analysis suffers from an irresistible urge to create mirror images, as if to say, "We were bad, but so were you." This leads him to make some of his most questionable statements, as when he compares British and French appeasement of Hitler at Munich to Stalin's virtual alliance with Hitler a year later. Gorbachev surely understands the difference, but he cannot refrain from outbursts that imply a symmetry between East and West.

If we leave aside such emotional obiter dicta, however, we find passages of perceptive analysis that we should not ignore. Take, for example, Gorbachev's list of the three "dangers" that confront the world today: a "new division of the world,"

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particularly evident in a Europe with Russia left out of an expanding NATO; a "new arms race," most notably the production of nuclear weapons on the South Asian subcontinent and the proliferation of "smart weapons" in developed countries; and "a notable revival of traditional power politics, a preference for military methods in solving problems." Gorbachev may be wrong in some of his characterizations, but he is almost certainly correct in identifying problems that have become more acute since he was in power.

Each of the three dangers he cites embraces a range of specific problems. Let us take just one from each as examples. Regarding the first, Russia's effective exclusion from the NATO security structure and from decisions to use force in the Balkans has increased instability in Europe. Ways must be found to make Russia an integral part of European security. On the second danger, development of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, along with the Senate's 1999 rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, may require a substantial modification of traditional nonproliferation policy. On the third, it should be clear by now that waging war with a country over human rights abuses creates more problems than it solves. Serbia as a whole and Kosovo in particular are worse off today than they were before the NATO bombing began. Furthermore, the proposition that a military alliance is entitled to authorize acts of war for humanitarian purposes is not likely to be accepted by the world at large and would not be in the interest of the NATO allies if it were. Gorbachev is surely right when he observes that the bombing of Serbia was a setback to efforts to extend the effective reach of international law on humanitarian issues.

Gorbachev is wrong in attributing the U.S. resort to military action to "traditional power politics." But his strictures on American policy, while exaggerated and at times misplaced, are likely to be shared by many outside America's borders. His alarm can serve as a salutary warning of more trouble ahead if the recent U.S. penchant for seeking military solutions to political problems and acting unilaterally is not curbed.

The solutions Gorbachev suggests are, alas, of little help. Pious admonitions—"we must advance through worldwide cooperation based on complete equality, without any use of force, and with peaceful development of all nations"—are not helpful when hard choices are inescapable. His idea for a council of elders to advise the United Nations is hardly more practical. Nevertheless, the problems he identifies are real, and he is entitled to be dissatisfied with the way today's governments are dealing with them—or failing to.

Gorbachev: On My Country and the World is flawed by unnecessary defensiveness, unfair aspersions cast on others, and outbursts of passionate utopianism. The prudent reader will, however, avoid overreacting to these lapses and will try to understand the message that lies beneath the rhetoric. Paraphrased, it is this: When my Western colleagues and I ended the Cold War and I delivered my country from a communist tyranny, we created the possibility of a better, more peaceful world. Those who came after us are closing, one by one, the doors we opened.

If that is indeed Gorbachev's message, one can only agree with him.

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Review Essay

Strange Bedfellows

Mandela, de Klerk, and the New South Africa

Mark Gevisser

Mandela: The Authorized Biography. BY ANTHONY SAMPSON. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, 649 pp. $30.00.

The Last Trek—A New Beginning: An Autobiography. BY F. W. DE KLERK. New York: St. Martin's, 1999, 432 pp. $35.00.

When President Clinton welcomed Nelson Mandela to Washington in 1998, he spoke of the universal nature of suffering and hatred, the "apartheid of the heart." The world adulates Mandela, he continued, because it seeks "wisdom from the power of his example ... to do whatever we can, however we can, wherever we can, to take the apartheid out of our own and others' hearts." Mandela, along with the heinous system he negotiated out of existence and the country he led into freedom, have lost all specificity and become universal metaphors.

In his definitive biography of Mandela, Anthony Sampson notes that "cynical politicians" are wont to "wipe away tears in Mandela's presence, perhaps seeing him as a secular saint who makes their own profession seem noble, who rises above their failings." Despite all the regal pomp that surrounds Mandela on his world travels, "he still manages to appear as the plain man with whom anyone could identify, like a Gary Cooper or a James Stewart, embodying simple values in a cynical world of technicians and manipulators" that bypassed him as he spent 27 years in jail. The Mandela story is "the world's favorite fairy tale." South Africa's transition to democracy is mythologized as a miracle and Mandela as the saint who made it happen. But Sampson—a British journalist who helped Mandela craft his famously ringing statement in the 1964 Rivonia sabotage trial—enlists

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the aid of Albie Sachs, one of the architects of South Africa's democratic constitution and now one of its Constitutional Court judges, to pull his subject—and South Africa—back to reality. The "South African miracle," Sachs has written, was in fact "the most predicted and consciously and rationally worked-for happening one could ever have imagined, and certainly the most unmiraculous."

Sampson's biography is authorized and thus sets out to explain, rather than deconstruct, its subject. His book soars, like any good biography should, on the wings of detail. It is written with an affectless lucidity and is both acute and cool-headed in its assessments. But perhaps because of its own emotional reserve and eschewal of the tools of psychoanalytic biography, it does not quite succeed in what it sets out to do: "penetrating the Mandela icon."

Nonetheless, especially when read together with *The Last Trek,* F. W. de Klerk's recently published autobiography, *Mandela* offers a powerful and compelling account of the grit that went into the forging of the South African democracy. The story is more exhausting than exhilarating; stripped of its mythos, it loses the cathartic qualities Clinton sought in it and becomes, rather, the inelegant, incomplete, and inconclusive tale of a difficult and not particularly significant country and its great but flawed leaders.

THE STRUGGLE IS MY LIFE

One of the pleasures of reading *Mandela* together with *The Last Trek* is getting two sides of the story—the parallel and barely intersecting realities of the two men who would one day free South Africa together. There is some unexpected common ground: each grew up imbued with a nationalistic ideology and a prophetic need to redeem his people, each sees his life as having been a sublimation of personal desires and needs to the service of his respective nation, and each acknowledges the personal costs thereof.

Indeed, one of the Mandela biography's greatest achievements is its subtle illumination of its protagonist's dismal failure as father and husband—and his own final redemption in the great love affair with Graça Machel, whom he married in 1998. The most revealing assessment comes from the estranged Winnie Madikizela-Mandela herself (by no means an objective assessor but certainly an informed one), who told Sampson in 1996, "My children still wait for the return of their father. He has never returned, even emotionally. He can no longer relate to the family as a family. He relates to the struggle which has been his lifetime."

Sampson notes that Mandela blamed himself for "being an absent head of the family," Winnie's difficulties, and her resultant excesses. In prison, "Mandela was often racked by remorse as he looked back over earlier years." Accounts of Mandela before his captivity emphasize his arrogance and combativeness; in the 1950s, his partner and comrade Oliver Tambo reportedly said, "When I want a confrontation, I ask for Nelson."

But Sampson believes that Mandela's years in prison "transformed him into a much more reflective and influential kind of leader" who came to see that "law, not war, was the basis of his hopes for his country's future." Because Mandela "was cut off from mass audiences, public images, and television cameras, stripped down to man-to-man leadership and to the essentials of human relationships ...

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

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Unhappy together: F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, Johannesburg, 1991

he learned about human sensitivities and how to handle the fears and insecurities of others, including his Afrikaner warders. He was sensitized by his own sense of guilt about [the] family and friends he had used during his political career."

Reading Sampson, one comes to understand how Mandela learnt his almost inhuman lack of bitterness and desire for reconciliation in the intensely controlled environment of prison, where he came to see that this approach not only got him what he wanted from the warders but actually lifted the scrim of prejudice from their eyes and transformed them into human beings. "The Department of Prisons has failed to apply its mind to the matter," he once wrote imperiously to the minister of prisons when he was refused more time out of his cell. Almost ignoring his captivity, he never behaved like a prisoner and thus convinced his warders that they need not behave like his captors. In the process, he discovered a reservoir of personal power he did not know existed.

Mandela's reconciliatory mission has included taking tea with the widow of apartheid's architect, H. F. Verwoerd, and even inviting Percy Yutar, the ruthless prosecutor who called for his hanging in 1964, to lunch. Might this have been motivated as much by ego, by a personal need to make his enemies love him, as by the political mission of presenting himself as a role model for national reconciliation? Sampson is far too reticent to even attempt an answer—partly because of Mandela's own modesty. The closest the biographer comes in getting a grip on Mandela's personality is citing Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., on Franklin Roosevelt: "He combined extreme heartiness with impenetrable reserve."

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In well over 600 dense pages, the only incontestable signs of Mandela's spontaneity are his searing letters to Winnie from jail. Beyond that, separating the man from the mask is impossible. Unlike Oliver Tambo, who preceded him as president of the African National Congress (ANC), and Thabo Mbeki, who succeeded him as South Africa's president, Mandela is more the activist than the intellectual. Despite his mellowing in prison, his leadership is regal and intuitive rather than judicious and considered. He was put in charge of the ANC's armed struggle in the early 1960s because he was a street-fighter who could think on his feet; he brought peace to South Africa from his jail cell for the same reason. A member of the Tembu royal family, he has a sense of right and destiny—and a total lack of self-doubt. As Albie Sachs says, "Tambo was a natural democrat; Mandela had to learn."

A DRY WHITE SEASON

"Ours had never been a marriage of love," de Klerk writes in *The Last Trek* of his government partnership with Mandela after South Africa's first free elections in 1994. "We had come from very different backgrounds and our families didn't get on very well with one another. We had been forced together to legitimize the new South Africa. Now the honeymoon was over. We greeted each other politely; we ran the household jointly, and tried to keep up appearances. We only remained together for the sake of our joint offspring."

Although Mandela and de Klerk were often presented as South Africa's reconciled Janus, their relationship was fraught and confrontational. The subtitle of *The Last Trek* might just as well be "How Mandela Wronged Me" for its detailed documentation of the slights and abuses de Klerk suffered at the old man's hands. But South Africa's last white leader has never been able to wrap his head around the fundamental shift in power that he initiated. In the eyes of Mandela, the ANC, and South Africa's black majority, de Klerk was more a midwife than a parent, and not an altogether trustworthy one at that.

Mandela initially saw de Klerk as "a man we could do business with" and an Afrikaner politician who "listened to what I had to say, [which was] a novel experience." De Klerk's background was complicated: he had in fact been a critic of P. W. Botha's reforms and won the leadership battle to succeed him as the candidate of the National Party's right wing. But de Klerk explains quite convincingly that he opposed Botha's reforms because they were "piecemeal." Upon coming to power, he showed himself willing to go far further than Botha ever imagined.

But Mandela came to rue the moment he called de Klerk "a man of integrity." He seems, ultimately, to have preferred the finger-wagging, autocratic Botha, whom he could relate to as one straightforward "chief" to another. According to Sampson, Mandela's frequent intemperate public outbursts at de Klerk before 1994 were motivated by his belief that the South African president was fueling political violence while talking peace and being "less than frank" in negotiations with the ANC. Bluntly put, Mandela thinks de Klerk wanted to prolong the transition—and white rule—for as long as possible.

De Klerk's alleged complicity in state-sponsored violence remains one of the great mysteries of South African politics. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that he was culpable but was forbidden to say so in its final report by a

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judicial order sought by de Klerk. At best, he was totally unable to control the apartheid juggernaut he inherited. In his book he denies all allegations, excoriates Mandela for his "bluster and bullying tactics," and gives several examples of how he refrained from rising to the bait of his counterpart's provocations and thus plunging South Africa into crisis.

The former president does show some understanding that Mandela was playing a political endgame, presenting the requisite toughness to his skeptical constituents even as he talked to the enemy. But de Klerk, a formidable strategist, is ultimately disingenuous: he never acknowledges that he might have been playing a similar game. The overriding sentiment in *The Last Trek* is aggrieved righteousness. Why, de Klerk asks again and again, has he been so vilified when he voluntarily gave up his power and birthright for the sake of justice? His greatest failing is an inability to get beyond the forensic legal debate at which he excels into the world of sentiment. De Klerk's brilliance as a reformer, and downfall as a politician, is that he sees positions, not people. As such, he was never any match for Mandela.

THE ESSENTIAL GESTURE

Archbishop Desmond Tutu was not exaggerating when he told Sampson that "if that man [Mandela] wasn't there, this whole country would have gone up in flames." Having negotiated apartheid out of power, Mandela navigated South Africa through its transition to democracy and—knowing, unlike so many other African liberators, how important his departure would be for preserving the new republic—chose not to serve a second term as president.

Mandela's legacy is a country where the rule of law is entrenched in a virtually unassailable bill of rights, where predictions of racial and ethnic conflict proved wrong, and where the political violence that claimed thousands of lives annually in the decade before 1994 has almost entirely ceased. But if the Mandela presidency was inspired, it was also incoherent. Like Julius Nyerere, the only African statesman who comes close to him, Mandela was a far better nation-builder than governor. South Africa is in the throes of a recession; it has a minimal growth rate; 35,000 jobs were lost in the past two years, bringing unemployment to a staggering 37 percent; its murder, rape, and HIV-infection rates are among the highest in the world; and the postapartheid redistribution of resources, particularly in health and education, has been chaotic.

There has thus been some relief, both within and outside the ruling ANC, at Thabo Mbeki's succession. Mbeki is a backroom operator who has sold himself as a can-do technocrat far more interested in making things happen than in providing the kind of inspirational imagery at which Mandela excelled. Whereas South Africans loved Mandela unreservedly, they treat Mbeki with a mixture of respect and fear. Whites display more of the latter at Mbeki's avowed intention to accelerate social transformation—which ultimately means giving more of the country's funds and jobs to its black majority.

Mbeki, a pragmatic Sussex-trained economist, has a far more profound understanding of the global economy than his predecessor did. He believes firmly in the market, balanced budgets, and fiscal discipline. He drove the government's Growth Employment and Reconstruction program despite huge opposition from the ANC's leftist allies, and the largest achievement of his first few months in office was staring

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down the powerful public-service unions in mid-1999 and refusing to negotiate a wage increase above the rate of inflation.

At home, Mbeki's profile is very low; Mandela is in the press far more. Internationally, however, Mbeki is getting noticed. His well-reviewed September speech to the U.N. General Assembly demanding a reorientation of the United Nations toward Africa and the developing world was very much a part of his campaign to secure a permanent Security Council seat for South Africa. He does not balk at criticizing African despotism and lecturing other leaders on why human rights and multiparty democracy are preconditions for his much-vaunted "African Renaissance"—a phrase he sold to Clinton, who used it extensively in his 1998 Africa tour. Mbeki's greatest, perhaps quixotic, personal mission is resolving the interdependent wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Mbeki's training is as a diplomat. He was more responsible than anyone else for selling the ANC to the West as a legitimate liberation movement rather than, as Margaret Thatcher had it, a horde of murderous communist terrorists. Mandela's approach to foreign policy, Sampson shows, was both more intuitive and more scattershot: witness his furious denunciation of American hypocrisy for criticizing his friendships with Muammar Qaddafi and Fidel Castro, his inspired call for sanctions against Nigeria after the hanging of the dissident Ken Saro-Wiwa, his failed attempts to remain close to both Chinas due to Taiwan's huge contributions to ANC coffers, his ties to Indonesia's Suharto (again, because of campaign contributions), his mediation efforts with the East Timorese, and his ultimately successful obsession with ending Libya's standoff with the world over the Lockerbie bombing.

Crowds will never idolize Mbeki the way they did Mandela during his ticker tape parade down Fifth Avenue in 1990, or outside the Royal Palace in Oslo when he went to pick up his peace prize in 1995, or along Pall Mall when he rode a carriage with Queen Elizabeth II in 1996. South Africa has again become a real place, gritty and grubby, its unemployment and crime wave no longer cloaked in the robes of international adulation that Mandela had draped over them.

In the face of their social and economic difficulties, mutual suspicion and loathing, South Africans found a common patriotism, embodied in the saintly parent-figure of Mandela, to pull them over the hump of 300 years of colonialism and 50 years of apartheid. But in September 1999, six months after Mandela retired as president, a black soldier—a liberation-era guerrilla integrated into the South African Defence Force—ran amok at a military base, killing seven white colleagues before being killed himself. This manifestly racial incident (he pushed blacks out of the way before gunning down whites) sent shock waves through the nation, symbolizing just how fragile Mandela's program of racial reconciliation was. In a powerful 1995 speech to parliament, Mbeki used Langston Hughes' famous poem to warn of the dangers of failing to bridge the gap between white and black in South Africa: "What happens to a dream deferred? It explodes." Mandela will go down in history as the man who, like Martin Luther King, Jr., before him, gave the world a dream. South Africa finds itself strung between deferring and redeeming it.

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Response

A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan

The Taliban's Days Are Numbered

Peter Tomsen

The Taliban movement, depicted by Ahmed Rashid ("The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," November/December 1999), has passed its high-water mark. It is now disintegrating, echoing the rapid rise and fall of similar religious movements in Afghan history. With the Taliban's demise, Afghanistan faces a new challenge: who will fill their place?

As Rashid notes, the Taliban emerged in the mid-1990s, when their radical leader Muhammad Omar succeeded in melding religious fervor with the tribal patriotism of Afghanistan's largest group, the Pushtuns. Omar and the other militant mullahs from rural southern Afghanistan in the Taliban leadership were assisted by the powerful Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), the extremist Pakistani religious party Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and radical Arab Muslims, including members of Osama bin Ladin's terrorist network. Together, these forces unleashed a powerful coalition that sallied northward from the Pushtun belt that borders Pakistan, ultimately gaining control of 90 percent of the country. The Taliban were initially welcomed by an Afghan population tired of war and disgusted by Kabul's inept, corrupt mujahideen government, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

THINGS FALL APART

Since their seizure of Kabul in 1996, the semiliterate Taliban mullahs have proven singularly incapable of governing the areas they control. Their rigid Islam, blending aspects of anti-Sufi and anti-Shia fundamentalism from India, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf states, is alien to the moderate Islam practiced by most Afghans. Early on, the Taliban's authoritarianism and

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intolerance alienated non-Pushtun Afghans, who make up more than half the population. More recently, the Taliban have begun to alienate Pushtuns as well. The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani and Arab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of the local populace.

The Taliban's failed offensive in the fall of 1999 exposed the movement's declining military punch. A mostly non-Pushtun coalition in northern Afghanistan turned back the Taliban's attacks and has since pushed the front lines toward Kabul, capturing Taliban-controlled areas in northern, eastern, and western Afghanistan. The popular enthusiasm that greeted earlier Taliban offensives has faded: Pushtun youth are no longer volunteering to join the Taliban, and Pushtun fighters are leaving the Taliban's ranks, gravitating back to their southern tribal areas.

Signs of the Taliban's disintegration abound. Afghans are growing suspicious of how heavily the ISI controls the Taliban; ISI officers and Pakistani religious-party firebrands have become ubiquitous in Taliban-controlled cities, including Kabul. Taliban adversaries are profiting from these suspicions. Moreover, corruption, inspired by the lucrative opium business, has now started to infect Taliban leaders; this has raised questions among their followers about whether they have abandoned their professed spirituality in order to gain personal wealth and power.

A GRAND ASSEMBLY

Afghan supporters of a broad-based political reconciliation must now consider who will fill the vacuum left when the Taliban are forced from Kabul, perhaps as early as this summer. If the past seven years are any indication, Kabul will fall yet again to another foreign-supported, well-armed Afghan faction. But it, too, is doomed to be a transitory force, driven out by the overwhelming military strength of other groups that will eventually coalesce against it. Death and destruction could continually wrack the country.

Most Afghans agree that to escape this cycle of violence, the country's major religious and ethnic groups must cooperate to choose their own leadership, rather than have one imposed on them from the outside. They could do so through a mechanism such as the proposed Grand Assembly, for which models can be found in other times of trouble over the last 300 years of Afghan history. If successful, this type of large Afghan gathering could produce the first leader considered legitimate by the people since 1973. In November 1999, Afghan ex-monarch Zahir Shah presided over the second Afghan consultative conference in Rome to facilitate a Grand Assembly in 2000. Many Afghans consider Zahir Shah a suitable—but not the only—vehicle to achieve consensus within Afghanistan on how to restore peace. Worried about their own poor prospects, however, Taliban leaders and their radical foreign backers are already maneuvering to derail the Grand Assembly initiative.

The Grand Assembly could also consider reform more fundamental than merely changing the country's leadership. It could decide, for instance, what form of Islamic government is best for Afghanistan. Should the Afghan state be structured in a federal pattern, and how much power should rest at the state and at the national levels? What are the country's reconstruction priorities?

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What kind of constitution and legal system would best serve Afghanistan?

All non-Taliban Afghan groups, including Pushtun tribal leaders and the powerful Tajik northern commander Ahmed Shah Masoud, are advocating such a consensus-building process. Even mid- and lower-level Pushtuns in the Taliban's ranks have notified prominent Pushtun tribal leaders that they, too, support a broad-based intra-Afghan dialogue. Without exception, all Afghan groups have publically declared their preference for a united, unpartitioned Afghanistan.

If the post-Taliban leadership is wise, it will steer Afghanistan away from the Islamist crusade of Pakistani, Arab, and other foreign extremists attempting to export militant Islam to Central Asia and other parts of the Muslim world. Afghanistan has more than enough problems of its own. Internal stability and reconstruction will take years of domestic cooperation and hard work to achieve. The Taliban's replacements should realize that the international community will not be willing to assist them if foreign Islamists continue to divert Afghanistan toward violent campaigns abroad while its problems fester at home.

The most acute threat to a stable, peaceful, and neutral Afghanistan will continue to come from Pakistan, even though nearly all of Afghanistan's other neighbors also support their own Afghan proxies. Just as the Soviets tried saving their communist asset in Kabul by invading Afghanistan, Islamabad has been funneling more troops and military resources to save its own asset, the Taliban. More than 10,000 Pakistanis (and one "brigade" of radical Muslims from Arab states) now fight alongside Taliban forces in what many Afghans describe as a "creeping" Pakistani invasion of Afghanistan. The ISI, the JUI, Arab extremists such as Osama bin Ladin, and the Taliban leadership all cooperate closely. The ISI has long orchestrated this Islamist coalition; its continuing support for the Taliban is the biggest obstacle to a political settlement in Afghanistan.

PUTTING IT TOGETHER

American policy today is inadequate to deliver on U.S. interests in Afghanistan. U.S. foreign-policy makers must craft a more forceful, creative, and effective approach to address America's geostrategic concerns, the soaring Afghan opium trade, massive Taliban violations of human rights, and the return of the largest refugee population in the world. The current U.S. emphasis on bin Ladin's arrest is a necessary objective. It should, however, be part of a larger regional policy framework geared toward achieving U.S. goals.

The chief danger to U.S. interests is the rising tide of Islamist militancy and international terrorism emanating from bases in Afghanistan. The Afghan springboard for Islamist militancy endangers other pro-Western governments in the Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia, where a turn toward extremism would severely set back U.S. interests. Afghanistan is the documented training and inspirational base for worldwide militant Islamist operations ranging from American soil to the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Philippines. Muslim extremists are menacing Russia's southern periphery, providing ammunition for Moscow's antidemocratic, ultranationalist advocates of regimentation at home to defend against enemies from

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abroad. The greater the influence of radical Muslims in the Central Asian republics, the more tempted the governments of those republics will be to seek Russian military assistance, further undermining their independence. This has already occurred in Tajikistan, which is now virtually a Russian protectorate.

A more energetic American policy should discreetly encourage the Afghan consensus process now underway. It should also advocate a fresh beginning for the lagging international negotiations on Afghanistan by replacing the nonproductive "Six-Plus-Two" U.N. forum that even Secretary-General Kofi Annan has criticized as ineffective. U.S. diplomacy must focus on removing Afghanistan as an arena of competition among Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. The 1955 State Treaty on Austrian Neutrality can serve as a useful precedent; it led to the withdrawal of Western and Soviet forces from Austrian territory and produced the first major "thaw" in the Cold War, when the contending outside powers agreed not to extend their spheres of influence to Austria.

The United States should continue to demand that Islamabad change its course on Afghanistan. It can appeal to the military leadership's own self-interest, pointing to the strategic, political, and economic benefits Pakistan stands to gain in an Afghan settlement: Pakistan's desperate search for overland trade routes to Central Asian, European, and Chinese markets will not be realized until the Afghan population recognizes its leadership as legitimate, not imposed. A formal international treaty respecting Afghanistan's neutrality and sovereignty would permit Islamabad's military leaders to discontinue—with honor—their blatant and extensive interference in Afghanistan.

Ahmed Rashid correctly observes that "until the United States demonstrates that it has the determination to mobilize an international effort for ending outside interference, Afghanistan's chaos will only spread." Recent political developments, such as the failed Taliban offensive in the north, international sanctions on the Taliban, doubts in Pakistan about its Islamist-centered Afghan policy, the military coup in Pakistan, intra-Afghan initiatives toward a Grand Assembly meeting, and other regional powers' concerns about the Taliban have opened the door for America to make an informed, diplomatic push on Afghanistan. But real progress toward ending the Afghan nightmare will be possible only if the United States creates a policy more congruent with American interests in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. A promising opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan conflict is emerging out of the Taliban's decline. The United States should seize it.

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Response

A Poor Case for Quitting

Mistaking Incompetence for Interventionism

Chester Crocker

When such high-caliber observers as Joseph Nye, Jr., ("Redefining the National Interest," July/August 1999) and Edward Luttwak ("Give War a Chance") call on the United States to scale back its humanitarian intervention in places of low strategic importance, they get attention. Although they use sharply different arguments, both scholars would have the West curtail its tendency to intervene in other people's wars. Unfortunately, their discussions muddle the long-overdue dialogue on U.S. national interests and the proper policy toward peace operations.

Luttwak's essential argument—that most forms of outside intervention actually postpone peace and perpetuate war, making it better to "let minor wars burn themselves out"—is seductive. So, too, is Nye's appeal for raising the bar on humanitarian interventions and keeping America's strategic eye focused on higher-priority interests. His is a plea not to squander unique military and political capital on lower-order conflicts. Like Luttwak's argument, Nye's claims could be persuasive, especially as the election season puts the Clinton administration's proclivity for frequent, political use of military power under scrutiny.

The sad thing about the apparent convergence of Nye's and Luttwak's views is that both miss the real point. It is the actual record of U.S. peace operations during the 1990s that is most worthy of criticism, not the inherent merit of using American power—in all its forms—to support regional stability and manage conflict. How various U.S. "national interests" relate to one another is more important than the debate between an expansive "Clinton doctrine" and more restrictive ones. Recent American policy has too often succeeded in discrediting worthy ideas, institutions, and principles.

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MOVING PAST YOUR ABC'S

Nye is uncomfortable about the ease with which a "C list" humanitarian issue like Kosovo managed to "migrate" to the "B list" of national interests that merit the urgent use of military force. Critical of the U.S. diplomacy that forced Clinton into a test of wills with Slobodan Milošević, he cautions against responding to "media-genic" humanitarian crises that stir public passions. He cites cases of real genocide—such as the Holocaust and the 1994 slaughter in Rwanda—in arguing that the term has become "trivialized," letting the United States be seduced into wars of self-determination and ethnic conflict. The bottom line for Nye is to confine U.S. military action against "C list" challenges to legitimate cases of genocide and those where strong national interests (beyond purely humanitarian concerns) are present.

No serious participant in the debate argues for the United States as globocop. It cannot intervene against all ethnic cleansing (or pursue an "anti-son-of-a-bitch policy," as Charles Krauthammer puts it). But Nye's effort to segregate neatly a few "hard" cases from the generalized bulk of conflicts in transitional and emerging regions does not stand up well. The "C list" (Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti) includes the hard case of appalling genocide in Rwanda, as Nye himself recognizes. It includes Somalia, where much of Africa's current travails began in 1993 when American statecraft lost the will and the way to lead, resulting in an unbroken string of contagion effects as far south as Angola and as far west as the two Congos. The West's failure in Rwanda was the strategic child of its failure in Somalia.

Nye's "C list" also includes the conflicts in two parts of the former Yugoslavia. Only when viewed in a vacuum could they represent "minor wars"; they are actually parts of the same rotting corpse that threatens the security of southeastern Europe. The Western response has been a piecemeal acquisition of de facto protectorates, rather than a holistic approach that would reform the political structure of the Balkans. On closer inspection, then, four of Nye's five "C list" cases are constituents of larger regional security instabilities, not unlike the nuclear crises on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia. Haiti, the final "C list" case, can be viewed as either a challenge to Washington's democracy project or a classic case of the nation's interest in preventing others' traumas from becoming its own.

Mismanaging the complex security issues of unstable regions, even when they are not of "A list" strategic weight, has a high cost. But contrary to Nye, it is not possible to compartmentalize the globe and wall off the strategic slums. Regional crises exist, they get worse when left unattended, and they have a way of imposing themselves on the Western agenda through humanitarian activism or concerns over terrorism, criminal business networks, failed states, ecological disaster, and global health crises.

Clearly, Nye's "A list" is closely related in practice to his "C list." After all, the "A list" comprises not only America's obvious strategic interests in Russia, China, and Japan, as well as its alliances and global trade and investment, but also its inherent interest as the world's leading status quo power in "preventing disorder beyond our borders." Like the British empire in the nineteenth century,

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the United States has an interest in stronger international institutions and strengthened norms for advancing—with no apologies—its national interests. Preventing disorder means sustained U.S. leadership in peacekeeping and diplomatic initiatives, as well as in confronting proliferation threats. We cannot effectively address Nye's "A list" if we imagine that the "C list" is a separate universe. "C list" problems threaten "A list" interests; if that makes us modern imperialists, as some charge, so be it.

WAR AND PEACE

Luttwak, on the other hand, cogently laments the fact that we have forgotten the "paradoxical logic" of war, the only useful function of which is to bring peace by annihilating one side or exhausting it through attrition. Modern Western and U.N. diplomacy has prevented wars from running "their natural course." Imposed cease-fires and armistices or the deployment of observers and peacekeepers make the conflict comfortable, giving warring sides a breather—before they regroup and re-equip for the next round. Luttwak believes that by not allowing nature to take its course in the former Yugoslavia, the level of suffering has been increased and real peace postponed.

Compelling as his argument may be, Luttwak is incorrect about the "natural" consequences of contemporary warfare. The battlefield by itself does not necessarily lead to durable peace except in unusual circumstances: when the victor wins overwhelmingly and then rigorously assimilates the loser, who gets little support from any quarter; when the victor is atypically magnanimous in co-opting or sharing with the loser; or when the weaker side has the rare foresight to sue pre-emptively for a deal. These are not common conditions in the modern era. Losers and victims are less isolated and have more friends, enabling their causes to be sustained and reopened. Internal wars have qualities that tend toward stalemate, not peace: Chechen and Dagestani warlords began battling Russians in the 1830s; Sudan has been at war for most of the past 45 years; Kashmir and Sri Lanka fester more or less on their own with rare bursts of external "meddling"; Angola's factions notoriously reject or scuttle peace initiatives. The stubborn reality is that war in such places serves the interests (however defined) of those elites who choose to fight them.

Rather than a fight to the finish—which would come at horrendous cost to civilians and would threaten a range of American interests—regional crises need competent intervention (and not just of the military sort) appropriate to local conditions. A foreign policy of prudent activism will best advance America's global interests in an age of uncertain norms, messy transitions, and expanding challenges to political order. The United States will need strong political, economic, and military tools to address this agenda. And it will need all the partners and allies it can mobilize to build ad hoc coalitions of the willing, to make U.N. peace operations effective (where that is the appropriate approach), and to mount imaginative, purposeful diplomatic initiatives of the kind that have served well in the past.

Competent foreign intervention has been effective at times—in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Central America, certain parts of the former Soviet Union, and various regions

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in Africa, for example. But Luttwak is right to go after egregious cases of inept meddling. There is no excusing the U.N. Security Council's tolerance of Serb outrages in Bosnia, which discredited and demoralized U.N. peacekeepers trying to carry out mandates designed and approved in Washington and other key capitals. Nothing can explain away the human consequences of the West's appalling refusal to act in Rwanda or its decision to establish refugee camps in eastern Congo under the effective domination of genocidal butchers. But these are not examples of "interventionism"—they are examples of incompetence.

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Letters to the Editor

Sergio Vieira de Mello gives war little chance; Max Baucus on why China matters; and others

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

To the Editor:

For a scholar who has offered much on the causes and consequences of war, Edward Luttwak's latest contribution is a disappointing and simplistic compilation of old arguments and wrong conclusions ("Give War a Chance," July/August 1999).

The idea that peace agreements and humanitarian assistance fuel wars is hardly a new one. More than ten years ago, William Zartman argued that wars must run their course before they become "ripe for resolution." And it was pointed out long ago that most internal wars end with victory by one side, rather than with negotiated settlements (unlike international wars, where the reverse is true). That humanitarian assistance can sometimes have the perverse consequence of fueling conflict—such as in the refugee camps in eastern Zaire and Somalia—has been widely acknowledged, including in official U.N. reports.

Yet U.N. officials, nongovernmental actors, and others continue to engage in peacemaking efforts, seek support for peacekeeping operations, and persist in providing humanitarian assistance in the middle of wars. Are we blind to theories of war? Are we, as Luttwak suggests, simply acting on the basis of "disinterested and indeed frivolous motives," responding to public pressures that result from the media coverage of wars? Or is something a bit more nuanced going on?

There is a growing and improving body of scholarship on the causation of war, its dynamics, and of most relevance here, war termination. At the same time, the U.N. and other world bodies are gaining more experience in civil-war negotiating, especially in this post–Cold War period. We are daily asking the same questions: What causes wars to end? What stops them from restarting? Do peacemaking efforts contribute in a positive way, and if so, under what conditions?

These questions are prompting a nuanced set of answers. As Stephen Stedman has argued, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping are policy tools that are effective in certain types of cases. True, some wars simply exhaust themselves—though even in such cases, it is almost always necessary that an independent third party like the U.N. be on hand to help combatants steer the path from war fatigue to peace negotiations. And there are cases when the only just outcome is victory by one side—like the defeat of Rwanda's genocide forces, for instance. But what about Bosnia? In 1992–94, should we have let "the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively?"

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There are wars in which peace processes do make a difference. Peter Wallensteen's data attribute the decline in the number of wars worldwide to multifaceted peace agreements, such as those negotiated in Namibia, El Salvador, and Mozambique (all of which are notably absent from Luttwak's repertoire of stories). Virginia Page Fortna conducted an empirical review of peace agreements and concluded that, when they incorporate key elements, peace agreements do help the transition from war to sustained peace.

Yet this data is nowhere reflected in Luttwak's article. Moreover, Luttwak treats civil wars as if they were isolated events that should be left alone to peter out. Michael Brown already demolished this misperception of civil wars with compelling evidence that characterized almost all so-called internal wars as regional and international, at least in part; neighboring states, Brown writes, are "often active contributors to military escalation." Because regional actors are usually involved, even decisive military victory by one side (Luttwak's preferred solution) can lead to new wars and instability in neighboring countries.

Luttwak paints a uniform picture of war, when in fact the phenomenon is complex. He argues that "hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat." How can civil wars like the one in southern Sudan, which has lasted since 1956, be explained? Surely not by arguing that humanitarian aid has sustained it. How long must a war continue without external mediation, per Luttwak's theory? U.N. officials in such places as eastern Angola, northern Sierra Leone, and the eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo face the fact that rebels fight not for victory but because fighting itself offers power and wealth. In such cases, not only is victory by one side an unlikely outcome, but war can sustain itself over generations. Worse yet, civilian suffering does not impose costs on the warring parties. Instead, the combatants make profits by plundering national wealth—extracting diamonds, timber, opium, and strategic minerals, for instance—not by taxing the populations under their control (whose minimal wealth has already been depleted by decades of war).

In such cases, should successive generations suffer continually from forced displacements, attacks, the denial of human rights, deprivation, and even starvation, all without any assistance from the international community? Humanitarian assistance by itself is never a solution, and elements of it can at times be a problem. But if humanitarian assistance does so much to aid combatants, why do rebels often try so hard to keep it out? To deny aid altogether is not only unhelpful, it is unthinkable. Such options were permanently banished 50 years ago through the Geneva Conventions.

Civil war is a multifaceted problem for which the international community must have a variety of policy resources, both in peacemaking and in humanitarian assistance. We at the U.N. rely on good scholarship to help us sort out which policy tools will be effective in which kinds of cases. But oversimplified accounts far removed from the complexities of actual war and blanket statements that lead to quietism do not help.

SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO
United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs

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ASIAN BULGE

Editors' Note: Our sincere condolences to the family and friends of Gerald Segal, who died on November 3, 1999. He was 46.

To the Editor:

I take serious issue with Gerald Segal's article ("Does China Matter?" September/October 1999). Segal presents an interesting compilation of statistics and concludes that "the Middle Kingdom, then, is merely a middle power" in terms of its economy, its military strength, and its global political impact. Segal's bottom line is that China is a "theoretical power" that "has mastered the art of diplomatic theater," although he hedges by writing, "It is not that China does not matter at all, but that it matters far less than it and most of the West think."

The debate on whether to engage or to contain China is a sterile one. The question is how Americans can adjust to, and deal with, China's imminent emergence as a major regional and global power, and how they can foster an environment in which China is most likely to make choices that steer its energies into productive, peaceful, and stable relationships across the region and globally.

We are at a crossroads in our relationship with China. Segal's article, although entertaining intellectually, is simply another diversion that does little to help develop a coherent and long-term China policy. I believe that we in the United States are, in fact, paying too little attention to China, and the attention we do pay is perilously short-term and uncoordinated. China does matter.

First, it matters economically. The reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping two decades ago and promoted today by Vice Premier Zhu Rongji and President Jiang Zemin cannot be reversed through entrenched economic interests or communist ideologues. The Chinese Communist Party, with its Leninist-Maoist ideology, is finished. It will hold power only as long as it continues to bring economic growth to its citizens. China may not adopt the American version of an open market economy, but its direction is clear. Hundreds of millions of Chinese are not going to move back to farms and apply for ration cards and residence permits. We can therefore expect increased inward and outward investments, increased imports and exports, the adoption of and adaptation to foreign technology, and a greater role in the regional and global economy, including regional financial markets.

Second, China matters militarily. The country is, of course, modernizing its military. It will be a generation before China is able to develop a fully operational blue-water navy or significant force projection capabilities—not before 2015 or 2020. But I do see an irredentist China interested in securing its borders as it defines them. China will therefore develop the military force it believes necessary to deal with the possibilities of an unfriendly and united Korea, a rearmed Japan, a stronger nuclear India, and most imminently, a Taiwan seeking formal independence. If a cross-strait dialogue can resume and both Beijing and Taipei find ways to move peacefully toward reconciliation, the principal source of a potential direct conflict with the United States could be ameliorated. China will always look across the Pacific at the United States and wonder about America's intentions in Asia. It will develop the force it

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believes necessary to serve as a military and political deterrent to perceived American actions and policies.

Third, China matters in global politics. Its significance will develop gradually. China has already begun to play a larger role in the region—helping ratchet down a North Korea crisis, attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Regional Forum meetings, and participating in the meetings of the leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group. China has also succeessfully improved its relations with neighboring nations, fifteen of which share its borders. If we think Asian geopolitics matters, then we must care deeply about what China is doing.

Finally, issues that arise in areas such as the environment and the Internet can be handled only in a global context. China's impact in each of these will be enormous.

I hope we have learned a lesson from the relationship between Britain and Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, when a dominant state refused to give a rising power the status and prestige the latter felt it deserved. A couple of centuries of perceived humbling by foreign imperialists has led to a strong nationalism that will push China into adopting military and geopolitical policies designed to ensure that such humiliation is never repeated.

Although China may be a middle power today in strictly statistical terms, it would be folly to put off the challenges that a rising China will bring to the fore.

MAX BAUCUS

Member, U.S. Senate (D-Mont.), and Member, Senate Committees on Finance and Intelligence

To the Editor:

I do not question Gerald Segal's figures, which show that China is not a superpower ideologically, politically, economically, or militarily. I also agree with Segal that China is a second-rank middle power that wants to appear more powerful. But China matters for a number of reasons. First, China is a non–status quo power, struggling to find its role in a world governed by Western rules. Furthermore, the Chinese have yet to come to terms with their history. The superiority and inferiority complexes developed over the past 150 years led many to experience a victimization syndrome. Finally, the insecure Chinese regime is inclined to boast about itself on the one hand and pass the blame for its failures on the other.

Segal takes the Chinese leadership's theatrical performance too seriously, more so than the Chinese themselves take it. China matters not because it "has mastered the art of diplomatic theater." In fact, many Chinese would argue that, as a whole, the present leadership has a poor diplomatic record when compared with Mao Zedong's show of strength or Zhou Enlai's sophistication. Indeed, the Chinese constantly joke about Jiang's clumsiness and his eagerness to show off.

And yet China matters because whichever way it goes will affect all of us. If China becomes economically affluent—which is still possible despite the last 150 disappointing years—its buying power will alter the global economic landscape. If China becomes unhappy with the status quo and decides to reclaim Taiwan and the entire South China Sea, the war calamities would be too great to contemplate. But what if China goes down the drain? Should civil war and chaos engulf

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it, how would the world cope with Chinese refugees? Finally, suppose China simply plods along, neither fast enough to become a superpower nor slow enough to embrace disasters. Will the earth be able to cope with China's environmental problems? The bottom line is not whether China wants to matter. Rather, it is the massive scale of its problems and their potential implications for the world.

MOBO C.F. GAO
Director, Asian Center, University of Tasmania

SEATTLE PLAN

To the Editor:

Marcus Noland correctly points out that neither the president nor Congress is taking on the growing protectionist sentiment ("Learning to Love the WTO," September/October 1999). With the new round of trade talks recently initiated at the World Trade Organization (WTO), what needs underscoring are the two biggest issues in trade policy that confront the United States: the trade deficit and trade wars.

Trade deficits of the magnitude America is experiencing are new to U.S. economic planners—and taming these deficits is an uncertain possibility. Because the trade deficit will reach about $255 billion this year, the risk is increasing that foreign investors will find other, safer places to invest. The market-opening measures signed with China should improve the trade gap, which may level off soon. But these cycles are uneven and the deficit may increase yet again in early 2000.

How can Americans keep the economy afloat and maintain their buying power? The solution is fairly simple: keep trade barriers down and production up. The result would be a greater balance in global trade, with Japan, China, and western Europe buying more American products and services.

Regardless of the damaging effects, the international system has never witnessed so many retaliatory global trade disputes—from beef hormones to steel, lamb, genetically modified food, and trademarks. Trade conflicts were led by the battle over bananas and sanctions, which caused our trading partners to threaten not to buy American goods—illustrated most vividly when protesters occupied the McDonald's in Auch, France. This cycle caused Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to declare his "concern" recently for Congress' weakening support of trade liberalization.

American trade unions argue with some authority that the majority of American workers have not benefited from global trade, citing the decline of wages, child-labor violations, and environmental problems that are not enforced in global trade agreements. Add an election year and it will be difficult to get done what U.S. trade negotiators should do in the next round of global negotiations: cut tariffs and liberalize trade, enforce antidumping rules, and ensure that these rules incorporate both enforceable workers' rights and environmental protections.

Ultimately, the way to deal with the growing trade deficit is to promote exports, but not by limiting imports. The WTO's new millennium round could still be a start—if U.S. negotiators follow up with a plan and with enough resolve to support

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Americans' belief that they must benefit from market liberalization.

PAMELA S. FALK
Professor of International Trade and Commercial Transactions, Queens College School of Law

CLEARING UP KOSOVO

To the Editor:

The following observations are prompted by the articles on the former Yugoslavia in the September/October 1999 and November/December 1999 issues:

• One might deduce from those articles that the Kosovo problem started with the Rambouillet conference and that it was all Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's fault. But the fact is that it was the "boys" in the Bush and Clinton administrations who crafted the disastrous response to Yugoslavia's disintegration—a decade-long episode, expressed recently in the Kosovo war, which is far from over. Had Albright's early and consistent stance against passivity, appeasement, and incrementalism in dealing with Serbia and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević been followed, much grief and money, and many lives, might have been saved.

• The West went to Rambouillet to *avoid* bombing Serbia, not to find an excuse for bombing. Milošević had violated the October 1998 Activation Order from the start. That violation was supposed to have "serious" consequences: remember the incessant warning, "the Activation Order is on the table." The final straw—the massacre at Račak—produced not a military response but more talk. No country wanted to bomb.

• The amazing but unmentioned aspect of the Rambouillet and Paris negotiations is that Milošević passed up a golden opportunity—he could have created havoc among the fractious Kosovars and destroyed the fragile consensus within NATO and among the Contact Group. All he had to do was appear to negotiate seriously on at least part of the draft proposals. He refused to do so—why, I am not smart enough to say. Milošević probably expected that the allies would not take military action or that any military response would be very limited (not a surprising judgment on his part). This behavior also fits the evidence that Milošević had already decided to "solve" the Kosovo problem in a different way. In any event, he forced our hand.

• Last, it borders on the obscene that the Clinton administration continues to characterize Bosnia and Kosovo as successes. Perhaps more than 200,000 people are dead, 3 million displaced, 2 protectorates have been established where Western forces will be for no one knows how long, and some $50 billion has been spent with much more to come. That is some success.

MORTON ABRAMOWITZ
Senior Fellow, Century Foundation

SAFE KEEPING

To the Editor:

In his fascinating account of U.S.-China normalization, Patrick Tyler makes a series of statements relating to the documentary record of the Ford administration that requires correction ("The (Ab)normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations," September/October 1999).

First, I was not Henry Kissinger's deputy at that time. Kissinger was secretary of state and I was national security adviser, so he had no authority whatsoever over the disposition of presidential records in the White House.

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Second, I did not "order" empty safes as I left office. There was—and is—a standard, nondiscretionary procedure in the White House for document disposition. In the National Security Council (NSC), presidential documents (which were in the NSC files because I, as national security adviser, was a presidential staff member) were sent to the presidential library, and NSC documents were sent to the Federal Repository in Warrenton, Virginia. My only role was to ensure compliance with that compulsory procedure, which was the same process that governed the end of the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations. To the best of my knowledge, there was no shredding of documents destined for the presidential library or the Federal Repository.

BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush

Patrick Tyler replies:

I have read with interest the letters of President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Richard Gardner (November/December 1999) and Brent Scowcroft's letter in this issue. For my biography of U.S.-China relations, *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China,* I interviewed each of them, except Gardner. President Carter says my reconstruction of China-related events is "grossly biased and distorted," but he declined to "go into detail" to substantiate his assessment. He confines himself to restating many of the points made in his 1982 memoir, *Keeping Faith.* Like many presidential memoirs, Carter's account has significant gaps. There is no detailed reconstruction of the secret negotiations in 1978 that led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington. Carter claims there was no conflict with, or exclusion of, senior State Department officials, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in the secret negotiations directed from the White House. Yet he fails to address the well-established fact that Brzezinski excluded Vance's assistant secretary of state for East Asia, Richard Holbrooke, from a critical meeting with Deng Xiaoping in May 1978, an act so disturbing to the State Department that Holbrooke and Michel Oksenberg, Brzezinski's aide on China, were at each other's throats over the custody of Deng's transcribed remarks. Carter also overlooks the fact that Vance himself was excluded from the Oval Office discussion in October 1978 in which Carter directed Brzezinski and Ambassador Leonard Woodcock to prepare a draft communiqué for Deng Xiaoping, at a time when Vance believed he had the president's support to first conclude the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), invite Leonid Brezhnev to Washington, and then normalize relations with China. Vance may have been getting copies of cables, but it is a stretch to suggest that he was an equal partner with the White House in directing the secret negotiations with China in 1978. President Carter, to whom I am grateful for requesting an expedited declassification of top-secret documents at the Carter Library related to U.S.-China normalization, should know that my account, although unsparing with regard to the bureaucratic antics of some of his senior aides, is neither biased nor distorted.

Brzezinski ill serves his president and history by accusing me of providing "fictionalized history" and a "complete fabrication." In doing so, Brzezinski

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disputes a minor scene in *A Great Wall,* that a dinner between himself, Cyrus Vance, and Richard Holbrooke took place. There is no dispute that on election night in 1976, Brzezinski and his wife dined with Vance and his wife. I attributed this vignette by footnote to Vance's memoir, *Hard Choices.* Richard Gardner's letter testifies that the dinner took place, albeit without Holbrooke, and he corrects my mistake that the venue was at his apartment in New York, not Holbrooke's. As for Brzezinski's assertion that I attributed to him vulgar language that he is "not accustomed to using," he himself verified to me in a tape-recorded interview that he used the cited vulgarity.

Finally, General Scowcroft confirms what is clearly stated in my book, that as the Ford administration went out, an "empty safes" order was issued as a "nondiscretionary" procedure. Yet his letter wants it both ways: Scowcroft says he (not Henry Kissinger) was in charge at the White House, but he did not issue the order. Then, he adds, an "empty safes" procedure was executed. So we agree. I can only say that I reported this "empty safes" order in my book because officials like General Scowcroft acknowledged to me that it raised a complex issue of continuity in government when one administration carries off its documents, leaving the incoming administration to reassemble them as best it can from copies scattered around the government. After Scowcroft and Kissinger left government and set up Kissinger Associates, calls for reform were raised and some reforms were implemented within the executive branch with respect to document preservation. And as it was, Holbrooke and Oksenberg went to great lengths to reassemble the U.S.-China negotiating record, including urgently flying to Ann Arbor, Michigan, to retrieve from President Ford's papers a copy of the "top-secret" transcript of the Ford-Kissinger meeting with Mao Zedong in which key American concessions were made. To incoming Carter aides and to others, it was a real issue, and I am satisfied that I reported it faithfully.

ERRATUM

Arnold Kanter, one of the co-authors of "Saving NATO's Foundation" in the November/December issue (Volume 78, No. 6), was misidentified. He is Senior Fellow at the Forum for International Policy and served as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and Special Assistant to President Bush for Defense Policy and Arms Control. Our apologies.

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